TOWARD A SOUND METHODOLOGY FOR COMPARATIVE RHETORIC WITH AYMARA AS A CASE STUDY

by

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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents and my daughter who were all happier than I was to see it over.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

LIST OF TABLES

ABSTRACT

Studying rhetoric in non-Western contexts is complicated by rhetoric's sedimented cultural history in the West. Analysis of different approaches in anthropology and the discipline of rhetoric itself show that a multi-pronged approach is necessary to study rhetoric, including analysis of texts in context, consideration of the rhetorical competence of speakers, and careful attention to the power dynamics in a given situation. Using the collection and analysis of Aymara texts as an example of this new approach, this dissertation argues that considering rhetoric as a phenomenon of language use that occurs across genres when competent speakers attempt to achieve social or personal ends through language best helps to capture texts that will yield fruitful rhetorical analyses. It is argued further that the methodology developed in the ethnography of speaking for the analysis of communicative events addresses many of the shortcomings in working with texts in languages other than one's own.

CHAPTER ONE: DEFINING RHETORIC COMPARATIVELY

In a recent review of the literature of comparative rhetoric, Robert Sullivan aptly points out some of the theoretical considerations necessary to both anchor and qualify any claims one wishes to make about a rhetoric distinct from that of one's native speech community. He points out the need to approach understanding texts in their original language, distinguish differences between spoken and written texts, and investigate the various contexts--political, historical, and cultural--within which examined texts are embedded (106-107). These tasks--amounting to part of the methodology used for data collection in linguistic anthropology--while not easy to perform in practice, are at least straightforward and unlikely to raise much controversy among scholars.[1]

In undertaking fieldwork in comparative rhetoric, Sullivan argues the researcher should also undertake a much more difficult and potentially troublesome task. He advocates that the researcher define rhetoric itself, or in his own words give "a clear account of what one means by the term 'rhetoric'"(105). This proposition is problematic for an investigator of comparative rhetoric because this is the goal of the research itself: to provide an adequate description of rhetoric in the foreign speech community even as it also seems necessary to have a definition in mind to guide the research. Sullivan does not acknowledge this paradox, much less clarify the distinction between starting point (that is, undertaking the research) vs. product (that is, reporting the results of the

[1] For a discussion of methodology, see chapter two.

research to readers). Stated in another way, should the definition of rhetoric be established as a premise/hypothesis to guide the investigation or should the definition be the result of working through the data? If one chooses the latter position, then what criteria do one select to guide the investigation[2]? An even more basic question posed by this paradox is whether there even exists some relatively stable phenomenon, called rhetoric in Western contexts, which can be identified in all languages and cultures without exception.

As a starting point for my dissertation, I examine the relevant scholarship in contrastive rhetoric, comparative rhetoric, and anthropology from this perspective: how scholars in different fields handle the problem of defining rhetoric, and the implications that their approach to definition has on the outcome of their research. In doing this, I ask the following questions:

1. What are the implications for using unproblematized Greco-Roman categories to define rhetoric in a foreign speech community?

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[2] One runs into the same trouble with other words with similar connotations such as "persuasion." My own observations of Aymara, for instance, make me think persuasion would not adequately account for certain communicative differences, such as in particular a "take it or leave it" attitude about arguments. More specifically, I observed how some speakers after making an argument took the interlocutor's response without any apparent emotional reaction. When I asked them about this, I was told in one instance that the interlocutor would agree or disagree depending on who that person was in relation to the argument and speaker. He added: "You may see it differently; this is how I see it." The element of desire, if it was there, was not visible. The experience has caused me to question the universality of Burke's notion of the rhetorical motive, or more specifically, the desire to identify. Perhaps some people speak more out of a sense of obligation or duty. Or perhaps there is--borrowing the epistemologically securer words of physics--an equal and opposite desire to distinguish oneself as separate rather than identify. (For Burke's discussion see 55-65.)

2. Is there a way to avoid premising a Greco-Roman definition of rhetoric with its attendant categories as established by Aristotle?
3. How do we document the process of moving from our own culturally instantiated definition of how rhetoric works to a culturally different one?

Rhetoric and Anthropology

In examining prior research, investigators handle the paradox, whether acknowledged or implicit, in a variety of ways. Many researchers have taken the stance that rhetoric with all its attendant baggage--what Sullivan refers to as Greco-Roman categories--amount to objective universals that do not bear further comment or are perfectly satisfactory as they stand. Were I to have taken this position, I would have made my project to find equivalents for ethos, logos, pathos, oratorical genres, modes of delivery, arrangement strategies, and so on. In fact, this was the approach I took, but not to map Greco-Roman principles onto Aymara but rather as a guide to hunt for texts where some form of suasion was at work, keeping that term as crude as possible.

Post-structuralist critiques of the possibility of universalist terms and longstanding resentment towards Aristotle and Plato seem to have motivated other solutions. In ethnography, the post-structuralist assessment has been to conclude that the scholarship ends up saying more about the scholar than the object of study. In fact, this difficulty may partly explain why anthropologists have been so careful to avoid the term rhetoric except when they apply it to

themselves. A case in point is a 2000 issue of the *Journal of Linguistic Anthropology*, which in its entirety is devoted to a glossary of terms linguistic anthropologists consider central to their inquiry. Rhetoric is not noted as a key term. Instead the term that comes closest is "oratory," although the author of this article Joel Kuipers acknowledges in the first sentence about oratory that, "As an analytical term for linguistic anthropologists, *oratory* harbors rich associations with classical rhetoric"(173), suggesting that rhetoric plays an essential role . . . somehow. Following this point he notes:

> For Aristotle, oratory referred primarily to the art, rather than the act, of effective public speaking: the skills, competencies, and tactics of persuasive talkers rather than the actual events, practices, and performances that frame and define such displays of verbal ability. As in much of linguistic anthropology, the analytical tension between the art and the act creates opportunities for research and reflection (173).

In the text above, Kuipers has moved from calling *oratory* a field with "rich associations" to making rhetoric and oratory synonymous. My own analysis of Aristotle takes a broader view than this. Certainly, to the modern ear, it would sound strange to conflate oratory and rhetoric since we understand rhetoric to be, at least partly, a set of practices that apply in a variety of contexts that do not all involve oratory, as, for instance, in conversation. One does not intelligibly say that oratory is being applied in a conversation when one means rhetoric. But

perhaps Aristotle would have called the application of what we call rhetoric in this context to be dialectic.

And it is true that Aristotle occasionally uses oratory and rhetoric interchangeably. Unfortunately, though, this conflation makes the study of rhetoric all but impossible. Oratory is a genre distinction, and as such, neglects both content and intent, although these are arguably implied to some degree by form. Moreover, I think Aristotle successfully demonstrates that a number of principles operate across genre boundaries that justify a common art--rhetoric not oratory. For instance, when Aristotle divides oratory into categories--the epideictic, deliberative, and forensic--does he suggest three mutually exclusive arts? Or, one art (rhetoric) that uses a coherent body of tactics to suit the occasion that include formal considerations (that is, those pertaining to genre) and ones that cut across form, including appeals to character, emotion (modern scholars also add values), and logic, as well as principles of arrangement, of style, and delivery?

Most importantly of all, if Kuipers' contention about the "rich associations" that rhetoric shares with genre are correct, then the study of oratorical form, and the study of oratory in place of rhetoric, should lead to satisfying analyses of rhetoric, but this turns out not to be the case. Within the prolific sub-field in linguistic anthropology called *speech genres*, rhetorical practice still remains hidden. As I show below, this sub-field amply documents how non-Western cultures categorize their own speaking behaviors, but the approach sheds little light on rhetorical practice.

However, dodging the term rhetoric for oratory does solve, or at least alleviates the problem, of being accused of coming at the study of culture from an ethnocentric viewpoint.

This important shift in emphasis in linguistic anthropology has an odd history that perhaps can be traced back to the linguist Kenneth Pike's coinage of the terms "emics" and "etics." Pike theorized the idea of emics and etics originally to deal with observations that were visible to outsiders (of, for instance, a speech community) but invisible to insiders, or conversely visible and salient for insiders but opaque for outsiders ("Language" 10). An example of the former type of visibility that shows the coinage of the terms is the definition of the allomorph. For insiders, or native speakers of a language, allomorphs are ignored as variation even though from a descriptive morpho-phonological point of view allomorphs are distinguishable. So in English we have several allomorphs for what native English speakers think of as the same -ed ending: *judged*, *hunted*, and *rinsed* share the same morpheme -*ed* that signals the completed action. But in phonemic representation this completive morpheme varies in its form from [-d] and [-əd] to [-t]. Most native English speakers ignore the variation in pronunciation because the important point--to an English speaker--is that all three variants refer to the plural of the noun. However, to non-English speakers (outsiders in this case), the variation in sound may cause them to wonder whether a particular noun is being completed or if some other meaning applies.

The interesting conundrum that these alternative perspectives provide is that both the insider and outsider have valid claims about the reality of the usage. Certainly the data shows that these are different sounds representing the perfected action, so the linguist has grounds for making the distinction. At the same time, given that the distinction does not help to distinguish meaning (and in fact would slow apprehension of meaning down were it attended to by a speaker) for practical purposes--the purposes, one might say, of a native speaker--the three are in fact the same, and most speakers would not notice the schwa in one instance or the switch from a voiced /d/ to an unvoiced /t/ in the other. [3]

Where the emic perspective hides difference for the cultural insider in some instances, Pike argues it also reveals social and linguistic realities to them that remain invisible to the outsider in others. This definition is based on the notion of appropriateness, or the idea that any insider will know how to behave, or "I knowed what is right an' wrong since I have been teen" as Ado Annie puts it in *Oklahoma*. Thus, Pike defines the emic as "a physical or mental item or system treated by insiders as relevant to their system of behavior and as the same emic unit in spite of etic variability"("Emics" 28). So from this perspective, if my daughter is brushing her hair in the bathroom, I consider her behavior desirable and part of good grooming and cleanliness; however, if I catch her brushing her

[3] And there is an additional complication that instances of phonemic or other linguistic knowledge, largely considered invisible to most speakers, is not so to all. As Sidnell notes, "Field linguists often encounter certain individuals who, though completely untrained in current generative theories of grammar, nevertheless are able to discuss language in terms of its structural principles with extraordinary acuity. 'Linguistics' it would seem is an indigenous tradition in every community"(39).

hair at the dinner table, I suddenly consider the behavior disgusting, inappropriate, and I immediately send her out of the room. To some American insiders, overzealous as we are about cleanliness, this distinction in grooming spaces is obvious. But to an outsider who is not obsessed the way my culture seems to be, my apparent one-hundred-and-eighty-degree shift on hair brushing could well appear contradictory. Another example is how cousins are classified in different languages. English has one word for *cousin* where Navajo has sixty-four! (Troike personal communication). The Navajo perspective requires speakers to be more precise, and the difference suggests a much more detailed conceptualization of the idea of family interpenetrating into a larger community that does the word *cousin*.

These fluid aspects in the emic and etic, and within the emic itself, were something that linguists and anthropologists wrestled with from Pike's formulation of it in the fifties into the nineties. The baldest formulation of this pair was put forward by Harris who argues the two form a dichotomy in which etics--the scientific view of outsiders as he sees it--trump the emic interpretation. Harris writes:

> Emic statements refer to logico-empirical systems whose phenomenal distinctions or 'things' are built up out of contrasts and discriminations significant, meaningful, real, accurate, or in some other fashion regarded as appropriate by the actors themselves. An emic statement can be falsified if it can be shown that it contradicts the

> cognitive calculus by which relevant actors judge that entities are similar or different, real, meaningful, significant, or in some other sense 'appropriate' or 'acceptable.' Etic statements depend upon phenomenal distinctions judged appropriate by the community of scientific observers. Etic statements cannot be falsified if they do not conform to the actor's notion of what is significant, real, meaningful, or appropriate (Harris 48).

Here, Harris sets up not just a dichotomy but also a hierarchy in which the emic's interpretative status is secondary to that of the etic. When he says that "Etic statements cannot be falsified," he is not referring to disputes among scientists--for whom any claim is always open to dispute--but to dispute between the native with his or her emic perspective challenging the etic perspective, or at least this is how I read him. Distinctions based on the judgment of the scientific community take primacy where variation is found to occur. So, Harris, applying his emic/ etic perspective to child mortality in Alto do Cruzeiro, Brazil, notes that the emic interpretation, or how mothers described why their babies were dying, was because the children suffered from *doenca da crianca* (child sickness) or *fraqueza* (weakness)"(58). Harris goes on to say that the mothers saw these ailments fatalistically, that there was nothing to be done. On the other hand, the etic interpretation was that these children died from severe dehydration caused from diarrhea, and that the neglect was "selective," offering an escape for women overburdened with children already (58). Everyone gets diarrhea, but these women saw it in isolation in infants as its own sickness. In this case, a converse

of the allophone example above, the women did not perceive the commonality of symptoms for the diarrhea that everyone gets but saw a distinction only visible to insiders. Harris goes on to point out that the wider Brazilian community had failed to provide adequate information and birth control resources so that mothers who were already struggling to raise four children would not have to deal with a fifth. Harris argues from this example that while the emic description allows women to cope with their situations and themselves in it, the etic perspective is the more powerful one because it more closely approximates reality and thus a genuine solution.

In response to Harris, other investigators have offered alternate ways of conceiving of the pair. In Harris' example, the epistemology of medicine is the eight-hundred-pound gorilla that squashes the epistemologically weaker interpretation of poor women in Brazil. But other cases do not so clearly favor one epistemology over another (as in how cousins are designated in the example above). Hymes suggests that instead of viewing emic/ etic as a dichotomy it should be viewed rather as a dialectic. Hymes points out that among languages, each excels in special ways at expressing understandings and doing things not necessarily available to others. To give primacy, then, to the etic risks losing what is unique or special about a particular culture or language ("Ecumenical" 120 - 126).

Although I like visualizing the terms as being in dialectic conversation, Hymes elides certain post colonialist problems. One of these is that of power. Clearly it is the etic perspective which "talks," which interrogates, analyzes,

apportions, organizes, and delimits the emic. The emic is not in a position to answer back or contest the claims of the etic. While Harris claims epistemological superiority in his example, this is just that—an example and not a principle. In many cases, the emic perspective wins epistemologically. For instance, in Hurricane Katrina, the expert insiders had been warning for years that removing and developing wetlands surrounding the city was a recipe for disaster. Kerry St. Pé, an ecologist who had lived his life in Southern Louisiana and directed the Barataria-Terrebonne National Estuary Program, said four days after Katrina: "We've been telling this since 1990. This was information gathered at the start of the estuary program. It's 2005! They said, 'We can't afford to restore Louisiana'"(Austin 671-72). There are endless examples of this, and the reason why is clear: people tend to be experts in areas that directly pertain to their lives. Ask a fifteen-year-old dishwasher the fastest way to get through the workload at a busy restaurant, and he will show you how to do it better than the manager who is there to assess his work. But the problem of power distorts the emic. The etic perspective is inextricably linked, as Foucault would put it, to the "regimes of truth" where "truth" is really a metonymy for how the West dominates societies and individuals through discourse. In its ability to classify, make use of, give access to, and talk about the emic, the etic wins.

Figured another way, this problem of influence is what Spivak, Bhaba, and others have called subalternity, or the difficulties in passing knowledge across a gap where there is already one of power based on social class, economics, and language. Can the subaltern speak when, as Spivak puts it, the

investigator already places "the effect of the subject as subaltern"(286) in place of the subaltern itself? Spivak refers to this substitution in observation as unavoidable metalepsis, a figure of speech in which a metonymy replaces a word already used figuratively. So, for instance, a “lead foot” is a substitution for someone pressing hard on the gas, substituting for a person who drives too fast. In Spivak's analysis, then, the perceived effect of what the investigator looked for as rhetoric (the lead foot) would stand in for something that was understood differently by the subalterns themselves (the dangerous motorist).

Perhaps a partial solution to this quandary is to figure the emic/etic as a "philosophical pair" in the technical sense of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (411-459). Philosophical pairs maintain the visibility of the quandary posed by Spivak and others by insisting on the dissociation of the emic from the etic, while implying a common ground, presumably where communication is possible; at the same time, the sort of equivalency implied by dialectic is avoided. Furthermore, philosophical pairs tend to have one term that dominates. For instance, the pair "appearance/ reality" on epistemological grounds favors "reality," and therefore probably is not a good corollary. Others, though, such as "means/ends" depend much more on context to determine primacy. One who would use this pair ignores the means to his or her peril, no matter how elevated the ends. Likewise, researchers need a humbler etic side and a more robust emic side to get it right.

Now going back to the point I had brought up earlier--that linguistic anthropologists ended up dodging rhetoric in favor of the much less satisfactory

term oratory--the route seems to have been via this distinction between the emic and the etic. At first glance, it seems as though the emic/etic distinction would be a valuable way to approach studying rhetoric in other cultures. However, it appears to be the case that rhetoric is more difficult to identify both as a term and as a set of practices than are names for speech genres. As a result, what appears to have happened, probably out of a much warranted concern for the status of the emic, is that the study of phenomena, where rhetoric would seem to play a large role, became conflated with speech genres themselves. Investigators found themselves classifying and describing speech types, thinking that, in the exercise, rhetoric had been somehow contained. But rhetoric is too sly a butterfly to be caught by such a crude net. Ironically, the same critique that the ethnography of communication had applied to sociology and anthropology more generally--that in abstracting patterns of social organization the details had been lost--seems to have happened here as well: in the analysis of speech genres, the details of how rhetorical transactions occur are all but lost.[4]

But, as the saying goes, "the proof of the pudding is in the eating." To give a concrete example of the extent to which the analysis of speech genres can

[4] The conflation of oratory and rhetoric from a theoretical point of view probably got its justification from theories of genre by Bakhtin, who argues that no utterance is possible outside of genre since all communication is socially constructed or dialogically constituted. For an utterance to exist, it must have form (60). If one shifts the focus away from the literary, there may be more scope for this approach vís a vís rhetoric by looking carefully at issues of power. So, for instance the "interactionist" model in taking a dialogic view conceptualizes power as the product of role-relationships and the performance of communicative competence (Saville-Troike 253) But then this leaves unaccounted, as Saville-Troike points out, those very important details that link the produced text to historical moment and place.

define or illuminate rhetoric in a non-Western context, I turn to an article by Gossen entitled "To Speak with a Heated Heart: Chamula Canons of Style and Good Performance." This article maps out for the reader a highly developed system of genre or recognized "categories of verbal behavior." Interestingly, underlying and establishing difference in the genre system is a single metaphor: that of heat. Although, according to Bauman (748), a lot of texts Gossen collected did not fall clearly into any category, undermining Bakhtin's claim of the universality of genre, the system is amazingly elaborate:

FIGURE 1.1 "A folk taxonomy of Chamula verbal behavior"



(Gossen 396: "Figure 18. A folk taxonomy of Chamula verbal behavior")

In this figure, Gossen maps not just the elaborate genre system of the Chamula, but he also indicates the underlying organizational mechanism that distinguishes it: heat. Heat, as Gossen tells us, is associated for the Chamula with the sun, which in its cosmological function serves to organize social life, giving the concept far-reaching explanatory power. Thus we learn that men wear sandals and women do not because women are associated with the cold earth; men with the hot sun, and thus the sandals or their lack signal (respectively) proximity or distance to these sources (393). Likewise, as children mature, they are socialized by practicing generic forms that index the increasing heat that is associated with their stage of development (397). Most importantly, as Gossen's diagram shows, heat serves to organize the emic description that the Chamula give for categorizing talk.

Now going back again to Kuipers' contention about oratory's proximity to rhetoric, the claim raises the question of whether the classificatory scheme reveals significant aspects of Chamula rhetoric. I would argue that the reader learns almost nothing about it. Under the category "political oratory," for instance, Gossen writes the following:

> 'Political oratory' includes all public announcements made by religious and political officials outside ritual settings. Like 'court speech,' 'political oratory' has highly predictable stylistic components; yet each performance is theoretically different, which is why it does not qualify as 'pure speech.' The stylistic devices that characterize it have already been

> discussed -- parallel syntax, metaphorical couplets, redundancy of message, and verbatim repetition (402).

The genre has been classified, but what happens within the genre, and specifically what happens rhetorically, remains a mystery. The genre has been stripped of its content. While it is true that we are told of stylistic devices that are most likely rhetorical in nature, without reference to arguments, or content, the rhetorical impact is impossible to discern. Thus the genre description classifies where rhetoric may be occurring but omits the content that would explain how the genre does work for its speakers.

It is also possible that these political speeches are not rhetorically rich texts. Saville-Troike usefully points out that as speech events become increasingly formalized (one here imagines instances of genres occurring in public settings to the right in Gossen's diagram above) the options to innovate become more limited. Instead of political oratory being about rhetoric, it ends up being about social control since there is no legitimate entreaty to engage or negotiate (261). An example of this in Western culture is the Catholic liturgy in which priests and participants speak a dialogic text that does not admit variance. However, one wonders in the case of the Chamula if there is not some moment, perhaps before or directly after the highly formulaic speech genre begins, in which an actor can make his or her own argument and have it heard, just as priests have spaces worked into mass in which their own interpretations of religious texts are orated for persuasive intent.

Before moving from this topic of speech genre in general, it seems clear that the approach in one way does have a role to play in illuminating rhetorical processes. This role is in identifying the framework within which rhetoric occurs. Bauman, for instance, identifies Bakhtin's conceptualization of the "chronotope," as the time-space relations that the genre naturalizes for interlocutors and that establishes the epistemic framework within which communication occurs. This framework, from Bakhtin's perspective presumes how the interlocutors conceptualize reality. Commenting on Gossen's article of the Chamula, Bauman points out the "macro-level distinction between new (or recent) words (*ʔač' k'opetik*) associated with 'close time-space coordinates and the Fourth Creation,' and ancient words (*ʔantivo k'opetik*)" (748), as an instance of Bakhtin's theory in action. From a rhetorical point of view, what I would be interested in exploring is how Chamula speakers use this framework to argue their points or employ distinctions of genre as a source of authority. But one would need examples of actual texts as they were spoken to perform this sort of analysis, one would need content.

The same problem of conflating rhetoric and oratory seems to have clouded much work in other branches of anthropology. Maurice Bloch begins *Political Language and Oratory in Traditional Society* with a chapter entitled, "Why Oratory?" His answer to this question is that oratory offers a source of data that anthropologists can use to best justify claims about how political power works within traditional societies. "Oratory," he seems to be saying, can stand in for

rhetoric. But although the oratory is there, the rhetoric is not, and the workings of power through language remain largely opaque.

For instance, Firth--one of the contributors to the volume--discusses the native oratorical genres: the *fono*, the *oriori,* the *kai fakamavae,* and others. He discusses them mainly in terms of who gets to make these speeches and who listens, or the political framework that surrounds their production and consumption. The analysis, though, does not have explanatory power with regard to rhetoric. For instance, his one short excerpt from a speech exemplifies ritualized address. Based on this excerpt and the author's implied experience (which I think he expects will exceed any his readers can claim) Firth argues that the *fono* is highly scripted and lacking in novelty--in his words "the word-perfect reproduction of a traditional formula" (30)--and yet in spite of this it still manages to allow for negotiation with the audience who "By their reception of the speeches, expressed in silence or assent; by their very attendance or absence, the people communicate a view on the order or proposals put to them"(43).

In order for the identification of rhetoric to be explicated, Firth would need to investigate the means by which these proposals he refers to are created and communicated. Perhaps, as may be the case with the Chamula, the event of political oratory acts more as a stamp on negotiations that have occurred at some other place, in some other way, at some other time.

Six years later, anthropologists following the same topic--oratory--position their latest efforts in relation to Bloch. In a collection of essays entitled *Politically Speaking: Cross-Cultural Studies of Rhetoric*, Paine, the editor, specifically critiques

Bloch based on the approach that conflated rhetoric and oratory. He writes as follows:

> Contrary to Bloch, we see political rhetoric not as based upon an *a priori* acceptance of "who is top," but as directed to the attainment of that acceptance. This *a priori* element in Bloch's view of rhetoric as praxis has several serious consequences. One is the assumption that the code used by a speaker is autonomous (hence the elimination of discourse as well as of rhetorical creativity); in our view this is something towards which the politician strives--usually without ever attaining it. Another consequence is that rhetoric is relegated to an epiphenomenal place in politics: just as "the medium is the message" for McLuhan (1965) so, for Bloch, the social structure is the message. That this is the conclusion one arrives at from reading Bloch is particularly regrettable because he set out to pioneer, in anthropology, the "significance of what kind of speech is involved in political interaction" (*op. cit.:* 4). He raised an impediment instead (3).

As an alternative, Paine follows his critique of Bloch with a summary of the history of Western rhetoric. He then sets up Burke as the principal rhetorical theorist upon which the book will establish a definition of rhetoric against which cultural comparisons will be made. The essays by various authors that follow, however, are all from Western cultures, with the possible exception of one essay, which is about rhetoric in Bermuda. Unfortunately, the point of this essay turns

on the use of the Biblical imagery for rhetorical purposes--one can hardly think of an influence more dominating than this--and so Paine's critique is left up to conjecture. To follow Bloch in a serious way would have meant to re-examine the data from the South Pacific islanders.

Luckily, one researcher did just that. Duranti, working in the same region in the late seventies, gives every indication that he is studying comparative rhetoric, though he does not say as much. Instead he writes: "Everything I published about Samoa was . . . devoted to oratory, conflict management, and the role of intentionality in local interpretive practices"(114). In this endeavor, and looking at Bloch's claims about formality and oratory, Duranti sees Bloch as partly correct. He writes that

> when compared to ceremonial speeches, political speeches are characterized by the use of various codes, registers, and perspectives that violate the 'code consistency' and the 'increased code structuring' that Judith Irvine (1979) associated with formalized language and events. In other words, in the fono, after the initial lāuga, the consistency of the code and the restrictions imposed on what can be said are partly modified toward the creation of a 'blurred genre' in which multiple voices and multiple perspectives can be heard (*Grammar* 106).

Duranti's analysis suggests that rhetoric occurs most visibly when genre constraints are violated--one might even say that rhetoric is at odds with genre.

Once the formal *lāuga* has been observed, space opens up for the work of rhetoric to begin. Further on in his analysis Duranti, to paraphrase him in rhetorical terms, shows how speakers mix styles (formal with informal registers), use emotional expressions, project ethos, cite the speech of others to support their points, make logical arguments, and even break down the formality of speech into moments of dialogue (*Grammar* 107-111).

One other article, and the best I have been able to find on rhetoric in a non-Western culture--in anthropology or in any other field--is Michelle Rosaldo's "I Have Nothing to Hide: The Language of Ilongot Oratory." In this essay, Rosaldo describes a brideprice meeting in which two kin members negotiate how much a marriage is going to cost the groom's family. The interaction employs what Rosaldo refers to as "crooked speech," a way of arguing that sounds tantalizingly similar to ancient Greek sophistic rhetoric, and where a version of something like sophistry may be a dominant mode of communication for the speech community. Furthermore "crooked speech" arises across genres. As Rosaldo writes:

> In play and in oratory, when singing, telling riddles, or conducting a political debate, Ilongots say that they are using 'crooked language,' that they hide behind the wit and beauty of their words. Such language, rich in metaphor and elaborate rhythms, is heard in bursts of anger and of humor, and it is common in focused, public situations, in arguments and

> playful contests, situations in which an individual's skill, style, and rhetorical genius, have persuasive social force (193).

In the brideprice meeting, the negotiators employ crooked speech in the context of a specific genre Rosaldo identifies as *puruŋ* or 'oratory.' The description of the context and intentions of the actors allows Rosaldo to explicate how *puruŋ* interacts with crooked speech to resolve the conflict. For instance, she points out how "oratory appears to permit the unique, explicit, and consistent identification of actors with ideal roles or social categories"(208). This ideal does not obtain, Rosaldo tells us, as far as she was able to tell, in ordinary speech or situations. At the same time, crooked speech allows the speaker to exploit this idealization to seek concessions from the interlocutor. So for instance, in the brideprice meeting, the classificatory brother of the groom poses himself through crooked speech as the "father" of the bride's brother who has demanded a gun in exchange for allowing his sister to marry. But once the brother of the bride accepts the posed relationship, the groom's brother then exploits the idealized relationship to figure the ongoing dialogue to achieve concessions from the "son"(200-05). In sum, the reader gets a glimpse at the sorts of arguments that Ilongots make, how these are presented and interpreted, and how points of agreement are reached through the interaction. The article is altogether satisfying, and in my opinion, an example of the sort of research I aspire to do myself.

Contrastive Rhetoric

In applied linguistics and composition studies, research has been carried out under the label "Contrastive Rhetoric" (CR) but its methodology for data collection and focus severely limit its scope. As Robert Kaplan, the originator of the CR puts it, "It [Contrastive Rhetoric] was intended to facilitate reading and writing in English, creative use of the second language [also English], and the ability to express one's ideas in text in the second language" (viii). In other words, "Contrastive Rhetoric" was misnamed: it should have been called "Contrastive Composition," since its goal is focused on discovering how to teach foreign students successful strategies for writing in U.S. English composition classes when they misconstrue and interpret from their own cultural and linguistic backgrounds the writing assignments they encounter. Rhetoric is bigger than Kaplan's conceptualization of it.

In its application, Contrastive Rhetoric also has the unfortunate effect of stamping out the very thing it tries to describe. For instance, claims about non-linear or circular arguments (not meaning the logical fallacy, but reasoning that takes a roundabout path) that some foreign students make are the very strategies that, once identified, are expected to be replaced with the more appropriate American strategy of directness. It is likely that within the appropriate cultural context, such reasoning patterns have subtleties worthy of attention.

Some of the assumptions entailed by Kaplan's approach flaw the methodology. The first of these questionable assumptions is that a pattern produced by a second language speaker *in English* is the same as that produced

in the speaker's home language, presuming, as it were, that English is a transparent medium. A corollary to this assumption is that cultural patterns reproduce reliably in translation. An example where this equivalency is quite obviously false from my own research is in the use Aymara speakers make of Spanish past tenses to reproduce evidentials. Evidentials, or a set of morphemes and words Aymaras use to tag data source, mark knowledge as coming from what was seen personally, what was heard from others, or what was inferred[5]. Aymara speakers do have strategies for mapping evidentials onto Spanish. One of these is to use Spanish past tenses (past, past perfect, imperfect) to indicate data source (Stratford), but the Spanish verb tenses are far cruder than the rich set of evidentials the Aymaras have to choose from in their own language and cannot be said to translate with any of the vitality or subtlety found in the native language.

Another assumption worth questioning is the *communicative competence* of the students who are the sources of the data. The notion of *communicative competence*, developed first by Hymes, refers in part to the idea of whether a given utterance is appropriate in a particular situation. If we use the term more broadly to refer to a good, perhaps even an eloquent native speaker, someone who consistently accomplishes goals through speaking within a particular speech community, and someone (I might add), ideally suited for demonstrating what an investigator studying rhetoric looks for, then one can make a fair bet that ESL students probably are not of this ilk. Tlingit orator Nora Marks

[5] For further explanation of how evidentials work see pp. 106-8; 159-167.

Dauenhauer, for instance, referring to speaking publicly in the potlatch, considers someone in his or her sixties as young and inexperienced for the event. From her perspective, such events require consummate skill so that no one feels slighted. She made the analogy of giving one of these speeches as trying to move a long pole in a room full of people and avoid hitting anyone in the face ("Poetics and Politics" class).

Related to communicative context is also the *speaking event* (Gumperz "Linguistic"). Just as the composition classroom appears foreign and strange to many ESL students, so too many of the speaking occasions, places where rhetorical work gets done, do not make their appearance for the Contrastive Rhetoric researcher. One actually has to do anthropological fieldwork to participate in these events and grasp something of their significance or even know about them. So for the researcher of CR, the foreign speaking event remains invisible and unexplored.

Perhaps the most difficult limitation in using CR research to argue the thesis that some rhetorical principles apply only to particular cultures is that it focuses on composition and writing instruction rather than rhetorical theory. As a result of this emphasis, rhetorical theory is used as in other sorts of composition research as a set of assumptions to work from rather than theories to question. While studies in Contrastive Rhetoric necessarily entail cultural exploration, for someone who wants a clearer look at non-Western suasory use of language, reading anecdotes about the effects of culture on argument, organization, and style in English is frustrating (See Panetta for examples).

However, Kaplan should be acknowledged for having drawn many researchers' attention to the reality that different patterns of argument and reasoning *were* appearing in English composition courses, pointing to the possibility that there is more than one way to skin a cat.

Comparative Rhetoric

In turning to studies in comparative rhetoric, there have recently been some interesting attempts at mining Chinese history for answers about how a Chinese rhetoric, were it to be unearthed, might look. These studies meet the criteria of selecting relevant texts, but then seem to falter on the conceptual side. For instance, one scholar, George Q. Xu, in an article entitled "The Use of Eloquence: The Confucian Perspective," sets up a loose definition of rhetoric not closely allied with any one school of thought, and then presents and analyzes Confucius' commentary about the field to narrow in on Chinese differences. In the end, though, the broad definition, although pointing the reader toward what Xu wants us to look for, offers little power to illuminate the object of study. Perhaps this is the best that can be expected. For instance about rhetoric in general, Xu asserts: "In the context of this article, rhetoric is broadly defined to include the practice and theory of the use of discourse to accomplish a didactic, aesthetic, or persuasive objective; and eloquence is the skillful, artistic verbal expression for rhetorical effect"(116). The definition maps such a large territory that it obscures the glimpses of Chinese rhetoric we get from Xu's analysis and presentation of selected ancient Chinese texts. For instance, he quotes Laozi as

writing, "To talk little is natural . . . Truthful words are not beautiful; beautiful words are not truthful. Good men do not argue; those who argue are not good"(116). Xu does not seem to notice that Laozi is using chiasmus to make his argument, but he does catch the irony of advocating for writing simply but doing so in a complicated way. Or as Xu later writes of Confucius himself: "More than any other school, however, Confucius condemned 'glib talking,' vehemently and extensively, creating a particularly poignant irony of eloquent speakers and writers denouncing eloquence" (116). Is Chinese rhetoric, then, based on contradiction? How extensive is this sort of practice? The general definition of rhetoric Xu sets forth at the beginning of his article rules out the possibility that Chinese rhetoric be tailor-made to account for it.[6]

The most influential work in the field of comparative rhetoric is Kennedy's *Comparative Rhetoric: an Historical and Cross-Cultural Introduction* (1998), but this work lacks an adequate theoretical framework to manage the evidence presented. Kennedy bases his analysis on the dubious assumption that Western society can serve as an evolutionary yardstick for rhetoric as it has developed in other cultures. He does not consider postmodern critiques of universalism or distinctions such as the emic/etic one developed in anthropology as relevant to his analysis.

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[6] One more notation about Xu's method. He uses Confucius' prescriptivist writing about how speakers ought to conduct themselves rather than analyzing Chinese texts to see how the rhetoric works in practice. He also makes an argument for how influential Confucius was rather than tracing the influence of his precepts among writers.

This sort of positivist approach does have its supporters, but even in a field like biology more nuanced contextualizations are developing. For instance, some recent work in Marxism and evolutionary theory as it applies to anthropology problematizes how Darwinism can be applied to human groups. As Odling-Smee points out, if one wants to apply the ideas of evolution to culture, then a simple trajectory of randomized genetic change allowing some humans to out-compete others does not take into account that culture itself is constantly changing the environment to which descendants must adapt, nor that culture itself is something that is transmitted without sex, and its dissemination is both quicker and more widespread in a given population (134). In contrast, Kennedy, through his scientistic lens, views technological development in lockstep with culture, and culture as part of a slow-moving evolutionary force. Kennedy then applies this analogy to rhetoric.

Kennedy uses the Aranda, a group of Australian aborigines, as his test case for a primitive people who speak a primitive rhetoric. Having established them as a starting point, he documents increasingly more sophisticated rhetorical practices in other cultures that (unsurprisingly) come to look more and more like Western ones as their sophistication increases. This progression is the justification for claiming evolutionary status for rhetoric from social animals (chapter one) to elite Western texts (chapter nine). The need to have a primitive group to point to, then, is essential to making the evolutionary case. What I argue, however, is that if one looks at Kennedy's evidence in detail with regard to the Aranda, claims of the primitive collapse.

One way that Kennedy paints the Aranda as primitive is to say they lack public speaking events unlike more advanced cultures: "Aboriginal Australian culture, unlike many other nonliterate societies, had no provision for councils, assemblies, or formal debate . . ." (48). The claim is based on scant evidence. Kennedy cites the outdated *The World of the First Australians* published in 1964 to back this claim up. But chapter ten of this work, entitled "Law and Order," has only one Aranda text without a gloss in the original language on which disputation is managed. The text is reputedly a song the men sing when a decision has been reached to engage in a duel. But the authors Ronald and Catherine Berndt have no records of disputation in action, no verifiable sources of evidence for how the duel was agreed to in the first place.

Kennedy also analyzes an Aranda text to demonstrate more directly their primitive status. The story was collected from Strehlow, who himself writes of the Aranda and his own fieldwork:

> It must be emphasized however, that the Aranda used by skilful native story-tellers and in the difficult, intricate, and archaic language of the chants, is an instrument of great strength and beauty, which can rise to great heights of feeling.
>
> The general Australian public is, on the whole unaware of this fact. It has been led to believe that the native Australian languages are hopelessly poor and primitive in structure and vocabulary. There are two main reasons for this mistake . . . [ignorance and prejudice:] some scientists who, in their efforts to find the 'missing link' in Australian

> aboriginals, have described their language as devoid of all ornaments and graces, and characterized by an almost sub-human simplicity (xviii).

It seems ironic that Kennedy would choose to use Strehlow's work to support the very direction in research that Strehlow argues against. Below is the story as cited from Strehlow (Kennedy's version omits some text and italics, which I have underlined):

> They see a large euro nodding in its sleep. And Ntjikantja tells Kwaneraka to move in a half-circle to the rear of the animal so that he may sneak up to it more closely. When Kwaneraka is at the rear of the euro, Ntjikantja signals to him: 'Come forward; come further forward and throw your spear.' But Kwaneraka, who can see only the ears of the euro, is misled into thinking that the animal is facing him, and so he signals back: 'Not I; come forward yourself!' Again Ntjikantja calls to him: 'No, *you* [italics missing in quoted Kennedy's version] should come towards me; the euro is looking at me.' And Kwaneraka, in reply, repeats: 'No it is up to you; I am being watched.' They now go around the animal in a wide circle and meet together and take counsel: 'What is to be done?' Then Ntjikantja has a happy thought. He says to Kwaneraka: 'Wait here for a moment; I shall go back first to our camp.'
>
> He went to get a tjurunga; and having taken the tjurunga into his hands, he returned to his younger brother. He held it behind his back. And then Ntjikantja demonstrated to Kwaneraka its proper use: the

> tjurunga flew through the air, it gashed through the head and the body of the euro. And after the gash had been made, the brothers received the power of scent: their noses had been opened by the smell of the blood. Both men and euros ever since have been able to smell; for before this time their noses had been shut fast (22-23).

Using this example, Kennedy makes claims about the primitive state of the Aranda by linking their ability to reason with the grammatical resources of the language. However, given that there is no gloss of the story in Strehlow--he does not give us his transcription of the story as it was told in Aranda--linking grammar as it is presented in English with what can be inferred about Aranda's own grammatical structures is folly.

In spite of this, Kennedy attempts linking grammar to rhetoric to suggest the simplicity of both. He writes, for instance, that "Juxtaposition of words or statements, without inferential or subordinating connectives, (the equivalent of "for" or "because"), is characteristic of traditional Australian texts, which are almost without syntax, although connectives are used in the colloquial language"(49). This claim, however, is mistaken. In "Switch-Reference in Mparntwe Arrernte (Aranda): form, function, and Problems of Identity," Wilkins describes how clauses are marked and subordinated through the morphosyntax. He gives examples of a wide range of dependent clauses that are both embedded and adjoined, some of which appear to be beyond the power of English to express precisely. He provides at least one example of a *because* clause, refuting Kennedy's assertion at least about Aranda's available linguistic resources that

Kwaneraka did not use a "because" to justify himself because there was no way to say it: "*Re lhe-ke pmere tyewe ikwerenhe-werne,"* which Wilkens, in expressing a principle of how switch referencing works in Aranda, translates as: "He went to his friend's place to eat because he did not cook any food" (152).

Wilkens also provides evidence contradicting another of Kennedy's claims. Kennedy writes that "Nor does the traditional language have a system of grammatical tenses. There is little differentiation of time: It is an assumption of the culture that everything that ever existed still exists and will always exist" (49). Kennedy's assumption here is a Eurocentric one given that other languages not considered primitive, such as Chinese, do not mark for tense (Troike personal communication). In any event, Kennedy is again mistaken. Wilkens describes six tenses including the "non-past progressive (present and future), non-past completive (future reference only), past completive, past progressive, remote past habitual ('used to'), immediate past ('just happened')" (149). In this regard, Aranda is more complex than English. It is possible that traditional stories apply a particular tense for marking the distant past, but this is a very different thing from asserting that tense is not grammaticalized.

Kennedy's ignorance of the language dooms his argument. From his mistaken claims about Aranda language, he tries to argue that the rhetoric is primitive, but what he shows us instead is that he knows little if anything about either.

Partial Solution: Rhetoric Defined as Communicative Competence

One solution to the problem of defining rhetoric in different cultural contexts is to dispense with the term altogether and replace it with *communicative competence*. This approach, especially given rhetoric's history of definitions and redefinitions, has a lot to offer, but, as I argue below, it provides only a partial solution. More specifically, I argue that *communicative competence* can serve as the basis for describing how rhetorical principles work in a given language and culture, but it cannot identify instances of when it is occurring. Rather, examples of rhetoric have to be assembled first and then inferences drawn that illustrate the competencies.

On a positive note, this approach puts the emphasis for the investigator on discovery rather than on trying to fit the definition to the data. The investigator can build and add detail as s/he goes along. In this way, studying *rhetorical competence* would be similar to learning a second language. With a foreign language, one learns all the function words within a year or two, but even a native speaker does not know all the nouns and verbs of his or her native language. Similarly, with *rhetorical competence*, one can continue to observe the effects of particular strategies on speakers and assess their impact, probably learning in the same way as native speakers but with more focus. Knowledge of the language itself and how its resources are deployed, the values of a community, emotional responses to different events, the sense of logic, data, and reasoning, ideas about the self and community all become aspects of progressively deeper understanding of rhetorical competence.

Second, this is a practical definition. To me, this is one of the keystones to the spirit of rhetoric, although probably not academia. Rhetoric seeks to provide knowledge that can make its students more effective negotiators in a given context. This definition similarly seeks out to identify the linguistic and cultural parameters at play in a community and how one can best function within it.

Finally, and most importantly, this is a definition that allows the scholar to gradually paint a portrait of a rhetoric that does not look like all the others. Specificity in one's generalizations about rhetoric is the best way to make it meaningful to scholarship in other fields.

But there are also potential pitfalls with this approach. For one thing, there has to be agreement first about what constitutes the range of phenomena that is rhetoric before the principles underlying its production can be described. Consider, for instance, Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, which is essentially a how-to manual on developing certain communicative competencies needed by his fellow citizens in Ancient Greece. It is clear that Aristotle was drawing his inspiration from his surrounding culture: he did not need to question the appropriateness of the sources of data from which he inferred the principles he describes in *The Rhetoric.* An investigator doing research in a non-Western culture, however, does not have the same seamless access to performances that Aristotle did. As the examples from anthropology above attest, what is called political oratory, and would have unquestionably been considered rhetorical performances in Ancient Greece, may serve mainly ritualistic functions in other cultures and amount to reifications of

social control. The rhetoric, if it is occurring, is doing so in these cultures in other places.

History of Communicative Competence

The phrase *communicative competence* was coined by Hymes in 1972 in response to Noam Chomsky's idea of linguistic competence in which an idealized language speaker is viewed as someone who has internalized the grammatical rules of a language and is able to produce an infinite number of phrases, clauses, or well-formed sentences based on knowledge of those rules. Hymes cites the following passage from Chomsky's *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax:*

> Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech community, who know its language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in actual performance (3).

As Hymes and succeeding critics have pointed out, Chomsky's idea of competence puts rules for sentence formation at the center of linguistic study while at the same time abstracting them from their historical and social contexts,

their acquisition, or the effects of socialization on them. This view idealizes language in taking its instances as homogenous (Sidnell 39-40).

In contrast to Chomsky's definition, Hymes, by taking social and historical factors into account, sees the knowledge Chomsky defined as necessary but still inadequate for describing what a speaker needs to know to communicate. Additional competencies come from understandings of one's social circumstances in relation to others. For instance, I do not go to the mailman to get advice about how to fix my car. Nor do I ask a librarian at the information booth for a burrito. I also need to know what is appropriate. For instance, not only do I need to know that librarians do not make burritos at information booths, I also have to consider that making the request might be taken as offensive, that I might be asked to leave the library or review the sign (clearly visible) that says "no eating of food or drink allowed in the library." My request might be taken to indicate insolence toward librarians and the sanctity of the library more generally.

Hymes' conception of *communicative competence* tries to account for these other factors that Chomsky ignores. In doing so, Hymes shows a clear awareness of rhetoric. Hymes notes, for instance, that

> A major characteristic of modern linguistics has been that it takes structure as primary end in itself, and tends to depreciate use, while not relinquishing any of its claim to the great significance that is attached to

> language. (Contrast classical antiquity, where structure was a means to use, and the grammarian subordinate to the rhetor.) ("Competence" 272).

The rhetor is one who uses the rules of grammar to suit his or her purposes; grammar--the means--is secondary to the purpose the rhetor makes of it. In defining *communicative competence* thus against Chomsky's conception, Hymes develops four principles:

1. Whether (and to what degree) something is formally *possible*;
2. Whether (and to what degree) something is *feasible* in virtue of the means of implementation available;
3. Whether (and to what degree) something is *appropriate* (adequate, happy, successful) in relation to a context in which it is used and evaluated;
4. Whether (and to what degree) something is in fact done, actually *performed*, and what its doing entails ("Competence" 281).

Historically, the emphasis in using Hymes' four points has been to focus on the third point, or what is appropriate. For instance, Saville-Troike defines Hymes' idea of *communicative competence* as "knowing not only the language code but also what to say to whom, and how to say it appropriately in any given situation" (18). But one can see from examining Hymes' points one and two above that he also accounts for speaking situations in which a speaking performance may be possible and feasible but inappropriate. This is important

for rhetoric, for rule breaking is often advantageous. Consider the case of Margaret Thatcher's habit of having appeared to stop speaking during political debate, thereby encouraging others to come back with their retorts. But then, surprisingly, Thatcher does not stop talking. The interrupters often fail to take the floor, and as a result they appear disempowered and weaker. This interesting conversational strategy can at least partly account for her effectiveness as a politician, although audiences perceived her as domineering and impolite (Beattie).

One might also examine a range of other communicative strategies that give advantage in particular circumstances but that some audiences would find inappropriate such as the use of logical fallacies (ad hominem attacks, circular reasoning, etc), the use of discriminatory or racist language, or the use of opaque bureaucratic writing that obfuscates intent but also seems to indicate a lack of clarity in thought.

Another issue with regard to adapting *communicative competence* for rhetoric is its historical legacy as an object of research: the focus of it has mainly been on the acquisition of a variety of skills related to language use in social context among children. Significantly, Hymes first presented his paper on the idea at the Research Planning Conference on Language Development among Disadvantaged Children ("Competence" footnote 269). In Hymes' discussion, he responds carefully to the work of Labov who shows linguistic competencies among urban African American children that were overlooked by other academics and teachers. Their blindness to these competencies led to

assessments of verbal skills that were at odds with these children's actual abilities (see Labov).

Given this initial inspiration for the concept, it should not surprise us that the emphasis on research in *communicative competence* has primarily focused on skills developed early, such as the rules for taking turns, the understanding of what the current topic is, and how to either contribute to it or successfully change it. Dimitracopoulou claims that children have acquired this sort of knowledge, what she refers to as *conversational competence*, by age seven! (116). Dimitracopoulou sees *conversational competence* as "the most important dynamic context of language"(18) and would seem to subsume under its heading other less complex competencies.

Hymes, however, in this first essay does not limit *communicative competence* to early development. He suggests a split, one for learning that occurs in childhood, and a longer one. For this reason, a distinction useful to make is probably between *communicative competence* and--so far undescribed--*rhetorical competence.* Hymes writes,

> We spoke first of a child's competence . . . The matrix formed in childhood continues to develop and change throughout life with respect to sentence structures and their use. . . . Perhaps one should contrast a 'long' and a 'short' range view of competency, the short range view being interested primarily in understanding innate capacities as unfolded during the first

> years of life, and the long range view in understanding the continuing socialization and change of competence through life (287).

This view supports observations made by Dauenhauer, mentioned above, where speaking at the Potlatch is deemed young at age sixty. From this perspective, *rhetorical competence* is an ongoing project perhaps none of us can ever claim to have mastered.

It may be that work at this more advanced performative level is also being carried out under different headings. Two possibilities include "language socialization" and "language ideology." For instance, Susan Philips, in working with legal discourse from a linguistic anthropological perspective, has written about how lawyers acquire some of their rhetorical skills ("Acquiring"). More recently the work of Philips and others, in taking language ideology into account, presume the acquisition of specialized forms of *rhetorical competence* that judges employ to frame interactions within the courtroom in ways that give them control ("Ideology"). More explicit attention to the acquisition of *rhetorical competence* conceived in these specific terms provide rhetoricians with an opportunity to build a bridge to other fields where all scholars benefit.

Second Partial Solution: Rhetoric Defined by Where to Look for It

Let me summarize at this point, then, my major criticisms of attempts to define rhetoric as it operates in non-Western languages and cultures:

1. Greco-Roman definitions of rhetoric do not account for how non-Western cultures use rhetoric;
2. *Communicative competence* as a substitute for defining rhetoric focuses on the skills or knowledge needed to produce rhetoric rather than on instances of rhetoric itself;
3. Definitions of rhetoric in *comparative rhetoric* do not derive from historically located instances that are properly contextualized in the original language and produced by competent speakers;
4. Definitions of rhetoric do not acknowledge or allow for the role that power plays in defining its presence;
5. Rhetoric is defined in terms of genre, leaving out content.

The last three points, re-stated in positive form (so that I may move from critique to advocacy) would read as follows:

3. Instances of rhetoric upon which the definition is based should activate performative and communicative resources to accomplish some personal or social end: rhetoric performs power through language.[7]

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[7] One paper that distills recent efforts to conceptualize how power and language interact in face-to-face interactions is Kiesling's "'Now I Gotta Watch What I Say': Shifting Constructions of Masculinity in Discourse." The approach locates power as the process of making claims that index hierarchies and ideologies that mark a particular group as of higher status or more power (for instance, landowners vs. renters). In the sense that a claim of sorts is being made in such cases, the view falls into line with rhetoric, but the close attention to discourse at the prosodic level reveals new realms in which claims can be both made and contested. For other possible ways of conceiving power and discourse see Philips ("Power").

4. Non-Western rhetorics should be defined with historically located instances that are contextualized in the original language, described in the historical setting, and produced by rhetorically competent speakers.
5. Rhetoric should refer to properties of language use that apply across speech genres.

Let me use an example to defend these principles. In a recent article in *Linguistic Anthropology* the author SturtzSreetharan makes no mention of rhetoric, but, nevertheless, because of its close analysis of some transcriptions of Japanese conversation, the text allows us to make some inferences about what a rhetoric in western Japan might look like. The article, "'I Read the *Nikkei*, Too': Crafting Positions of Authority and Masculinity in a Japanese Conversation," shows how men use linguistic resources to construct their identities. As SturtzSreetharan sees it, these men employ "terms of self-reference and sentence-final particles (SFPs) as microlevel strategies of indexicality"(173). Such "strategies," as SturtzSreetharan calls them, are from my point of view, inevitably rhetorical ones, so even though the author is focused on issues of gender construction, her article uncovers part of what might be called the beginnings of a culturally specific rhetoric.

In one of the conversations analyzed, four men from the same company are having lunch. Two of the men are senior in age and authority and two are junior. On the surface, the four are having a typical conversation one would have while eating lunch, but SturtzSreetharan's closer analysis shows that the

men negotiate their positions of authority, with success depending on how deftly they use sentence final particles in relation to the various topics that arise in the conversation. For instance, one of the senior men addresses one of the younger men using *-chan* that implies his seniority in relation to the younger addressee, but also indicates a certain closeness, as between brothers. The younger man responds to the older man with the second-person pronoun *boku*, which reaffirms both the implied claim of authority of the older man and the familiarity that is indexed by *-chan*, cementing their relative positions. *boku* confirms the claims of social proximity and authority, but it also excludes the other young man sitting in the group.

The context for the usage revolves around the question of what newspaper the young man who has been addressed reads. In saying that he reads the *Nikkei,* the older men find reason to praise him since it is a serious newspaper, suggesting something of his commitment to business and the company more specifically (180-83).

The other young man, after hearing the first one praised, tries to garner favor with the seniors unsuccessfully. He manipulates the conversation by redirecting it toward talking about a restaurant where he goes and where, he ends up saying, they have the *Nikkei* too, which is where he reads it. The circuitous argument, however, fails partly because he "creatively" uses *boku* as his colleague had done, trying to claim the same warm relationship that the older men established with the other younger man but without them having authorized it first by addressing him with *-chan*. The younger man ends up

saying something along the lines of "'It's pretty rare to find a café that takes the *Nikkei* you know.'" In response to this one of the older men responds skeptically "'Is that so?'" and the other merely grunts (182).

This being but one example, it would be rash to claim too much, but one can see how the points four and five qualify this conversation as an example that will say something about rhetoric. Point number four is "Instances of rhetoric activate performative and communicative resources to accomplish some personal or social end: rhetoric performs power through language." One notes from SturtzSreetharan's data how the success of claims can be linked to authority, here tied to seniority and rank in a company. Presumably the relationships being sorted out among the actors in the conversation will have consequences and effects down the road. In the immediate view of the data, though, it is clear that those with more authority ask the questions; those with less answer them. Superiors offer praise; inferiors accept it. Superiors make claims of social proximity; inferiors confirm them. The desire the one young man exposes by seeking praise also turns out to be a mistake, suggesting something perhaps of the role that the individual is expected to play in relation to the group. Or it is possible that the desire could be appropriately expressed but in another way. Superiors control the feeling of belonging to the group.

These ideological concerns are partly mediated through stylistic norms. With regard to point number four, that "Non-Western rhetorics should be defined with historically located instances that are contextualized in the original language, described in the historical setting, and performed by competent

speakers," one sees how *boku* and *-chan* operate either successfully or not in the context of the exchange. More broadly, the text is precisely contextualized. SturtzSreetharan documents the conversation according to the origins of the inhabitants, their social backgrounds, the place, time, and occasion under which the conversation occurred, and the social and linguistic considerations more generally. As to the texts, these are described to state precisely what was said and include relevant discourse features, such as intonation units (see chapter two, "intonation units" pp. 125-26 for discussion).

With respect to point number five that " Rhetoric should refer to properties of language use that apply across speech genres," what the example shows is a few principles that occurred in a single conversation. One would expect, however, that many of these principles would be likely to appear in the context of other speech genres. For instance, in a board meeting in the same company, the ideology regarding respect for superiors that guides the use of sentence final particles and terms of self-reference are likely to be even more strictly adhered to than in conversation. One would need evidence to substantiate such a claim.

I would like to make one last point about SturtzSreetharan's article about method that is also worth pointing out for the analysis of rhetoric. What makes her example so compelling is that in a short conversational segment, she is able to compare successful use of terms of self-reference and sentence final particles with unsuccessful use of the same. The contrast between what works and what

does not forms the basis for making claims about rhetorical competence. I find the same approach useful in my work on Aymara.

In the end, defining rhetoric as I have attempted to do, leads to considerations of methodology--not so much saying what rhetoric is as suggesting where it can be found. The confusion around defining rhetoric must develop consensus first about where to look for it before claims about what it is can usefully be made. Ultimately, one would hope that native scholars working within their own cultures would take over much of the job of saying what a particular rhetoric is. If Spivak's ideas of subalternity turn out to be correct, the outsider confronts serious obstacles in terms of mistaking effects of language use; at the same time, insiders face the obstacle of developing enough distance to see the language they are swimming in.

In the absence of these scholars, and as a segue to the next chapter-- and as a heuristic for evaluating the ability of texts to deliver insights about rhetoric--I offer the flow chart below. This chart is designed to help evaluate collected texts and plan for collecting new texts useful for making claims about rhetoric in non-Western cultures.

The flow chart is divided into two columns. As one moves downward and to the left, one approaches texts that are most useful for making claims about rhetoric in other cultures. Accordingly, the most useful data for making claims about universals and particulars of rhetoric would be the bottom of the first column. My data (presented in chapters two and three) falls well short of the highest standard.

FIGURE 1.2 Rhetoric text collection and analysis flowchart



CHAPTER TWO: FAILED ADVERTISING IN EL ALTO, BOLIVIA

Site of Fieldwork: The Aymara Community

My reason for choosing Aymara as a language and culture to work with came about as a result of wishing to find a non-Western culture that resisted colonization. I wanted to identify such a culture because my hope was that resistance would be an indirect indicator of strong rhetorical practice. As is evident from the following history, pockets of the Quechua community and the Aymara in Bolivia are among the most successful groups in the Americas in maintaining cultural continuity from pre-conquest times. As Hardman reports of the Aymara, "The Incas came and conquered us, and then the Spaniards came and conquered us, but we are not conquered yet!"(*Aymara*[*] 2). One also gains from the historical record a picture of the Aymara as consummate negotiators who have a strong sense of communal identity, who show ethical restraint while exercising tactical and political intelligence, and who through collaboration and networking are able to marshal together a formidable collective presence when called upon to do so. The Aymara value equality and gender equality more specifically, autonomy, and cultural respect.

After recounting Aymara history, I give a sketch of the grammar, and then I describe my methodology and apply this to a sample text.

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[*] All references to Hardman refer to her 2001 grammar *Aymara* unless otherwise noted.

Aymara History

The historical record up to the European invasion in the sixteenth century is principally based on archaeological evidence, accounts of the first Europeans to interact with locals, and inferences based on current cultural practices and physical conditions compared to the aforementioned sources of information.

Based on these sources of data, historians claim that the Aymara came from the Tiwanaku civilization, centered around Lake Titicaca, that reached its height of power and sophistication in the ninth and tenth centuries C.E.

Tiwanaku civilization was notable for its ability to exploit the unique characteristics of Lake Titicaca, a huge navigable lake that ameliorated the surrounding temperatures typical of the high altitude plain (3,800 meters above sea level) in which frost occurs 300 days out of a typical year. More specifically, the people built raised beds in the flood zones around the lake, allowing the water to buffer the cold temperatures and thus created microclimates that permitted the production of crops that normally would be killed by frost. Managing these microclimates, heavy rainfall, and unpredictable weather patterns is what Tiwanaku excelled at, and much of the technological prowess displayed during this epoch persists among the Aymara today (Shimada 373-389).

Managing food production so carefully allowed the Tiwanaku culture to grow in population and negotiate trade with the peoples on either side of the

high plain, or *altiplano*, which sits between the Amazon basin to the east, and the Pacific coast with its access to seafood to the west.[8] The altiplano works like a natural icebox, so fruit and produce that requires warmth would last longer in the altiplano just as do fish and perishables from the west coast. Tiwanaku, and later the Aymara, secured resources through this "vertical trade," exchanging potatoes, quinoa, and other produce that grew well around Lake Titicaca for fruit and tropical produce from the east and fish products and warmer-growing crops that were produced along the rivers that flowed into the Pacific to the west. To this day, the Aymara are able to utilize altiplano climate, which is warm during the day and freezing cold at night, to freeze-dry potatoes and meat. (The word 'jerky' comes from the Aymara *ch'arki*.) My friend Graciela Cebada, whose family has been living in the Lake Titicaca region for hundreds of years, told me that her mother had *chuño*, or freeze-dried potato, that was at least twenty years old and would be brought out for special occasions such as weddings. (This *chuño* was also reputed to taste much better than the more recently made batches.)

Explanations for the decline of Tiwanaku culture are generally unsatisfying, but the archaeological evidence pointing to a shift away from heavy agricultural production and toward pastoral activities suggests that drought may have been a major antecedent. In addition, there appear to have been difficulties maintaining the technological sophistication of Tiwanaku. In any case, as

[8] Worth noting is that there is some dispute as to whether trade was carried among different cultural groups or whether, as one researcher calls it, there were "productive archipelagos" or enclaves of the Tiwanaku and their descendants who moved into outlying areas and managed trade among themselves (Shimada 377-378).

Tiwanaku declined, the Aymara chiefdoms arose to take their place, and these populations were large. Estimates for the Titicaca basin at the time of the Spanish invasion (1532) put the population at around two to three million people (Villamarín 633). Up until Inca conquest, these societies were autonomous with chieftainship granted through heredity and with a specified elite class (Villamarín 577). Interestingly, however, these polities apparently did not have one chief but two sharing the rule for the same region. This concept of dualism, apparent in language practices as well as political ones, it seems to me, is a critical area for investigating Aymara rhetoric. As noted andeanists María Rostworowski and Craig Morris point out:

> Dualism may be a very old Andean (and also Amazonian tradition), but we cannot be sure of its extent. Long before the rise of the Inka, local lords organized their communities into two halves, upper and lower, or right and left. The division, however, was not limited to two halves; instead, each half was ruled by two chiefs, forming a quadripartite organization. . . .
>
> This dual system is confirmed at the provincial level by two documents that refer to the southern Andes, one from La Paz, Bolivia, the other from Capachica on Lake Titicaca. The documents speak of a principal lord and a secondary lord, who served as the principal lord's "companion" or "assistant" (Rostworoski and Morris 785).

I found support for these contention in my own experience. I was told that two people who are enemies literally cannot understand one another, and so a mediator must be assigned to help the two communicate. The Aymara also have an elaborate system of "compadrazco," or "godparentage" in which an older couple acts as advisor for a newlywed couple. In the case of serious disputes, a spouse can resort to the padrinos, and depending on their thinking about the extent of abuse, a padrino can even physically punish the offending partner. This cultural practice is said to originally have come from the Iberian Peninsula (i.e., Spain) as early as the sixteen hundreds, but has since been modified as an important cultural resource among the Aymara (Saignes 103).

In addition to dualism operating at the familial and political levels, it has informed gender practices as well. One investigator notes that one of the effects of the Spanish colonialism that was to follow Inca domination of the region was to increasingly exclude women from positions of political power where their presence had not been a point of discussion (Spalding 945-46). That women would be in positions of political power is consistent with Aymara society today. The Aymara consider men and women equal, and positions of leadership depend on one's "power of convocatoria" or ability to bring people together and induce cooperation rather than depending upon one's gender. These claims are based on my own observations and discussions with Aymara speakers.

The rise of the Inca as an imperial power occurred probably only a hundred years before the Spanish invasion in 1532. The Inca rose to power by

the use of force and by exploiting the principle of "reciprocity." According to one of the first "ethnographies," or accounts in writing of native cultures by a gifted observer, a young soldier Pedro de Cieza de León, the Inca did indeed have a large army, but they combined this with initial overtures of gifts and suggested exchanges. Accepting the gifts amounted to losing autonomy; refusing the gifts meant Inca aggression would follow. Presumably Aymara communities had grudgingly yielded to this coercion (778). As the Spanish dismantled the Inca Empire, the chiefdoms asserted self-rule again for a short time with varying levels of hierarchical complexity (Villamarín 635-36). What followed this short respite, however, was cataclysmic. Between 1525 and 1575, the estimates for depopulation from European diseases killed 96% of the population. It was worse along the coast, but even in the highlands the estimates are terrible--somewhere between two-thirds and three-quarters of the population is calculated to have succumbed to small pox, influenza, and other European imports (Spalding 932).

What followed, with the Spanish figuring out how they could maximize the extraction of resources from the region, is almost as bad as the diseases they brought. The Spanish set up the "encomienda" system, in which a Spaniard took the role of what had formerly been Inca divisions of territory. Often these were *ayllus*. *Ayllus*, at this early stage, are defined by Saignes as "the ancient corporate kin groups that shared landholdings and putative ancestry. . . . the Ayllus tended to reside over far-flung landholdings"(64-65). And from these territories, they plundered as much as possible using existing political structures that had been in place during the reign of the Inca. The problem was that the Spaniards, unlike

the Inca, did not reciprocate. As a result of this, local native leaders, called *kurakas*, were often caught in the middle--trying to manage the well-being of the group of people they were representing on the one hand, and trying to satisfy the ever-increasing appetite of the Spanish for gold, silver, and people (Spalding 935-936).

Spanish control was far from absolute, in spite of the massive die-off and the vulnerability to European technological prowess. Much of the power that the Aymara and other groups were able to consolidate came from their skills as negotiators, both amongst themselves and with the Spanish. As Spalding notes:

> There is considerable evidence to suggest that authority and leadership in Andean societies was a complex process of negotiation and interaction among many people. This process included the local elders who spoke for the lineages and nested kin groups, or *ayllus* on a minimal level, as well as the variety of specialists whose function was to communicate with the regional deities and ancestors and to interpret the messages transmitted to their descendants. Authority did not inhere in a specific individual or lineage but was constantly negotiated and adjusted as people dealt with the conditions of their lives. This characteristic of Andean societies made it extremely difficult for the Europeans to transform these societies into a docile peasantry on the European pattern, but it also played an important part in the ability of Andean groups to

> respond rapidly, and often effectively, to the cataclysmic changes that affected their world during the sixteenth century (948-949).

Contrary to what many Europeans believe, even those whose descendants are now elites in Bolivia, the Aymara have been interacting capably and for their own interests over a long period of time and with increasing effectiveness.

The next major period in andeanist history is reckoned to be the 1570 - 1780, which is marked by the reign of Spanish viceroy Francisco de Toledo at its beginning and rebellion at its end.

Toledo assessed the situation in the Andean region for five years before implementing administrative policies that were intended to turn the Aymara, Quechua, and other groups into the sort of tractable peasants that, apparently, one could find in Europe. To this end, the Aymara were forced to work, especially in mines and without pay (called *mita*); they were supposed to become Christians but not allowed to become priests; they had to pay taxes and fees but without benefiting from them (called *tasa*); they were forced to buy merchandise (*repartos de mercancías*) (Saignes 89-90). Perhaps most damaging of all, they were supposed to recognize "written documents as supreme among forms of social knowledge" (Schwartz and Salomon 452) and see their own cultural practices of orality discredited.

Given the difficulties in administering such a large area--from much of modern Columbia to Southern Bolivia and all of Peru--and the problems of

language and culture, Toledo was persuaded to work through existing hierarchical structures throughout the region, namely, the *caciques,* who originally were the spokespeople of the "highest-ranked Ayllu authorized to speak for the community as a whole" (Saignes 64). In this way, Saignes argues, "The Spanish project involved modifying the kin-based model of politics toward one in which state interests could override, or at least counterbalance local dynastic process"(64). In other words, the Spanish would put the screws to the *caciques* to carry out their mandates, to find the labor forces, collect the taxes, convert people into Christians. For their part, throughout most of the seventeenth century the *caciques* increasingly identified themselves with European ways, including amassing huge fortunes and parading the fact publicly, at first in an attempt to rival the Europeans, and later on with motives apparently indistinguishable from those of the Europeans themselves. They became opportunists and exploiters and ceased to represent the interests of the ayllus they were from (68-70). As Saignes writes:

> After 1680 the native dynasties of what had once been the northernmost Inca domains deteriorated into more or less predatory arms of Spanish commerce and taxation. "Intruder caciques" (as Karen Powers names them) took over one *cacicazgo* after another, bringing low the legitimacy of their titles. When native groups retained integrity of internal process, they did so through non-dynastic ritual and civil leadership, often within emerging latifundia (71).

The imposition of these colonial practices met with resistance in each instance. In order to avoid forced labor and taxes, the Aymara exploited previous patterns of moving between the Altiplano, the jungle and the coast. Saignes notes that "Every colonially established village was the scene of constant comings and goings, in which the ayllus lost 'native born members' and gained migrants or 'outsider' newcomers"(94). Interestingly, these movements appear to have saved the *ayllus* rather than dismantling them since they had the effect of strengthening the links between urban and rural areas (94). The constant movement continues to this day and was apparent when I lived in La Paz's peri-urban areas and supports Saignes' claims about its effects on Aymara community and the *ayllu*. Families regularly left their homes from around La Paz to help their extended families in rural areas for occasions such as harvesting and planting of potatoes and other seasonal tasks or festivals. The Aymara are accustomed to traveling often on other occasions as well--heading down into the *Yungas*, the cloud forest areas on the Amazon-side of the Andes--to sell produce and bring back grape fruit, bananas, and coffee.

Physical comings and goings of Aymara were matched by ideological movement as well. The Aymara response to Christianity was not open defiance, but a resistance that the Spanish found impossible to stamp out. As one Aymara told me, "we walk with our left foot being Christian, our right being Aymara." While Christian cosmology is based on distinguishing materiality, the flesh and the world from the invisible, unapproachable spiritual realms, the Aymara

cosmology, in Saignes words, admits the "shared presence of the living and the dead and the continuity of inanimate and animate phenomena"(108). Given this conflict, the Aymara limited Christian influence to specific contexts--Spanish ones--He being a Spanish God--and maintained Aymara practices, sometimes even merging the two. For instance, in relation to Saignes' point about the "shared presence of the living and the dead," I attended with some Aymara friends their "Día de los Difuntos," on the surface a Christian celebration, but in practice adapted to Aymara cosmological views. On this occasion, the family went to the graveyard with food for the dead, as did the entire community. The various families put pictures of dead loved ones on the gravesites. Poor Aymara were given a lot of food on this occasion in exchange for praying for dead relatives. Apart from the food, there was music and drinking. The atmosphere was celebratory given that the dead were thought to be present, spending some time with the family.

One way to understand the hybrid Christianity of the Andes is to view it semiotically: the symbols and the significance of Christian doctrine meant one thing to Europeans, but given the very different world view of the Aymara, it meant something very different to them. Saignes notes humorously on this point:

> . . . bits of pre-Christian iconography, particularly representation of animals, appealed to Indians for whom animals were invested with the full force of the sacred. A sort of semiological blind man's bluff ensued, in

> which churchmen tried, very fallibly, to predict the reception and interpretation of symbols. In order to represent the Trinity -- and particularly to avoid showing the Holy Ghost in the form of a dove -- Christian artists preferred to paint three Christs, and sometimes three-headed Christs. In doing so they unintentionally recalled threefold prehispanic divinities. The Trinity was also interpreted as the fruit of the Sun-God and the Virgin-Moon, who procreated a Christ-Son; Christ himself could even be perceived as the younger or older brother of the devil (114)

Colonial Christianity also made the misstep of erasing the distinction between the dead, who were always present for the Aymara, and devils. Additionally, since the dichotomy between good and evil does not resonate in Aymara cosmology the same way it does in Christianity, the effect was to give the Devil a dark, but nevertheless positive character, responsible for fertility with help from the moon as well as for the fertility of metals in the earth, or their plentitude (Saignes 118-119). To this day in the mines in Potosí, one finds effigies of the Devil or *Supay* which miners pay tribute to with gifts and coca leaves to placate him while they are working underground.

In addition to hybridizing Christianity with Andean Cosmology, the Aymara maintained many of their original religious practices in secret. The power of the *Yatiri*, or shamans, is still based on access to forces that have existed since the beginning--from the ancestors and genealogy and from the *wak'a*, or

masculinized mountains or monuments. Two of the most important around La Paz are Illimani, the mountain that overlooks the city of La Paz, and the ruins of Tiwanaku (Layme 259). Historically, Saignes points out that as the Spanish destroyed mummies and man-made *wak'a*, or shrines, the powers moved into the mountains and the climate, and most dramatically in lightning (122). Saignes' claims are borne out by the work of Huanca, who explains how a prerequisite for becoming a *Yatiri*, a kind of shaman, is first to be hit and survive a lightning bolt (57). Lightning is particularly frequent and dangerous on the altiplano where the clouds scrape the ground as they pass by.

Other non-Christian practices are immediately evident in visiting the Lake Titicaca region. There the Aymara still practice reciprocity as a way to maintain the fertility of the earth. Before one drinks alcohol, one is supposed to pour a little on the ground first. I was in a boat on Lake Titicaca one day when a storm came up and caught us with large waves and heavy rain. My companions immediately emptied their cigarette packs in the water followed by the beer in the hopes of placating local deities thought to reside in the lake and surrounding mountains. It seemed to work.

To return to the history of the Aymara, after Toledo and the institutionalization of his policies, what followed appears to be increasing acculturation between Spanish and the Aymara and other native groups that created a *mestizaje*, a hybrid population that, on the one hand, allowed the Spanish to exploit native groups more fully, but on the other, created conditions of increasing cultural resistance and open revolt. For instance in the *Yungas*, the

cloud forest region on the eastern slopes of the Andes, a couple hours in a mini-bus from La Paz, rebellion occurred repeatedly between 1622 and 1626. The same happened again in 1664. Likewise in 1661 Glave reports of another mestizo riot in La Paz (508).

Glave's analysis of the origin of these rebellions is principally economic. He argues that what the Spanish expected as tribute was grudgingly accepted as long as it remained within the vestigial system of ritual exchange and loyalty to local authorities, the *kuraka*s. But during the period 1690 to 1730, this community bargain broke down with the shift to the *latifundia* system in which individual households became liable for tribute directly and native communities increasingly lost their land as it was expropriated by the Europeans as haciendas. In addition, the tribute collected and other sorts of economic penalties--for instance being forced to pay for Spanish goods--made the level of exploitation so predatory and visible that it was insupportable (511-513).

The worst of these rebellions during this period was Tupac Amaru II--a rebellion that actually started in Cuzco but then spread to La Paz and the surrounding environs. This episode led to estimated deaths of about a 100,000 people, roughly eight percent of the population of the region. As Glave argues, the principal motive sparking the rebellion appears to have been the business practices the colonialists used to extract resources from local communities. But once the rebellion had erupted, identity surrounding 'indianness," or more precisely, ideas of an Inca utopia or the return of Tiwantinsuyo served to organize and motivate those rebelling (542-550).

Following Tupac Amaru II, the Aymara population in Bolivia, while always beset by predatory colonialists, managed to thrive. Larson points out that from 1838 to 1877, the population in *ayllus* increased twenty-four percent, in spite of a number of epidemics. By contrast during the same period on the haciendas, the native population declined four percent. Likewise, the percent of tribute-paying Indians on *ayllus* increased from sixty-eight to seventy-five per cent. This is also supported by a census taken by José María Dalence in 1846, who found 620,000 Indians living in *ayllus* and between 375,000 to 400,000 living on estates (Larson 659-660). During this period, a number of Bolivia's national policies--protectionism and a deep conservatism among creole elites--helped maintain the status quo, but as Larson states, indigenous communities employed a wide array of tactics, some bordering on force and other working through existing institutional mechanisms, to protect their communities:

> As long as Indians still confronted the state over their customary-colonial rights to territoriality, they continued to root their struggle for land, autonomy, and identity in a moral historical past. Oral cultures, collective memories, genealogies, communal archives, and ritual celebrations, all combined into the shaping of native historical interpretations, which in turn reaffirmed ethnic identity and militancy.
>
> Yet indigenous uses of the past did not constrict their ability to adapt or alter their political and rhetorical strategies as power balances and [as] historical circumstances changed. Building or breaking

> multiethnic alliances, playing partisan politics, forging pacts of patronage, and weaving web of solidarity around the village eminences still called *caciques,* all were part of the shared repertoires and conventions characterizing nineteenth-century indigenous politics. Once the old tributary pact began to crumble-- once Indians could no longer work the cultural and semantic ambiguities of '*república*' to their own advantage-- indigenous communities altered their tactics and realigned themselves along partisan lines or popular-communal coalitions. They also intensified their pursuit of colonial legitimacies (662).

Toward the latter end of the nineteenth century, communally-held land became intolerable to creole elites who saw them as barriers to commerce, the ability to exploit resources, and an inversion of the proper relations of caste that should exist among Indians and creoles. In 1866 and 1868, President Mariano Malgarejo instituted land reforms to dismantle communal properties or *ayllus*, opening up vast territories thereby to a system of political clientism and reducing Indian status to tenant farmer. According to the reforms, all communally-held lands were declared owned by the state. If Indians who occupied these lands could not pay for them, then they were to be turned over to the highest bidder. Even if Indians were able to secure the funds to purchase the land, they would have to repeat the payment five years later, in a sense guaranteeing their status as tenants (Larson 664-665).

Following the land reform, the Aymara, who were most directly hit by the new rules in Pacajes, Omasuyos, and around La Paz, who saw their lands being sold to clients of Melgarejo, some already latifundistas, but also wealthy Indians, miners, and merchants, rebelled. From 1869 to 1871, the Aymara attacked land expropriators and even the city of La Paz itself, using a combination of violent and nonviolent methods. They squatted on disputed land, herded llama and sheep over disputed land, set up systems of sentinels to attack would-be occupiers. I was told be Aymara friends that in La Paz they surrounded and cut off transport in and out of the city. The violence ended when an 1871 Constitutional Convention annulled Melgarejo's law (Larson 666).

But this did not end the attempts to re-appropriate Aymara land. The *Ley de Exvinculación* essentially had the same object in mind as Melgarejo's law but went about the same project with more subtlety. Instead of going directly after land, it abolished tributaries as legal entities, imposing a new universal land tax on individuals in its stead. This had the effect of dismantling the authority system within Indian communities and made everyone subject to mestizo or white tax collectors as well as land speculators. But, again, this new law, though it was not rescinded as its predecessor, was substantially modified as a result of Aymara pressure. Waves of violence followed by government oppression resulted. Eventually, the government created loopholes to reduce friction. In 1883, the government allowed communal lands with colonial documents to stand as such, and they also created a complicated bureaucratic process to legalize land holdings. Many Aymaras argued against land sales on the basis of fraud using

these regulations (Larson 666-68). In spite of this, the Aymara lost huge tracts. Klein estimates that Indian communities went from owning about half the land of Bolivia in 1880 to less than a third in 1930 (152). Albó believes that the Aymaras lost half their land in this way ("Andean People" 769). Larson argues, however, that in spite of these setbacks, Aymara communities continued to function, accommodating and modifying themselves to fit local conditions. In the northern high plateau of Bolivia, for instance:

> . . . the small proportion of land held in estates, the vested interest of provincial bureaucrats in maintaining Indian tribute (as it continued to finance local government), and the historical legacy of indigenous struggle and insurrection in the area (as the scene of massive Indian rebellion during 1780 and 1781 ...), all conspired against the onslaught of applied liberalism and latifundism in northern Potosí (Rivera qtd. in Larson 669-70).

In other places, the Aymara were able to intimidate government tax collectors and employ their own, at the same time renegotiating tribute with provincial authorities. In these cases, the *ayllus* grew to be even more independent at the turn of the twentieth century than they had been in the nineteenth. In spite of this, Larson contends that in general, Aymaras under liberalist market conditions and a booming export market, "laws and practices of divestiture," and larger land taxes found themselves at increasing disadvantage. These setbacks appear to have had the unintended consequence of strengthening the sense of

communal identity, and not just within *ayllus* but across them, setting the stage for large Aymara rebellions that were to occur thereafter (Larson 671-2). Larson argues:

> It [protecting land] also sharpened popular uses of postcolonial discourses, invoking a mythic paternal pact only recently broken by the modernizing state. Indians deployed this rhetorical strategy to condemn the degeneracy and ineptitude of the post-tributary state and to legitimize their own actions. No less important, the avalanche of legal protest thrust Indian authorities into the center of long-term campaigns of communal defense. At the same time that civil law sought to level and atomize Indian society, it created the basis for the rise of militant 'appointed *caciques'* to lead the legal struggle for ethnic revindication in the early twentieth century (673).

One can parse from Larson's statements how much she bases claims about Aymara discourse on legal documentation--a legitimate if limited venue for understanding its potency, and probably also, as such, a source of distortion, but nevertheless one supported by concrete evidence.

The twentieth century was ushered in by Zárate Willka's claims to equality and justice for Aymaras. As an Aymara leader who was bilingual and literate, and one who had made a career of negotiating between white and Aymara communities, Willka found himself caught within the struggle for power between the conservative and liberal parties of his time. Willka aligned

himself, and consequently the Aymaras more generally, with the Liberal party even as the two parties' disputes turned violent in 1899. Militias of both parties began killing Aymaras and indigenous people indiscriminately in spite of Willka's alliance. As a result, the conflict split along ethnic lines. Apart from Willka, others also made moves for independence and equality. Juan Lero, a traditional *ayllu* leader, was named the president of a new republic in Oruro for a short time (Albó 771). In his role as negotiator, Willka advocated that local communities defend themselves at the same time he tried to maintain his alliance with the liberal party. In one instance, Aymaras in Mohoza massacred a liberal battalion, an event Willka had no direct control over. According to Larson, he commanded his troops to "exercise self-restraint toward 'whites' and *vecinos* and to remember their common goal (the overthrow of Alonso [leader of the conservative party] and the 'regeneration of Bolivia'). *Vecino* ('neighbor') at that time connoted 'town-dweller' and applied to people with racial and class advantages"(680).

At the same time, he inverted the social order by ordering whites in Tapacari, the province under his authority, to wear Aymara dress when meeting the militias of the conservatives in battle (680). Larson writes of this inversion that "In his proclamations and circulars, he hints of an imagined nation-state that not only redeemed Liberal promises of land restitution but invited indigenous communities into a new political covenant. His agenda embraced a federalism attuned to indigenous aspirations toward autonomy, equality, and cultural respect"(681).

After the conflict ended, the Liberals betrayed Willka and executed him along with 288 others. The President of the Liberal party, Pando, expropriated Willka's lands as part of his own hacienda (Albó 771). The Liberal party, in its new alliance with conservatives, held trials for a number of years in different cities around Bolivia, apparently as a way to solidify class differences along ethnic lines, categorically rejecting Willka's vision for Bolivia's future (Larson 681).

The next thirty-five years--from 1900 until the end of the Chaco War in 1935--was characterized by more state attempts to appropriate Aymara lands and further Aymara resistance, which was better coordinated among *ayllus* than in any other part of the Andean region (Albó "Andean People" 781). In 1914, Martín Vásquez became the leader of what became a transborder uprising and then a massacre in Jesús de Machaqa seven years later. (See Choque Canqui and Ticona Alejo). Another uprising that included several provinces but was centered in Chayanta, Potosí occurred in 1927. Finally, during the Chaco War, in which Bolivia was beset by the Chileans, Aymaras across the altiplano took advantage of the army's absence to assert themselves. Albó writes of the organizing behind these movements that

> coordination was not carried out so much by non-Indian radical groups, as in Peru, but rather by means of a subtle and complex network of communal authorities known to historians today as the '*cacique* movement.' This network represents an almost direct continuation of the

> one formed at the end of the nineteenth century. . . . The movement combined distinct cultural elements -- such as rituals for the colonial documents -- with legal struggles, political machinations, and insurrections, depending on the needs of the moment. Nina Qhispi, who began as a teacher, was even named President of the Republic of Collasuyo in the era of the Chaco War, a title that landed him in prison for usurping the functions of the chief of state ("Andean People" 782-83).

Albó notes that about the only beneficial response the government made in response to this constant social friction was to begin funding a few schools in rural areas. Although these schools were meager at best--referred to as 'pittance schools'--and there were far too few of them, they upon occasion incorporated Aymara cultural elements. One of them, begun in 1931, used the Andean *ayllu* as an organizational model ("Andean People" 783).

The period of agrarian reforms, roughly from 1930 to 1973, saw a shift in terminology away from indígena, indio, and toward "campesino," or "peasant," as Bolivians critiquing the social order, turned toward Marxism for inspiration. While erasing ethnicity was not a winning strategy for Aymaras in particular, the focus on issues of social justice certainly was. Other cultural forces kept ethnicity around, if not in the spotlight. For instance, a number of Andean writers spoke eloquently about the experience of Quechuas and Aymaras in the Andean

region--José María Arguedas of Peru, Jorge Icaza in Ecuador, Jesús Lara in Bolivia ("Andean People" 791).

The Mexican Revolution also led to symbolic recognition of native groups. The first Indigenist Congress, a meeting of Native Americans, anthropologists, and some government officials, was held in 1940, and a headquarters for the subsequent organization designed to further the interests identified in the Congress, the Instituto Indigenista Interamericana (III), was established in Mexico City in 1948. The Congress, and later the institute that promoted the goals of the Congress, identified major areas where serious problems existed, such as land distribution, food security, the hacienda system, and education. What followed from I.I.I. were publications and a lobby for the interests of Native Americans. However, beyond its symbolic value, it seems doubtful to me it had significant material impact on Aymara communities. The I.I.I. claims that by 1970, they had helped to install some 4,000 bilingual teachers throughout the Americas. How many of these were Aymara is unclear, although in 1977 Dr. Oscar Arze Quintanilla, a Bolivian anthropologist, lawyer, and social activist became the director of I.I.I. (Instituto).

Related to I.I.I. in scope, and having some material effects after 1950, and through the sixties, the U.N. also began to make its presence felt through "Misión Andina"(Albó "Andean People" 792), what amounted to a series of programs in health, welfare, and education with an assimilationist twist--the sort of functions that governments are expected to provide in developed countries. This new business came to be positively referred to as "development" by agencies such as

the U.N., the World Bank, and the self-styled Non-Governmental Organizations themselves (e.g., "Save the Children," "Care International") and more darkly dubbed modernized forms of neo-colonialism by others (see Edwards and Hulme; Petras; Prashad). Reality is perhaps somewhere in the middle (see Leve and Karim 53-58).

In the context of these more subtle cultural changes, Albó argues that the dominant concern of the period from 1930 to 1973 was the Agrarian Reform of 1953. As is noted above, Aymara communities had a long history of resisting the hacienda system, even though it had overtaken large portions of the country by the 1930s. The impetus for agrarian reform came after the Bolivians lost the Chaco war (1932 -1935). Many Aymaras had been forced to fight on the front lines while at the same time observing the more privileged creoles avoiding the fight themselves. The sense of unfairness, along with other factors such as meeting Bolivians from other parts of the country, Albó argues, created a "new postwar consciousness" that catalyzed efforts to abolish the hacienda system ("Andean People" 795).

In 1936 laborers from the Cochabamba valleys formed the first peasant union to protest and successfully break the largest hacienda in Santa Clara run by a convent. Activism and more unions followed. It was not long before political parties saw opportunities to align themselves with the movement. In 1945 the de facto president of the time, Colonel Gualberto Villarroel, organized an Indigenous Congress in which he and other speech makers demanded that schools be created on the haciendas and in which one form of servitude on the

hacienda called *pongueaje* or "servile labor"--essentially slave labor--be abolished. The other arrangement of the hacienda--unpaid work exchanged for the right to farm a plot of land or *colonato*--was not addressed in the congress, and Albó suggests that Villarroel's objectives in using the Indians was limited and political. Nevertheless, this alliance with Aymaras and other native groups as well as laws Villarroel ratified that officially recognized unions was something that the establishment found intolerable. The establishment fomented a revolt against Villarroel, and they stormed the presidential palace in the Plaza Murillo, La Paz. Villarroel was killed and tossed off a balcony later to be displayed dangling from a light post ("Andean People" 796-798).

In spite of the political murder, the oligarchy was not able to reverse Villarroel's reforms. In 1947 and years following protests and rebellions sprang up throughout the country. Some haciendas were burned to the ground while the government did its best to quell rebellions as they erupted. In 1951, Víctor Paz Estenssoro, the reformist candidate, won the presidential elections, but the President then in power, representing the interests of the oligarchy, handed his office to Hugo Ballivián, commander of the armed forces, who then tried to govern through curfews and military rule rather than give it to Estenssoro. What followed was essentially a revolution that brought Estenssoro back to power by 1952.

Estenssoro established universal suffrage, created a ministry for peasants, the word for *indígena* still being banned, and ratified agricultural unions. But this still was not enough to quell Aymara and Quechua sentiment that wanted the

hacienda system dismantled. Quechua peasants then took control of several haciendas in Cochabamba, thereby forcing the government to create a commission that became the 1953 Agrarian Reform ("Andean People" 798-99).

While the Agrarian Reform may have seemed a victory for Aymaras and others, following administrations began to undermine Aymara landholdings once again. Part of this was because the repatriation of land did not coincide with a repatriation of wealth. Aymara communities were still mainly poor and isolated from sources of power. In addition, the United States government had its hand in undermining the Agrarian Reform in Bolivia, not liking the communist flavor of the changes. The worse phase of this began when General René Barrientos took power in a coup d'etat in 1964. He accelerated the process of giving title to non-Indians of agrarian lands while at the same time managing to co-opt native communities in a variety of ways in which they were inevitably the losers. Albó argues that by the end of 1973, Aymara communities, while freed from the quasi-feudalistic arrangements of the hacienda system, were not substantively better off ("Andean People" 800-01).

Albó entitles the time period from 1973 through the 1990s "The Return of the Indian," and claims for this period that "Between 1970 and 1990 virtually the entire region witnessed the return, with unexpected vigor and almost in simultaneity, of specifically indigenous issues that had seemingly been put to rest once and for all in the 1950s"("Andean People" 824). The Katarista movement, a political federation identified with the interests of Aymaras, arose as did Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia

(CSUTCB) and Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia (CIDOB) (824). A major motive for the development of these movements was the inability for conventional leftist or rightist parties to adequately account for the interests of constituents. Along with this development, Albó argues that the state reformulated its assimilationist or "melting pot" stance to that of a cultural mosaic, or as "plurinational," ("Andean People" 825), although as can be observed in the text in the chapter following this one, the Aymara intellectual Rubén Carvajal views this idea as yet another form of colonization. Albó does point out that Katarismo impacted not just Aymaras in Bolivia but influenced Aymaras into southern Peru and the north of Chile, suggesting--though Albó himself does not claim this--that a trans-national Aymara nation may be more salient for Aymaras than a plurinational Bolivia ("Andean People" 826).

Albó also points to another major trend that has marked the last forty-five years: migration from rural areas to city centers. As such, urban Indians came to play critical roles in shifting power towards the Aymaras in La Paz "who no longer lived by working the soil but who, finding themselves rebuffed in their urban social ascent, transformed contempt into a cause and their culture, now more idealized than lived, into an ideology. In the city the most radically Indianist parties were born under slogans like 'as Indians they exploited us, as Indians we liberate ourselves'"("Andean People" 826). As will be apparent below, Aymaras exercise considerable power in La Paz.

Aymara Language

Aymara is spoken by about three million people in Bolivia, Peru, and Chile. The center of Aymara is in Bolivia around Lake Titicaca in the department of La Paz. But beyond this area, use of Aymara extends into Cochabamba, Oruro, and Potosí in Bolivia, along the altiplano highlands of Tarapacá in Chile, and heads west over the Andes in the departments of Puno, Moquegua, and Tacna in Peru. (A department is similar to a U.S. state or a Canadian province.)

Aymara is one of the Jaqi languages, which includes Jaqaru and Kawki. These last two languages are spoken in a couple of villages east of Lima and are on the verge of going extinct.

There has been a debate among linguists for years about whether Quechua (the language of the Incas) is genetically related to Aymara. This claim that is called the Quechumaran hypothesis may have been influenced by Inca propaganda that tried to link their authority and origins to those of Tiwanaku and its descendants:

> When the Spaniards arrived in the Andes in the sixteenth century, they recorded a myth placing the origin of the gods and governors of the Inka empire in the (to them) mysterious Lake Titicaca . . . . From its sacred islands and its waters, the founders of Cusco were said to have arisen, bringing with them the arts of agriculture, weaving, and other elements of a civilizing process. On the lakeshore in Tiahuanaco, one could still see the ruins of strange buildings, different from those of the Inka, and certainly

> empty before the sixteenth century. The Inka origin myth was then associated with them, and from the sixteenth until the late nineteenth century, Tiahuanaku became the symbol par excellence of pre-Inka formation. The debate about the origins of Andean civilization began to take form around Tiahuanaco (Shimada 522).

The trouble is that Lake Titicaca is at the center of where people speak Aymara, not Quechua, although Hardman claims that the Aymara were originally much more widespread and the push southward was a relatively late historical development (4).

The debate about a genetic relationship between Aymara and Quechua nowadays has moved from Incan elites to academic ones. The issue is both interesting and important because it allows linguists to test ideas about the stability or persistence of different features of language as they gradually mutate over time. The debate also has implications for tracing rhetorical practices as well. Hardman argues that the languages are not related because, significantly, the complex morphophonemics of Aymara do not reproduce in Quechua ("Aymara and Quechua" 634).

As a rule, in most of the Quechua languages, Hardman argues, suffixes follow one another transparently. On the other hand, in Aymara suffixes condition the vocalic or consonantal environments directly preceding or succeeding their placement. So, for instance, Hardman gives the example of three morphemes identical in form, but when attached to words, appear

differently because of their different requirements for vowels or consonants preceding and following their presence:

"uma- 'to drink' + -$_{c}$ta$_{c}$ 1>3S + -wa SENTENCE SUFFIX > umtwa 'I drink'" (*Aymara* 34).

In this example, the verb root *uma* has the morpheme *-ta* first person acting on third person (in this case, third "person" being the water being drunk) added to it plus the sentence suffix *-wa* (I discuss sentence suffixes in more detail below). The subscripts on the morpheme *-ta* one can note in the example above indicate that it requires a consonant both preceding and following its attachment to a word. As a result, *uma*, 'water,' loses its final *a* and *-ta* loses its own *a* because the following morpheme, the sentence suffix *-wa* begins with a consonant. The result is *umtwa* or 'I drink.'

On the other hand, consider this example: "uma- 'to drink' + -$_{v}$ta$_{v}$ RESULTANT + -wa > umatawa 'the drunk (person)'"(34). In this case, the morpheme *-ta* is homophonous with the one cited above, but is distinguishable given that it requires *vowels* rather than consonants before and after. The semantic content of this vowel-demanding *-ta* means 'the result of.' In this case, the result of drinking is to become intoxicated, thus the translation, 'the drunk person,' and the final word is noticeably different for the presence of the *a's* that were noticeably absent in the first example.

Unlike Aymara, Quechua does not exhibit this same property among its morphemes of requiring vocalic or consonantal environments before and after placement: they attach one after the other without altering their own form or that

of preceding and succeeding morphemes. Hardman's argument, then, is that it seems unlikely that such considerable complexity would arise in one sister-language after, a hypothetical proto-Quechumaran split into variants.

Arguing *for* the genetic relationship is Campbell who claims the evidence in favor of a genetic relationship is suggestive without being conclusive. Campbell does not consider morphonemics in his analysis, which would appear to be an unfortunate oversight, although he does argue that morphology, taken by itself, shows no more stability over time than other features of language (177-181). As for phonology, the sort of evidence he produces is as follows:

TABLE 2.1 Similarities in simple Aymara/Quechua words

	this	***to be***	***to live***
Central Quechua	kē	ka-	kawsa-
Peripheral Quechua	kay	ka-	kawsa-
Aymara	aka	-ka	haka-
Jaqaru	ka	kuanka "to be there"	haka-
Kawki	<aca>		
Proto-Quechua	ka-y	ka-	kawsa-

(Adapted from Campbell 191)

In the left column of this table, Campbell lists the languages compared. Jaqaru, Kawki, and Aymara are all uncontroversially considered to be sister languages already. So these three languages are being compared in form to Central

Quechua, Peripheral Quechua, and Proto-Quechua, this last being in part a reconstruction of a historical language. One can clearly see similarities among the words compared. Furthermore, the words chosen for the comparison were not random. In analyzing earlier research, Campbell develops a number of principles including looking at simple words since these are less likely to be loans and ignoring words that are identical from the different languages since these are likely to be loans[9] (182). Campbell argues from the evidence above that the imperfect similarity is suggestive that Aymara and Quechua are genetically related.

Aymara and Quechua do share about twenty percent of the same vocabulary, but this can be explained by the long history of contact between the two languages that has gone on for two thousand years (Hardman 4). I did encounter a village near Cochabamba where the inhabitants claimed to have switched from speaking Aymara to Quechua, but I am not sure how this could be possible, although, according to Mannheim, prior to 1600, Aymara was more widely spoken in Peru in areas where Quechua is now the principal language (650). I imagined such a process would be a gradual one but perhaps not.

Historically Aymara mainly has been an oral language, and in it there is nothing equivalent to the phonemic glyphs of the Maya, although some scholars have argued that linguistic representation was manifest in the quipu. The quipu is a device consisting of one long horizontal string from which vertical strings

[9] Campbell lists two other constraints that I do not discuss here as their technical nature would take the reader too far afield. See Campbell 182-83 for additional constraints.

descend tied with knots at various distances. The strings are also color-coded. Apparently, no one to date has been able to figure out how the device functioned. Early testimony about them is intriguing. Cieza de León tells us that during Inca rule, when a ruler approached death in old age and was preparing for a new ruler, he would ask for the preparation of a quipu:

> . . . when the Inca had heard them, he sent for other of his old Indians whom he ordered to learn the songs the others bore in their memory, and to prepare new ones of what took place during the time of his reign, what was spent, what the provinces contributed, and put all this down in the quipus, so that after his death, when his successor reigned, what had been given and contributed would be known (Cieza de Léón 173).

Cieza de Leon also verified how the quipu was used to keep exact accounts of goods in storehouses that after twenty years "the account [recorded in the quipu was] so exact that not even a pair of sandals was missing"(174).

Apart from the quipu, the Jesuits set up a mission on Lake Titicaca in the late fifteen hundreds, and one of them, Ludovico Bertonio wrote the first grammar in 1603 and dictionary in 1612. This marks the beginning of written Aymara, and today the Aymara community is becoming increasingly literate, although it is common to find Aymara speakers who read and write Spanish but only speak Aymara.

Below I present a brief outline of the phonetics and phonology, the morphology, and syntax of Aymara.

Phonology

TABLE 2.2 Phonemic consonants and vowels of Aymara

Notes on Aymara Phonemes					
voiceless consonants - The "q" is pronounced in the uvular region, just above the throat	p	t	ch	k	q
voiceless aspirated consonants - These have an English "h" sound after the consonant represented by the quote mark.	p"	t"	ch"	k"	q"
voiceless glottalized consonants - these have a glottal stop after the consonant represented by an apostrophe. We make glottal stops in English when we say "uh uh," or /uh'uh/.	p'	t'	ch'	k'	q'
The "x" is also pronounced in the uvular region, just above the throat.		s		j	x
nasal consonants	m	n	ñ		
The /l^y/ is similar to the historical Spanish 'll' in Spanish		l	l^y		
liquid sonorants	w	r	y		
vowels	i	a	u		
vowels with lengthening	ï	ä	ü		

(Adapted from Hardman 23)

Aymara has three vowel phonemes, /a/, /i/, and /u/. The /i/ and /u/ lower to [e] and [o] when next to uvular consonants such as /q/ and /x/. This means

that Aymara speakers do not actually hear a difference in the sound but hear an [e] as an [i] and likewise an [o] as a [u], although a Spanish speaker probably would hear the distinction because it is phonemic in Spanish. From a physical perspective, what is happening is that the tongue position for consonants made nearer to the throat has the effect of dragging the vowel sounds back with it.

Vowel length is phonemic in Aymara, which is to say that vowel lengthening is used to distinguish one word from another. For instance, /sara/ translates as 'gait' whereas with lengthening /sarä/ translates as 'I will go.'

Aymara has twenty-six consonants including--to give examples from the representative categories--resonants such as the [l] in English, fricatives (such as [s]) and stops (such as [p] that temporarily stop the flow of air). Aymara's only affricates--stop followed by fricative-- are ch, ch', and ch" (Hardman 11).

Stress is regular, non-phonemic, and falls on the penultimate syllable (Hardman 20). This is an important point for the English speaker since in English stress distinguishes meaning and is phonemic. In general, primary stress falls on the head of a noun phrase, and secondary stress falls on the modifier. So, For instance, the "whíte house" is where U.S. presidents live, but the "white hoúse"-- stress on the last word--is my neighbor's house just down the street. Aymara speakers use special classes of suffixes to do the work that stress and intonation do in English.

Aymara phonology becomes complex when it interacts with the morphology--or how morphemes, which are units smaller than or equivalent to words--follow one another. Some of these morphemes require that vowels be

present or be suppressed either before or after the occurrence of a given morpheme. So it is common to get strings of consonants following one another, making it difficult for the non-native speaker to disentangle one suffix from another. For example, 'I do not know' is *jani.w yat.t.k.ti* where each period separates a morpheme. In this example *yata-* lost an *a* as did the *-ta*, and the *-ki* lost its *i*. If an Aymara speaker says this slowly and carefully, one can hear the first two *t*'s articulated separately followed by the *k*.

This example also illustrates another difficulty with the language for non-native speakers, which is that among suffixes there is a great deal of homophony. For instance, the morpheme *-ta* can be a verbal suffix, first person acting on third person, a verbal suffix, second person acting on third person, a "resultant," that is, a morpheme that changes a verb to a noun, a directional suffix meaning approximately "from," or a derivational suffix that means "up" (Hardman 234). Speakers distinguish among these possibilities through inferences based on where the morpheme occurs in relation to other morphemes, whether a word is a noun or verb, and semantic context.

Morphology

Aymara is an agglutinative suffixing language, which means that noun and verb roots tend to have numerous suffixes added to them. Relationships carried out by spatial orderings of words in English have in Aymara their closest parallel by the orderings of morphemes within words.

The rules for how suffixes follow one another are relatively straightforward and regular. For verbs, for instance, the order is as follows:

TABLE 2.3 Order of morphemes in Aymara verbs

verb root	derivational suffixes	inflectional suffixes	independent suffixes	sentence suffixes

Keeping in mind that I am simplifying a number of Hardman's important distinctions, a verb begins with its root. After the root, a number of derivational suffixes can be added. These, in effect, change the semantic meaning in a variety of ways including spatial and temporal dimensions and manner of action. For instance, one of the verbs 'to speak' in Aymara is *parla.ña.* But if I add the derivational suffix *-nta*, which Hardman calls "the inceptive" (82) I get the following word: *parla.nta.ña.* The meaning of this new verb is 'start to speak'(83). In addition a class of derivational suffixes also has effects on the subject and complement of the verb.

Derivational suffixes are also ordered, and those affecting space, time, and manner generally come before those acting on subject and complement. One should not confuse temporal effects of the derivational suffixes with those of the inflectional suffixes that correspond to what we think of as tense in Indo-European languages--their semantic effects are of a different order. For instance, one derivational suffix, *-ra*, indicates serial action (Hardman 77), and another, *-t'a*

indicates momentaneous action (Hardman 85). With the inflectional suffixes added, the momentaneous or serial action can occur in past, present, and future.

Inflectional suffixes mark subject and complement (for instance first person acting on second person), tense, and data source. I discuss data source as its own category under "evidentiality" in more detail below. All Aymara verbs are transitive. The persons encoded by the inflections are:

TABLE 2.4 Person in Aymara

1p	naya	'I, we but not you'
2p	juma	'you'
3p	jupa	'she, he, they'
4p	jiwasa	'I and you, we including you'

(Hardman 101)

The reason that the third person *jupa* is both 'she' and 'they' is because plural is not an obligatory category in Aymara, so the designation applies to both singular and plural. Likewise, a speaker can use *naya* to refer to a 'we' that does not include the person he or she is talking to. By adding the plural *-naka* onto *naya* one gets *nanaka* or a 'we' that excludes the person being spoken to (but one should remember that the plural is added only for emphasis). One can see the usefulness of this distinction that often causes trouble in English--English speakers have to use intonation for the same effect, and the result often sounds unnecessarily harsh: "*we* are going to the movies, but *you* are staying at home." In Aymara this kind of statement can be much more gentle.

Verb inflections incorporate person in Aymara in the following ways:

TABLE 2.5 Paradigm of transitive interactions in Aymara

1>2	naya.x juma.ru
2>1	jumax nayaru
3>3	jupax juparu
1>3	nayax juparu
4>3	jiwasax juparu
3>1	jupax nayaru
3>4	jupax jiwasaru
2>3	jumax juparu
3>2	jupax jumaru

(Hardman 101)

The reader will note suffixes have been added that indicate the "he/him" or subject/complement relationship. The sentence suffix *-xa* marks subject, and the nominal suffix *-ru* marks the complement in each of the nine possible interactions noted above. These nine interactions are then encoded in different inflectional endings for each tense. Below are the endings on a typical verb in Aymara *churaña* 'to give' inflected for past/present. The inflections are underlined.

TABLE 2.6 Paradigm of verbal inflections in Aymara

1>2	chursma	nayax jumaru
2>1	churista	jumax nayaru
3>3	churi	jupax juparu
1>3	churta	nayax juparu
4>3	churtan	jiwasax juparu
3>1	yatitu	jupax nayaru
3>4	yatistu	jupax jiwasaru
2>3	yatta	jumax juparu
3>2	yattam	jupax jumar

The first entry 1>2, or *nayax jumaru chursma* translates as 'I give/ gave you.' But of course this sentence sounds incomplete in English as it does in Aymara. This is because the verb 'give' in English normally includes not just one complement "you" but a complement for the thing given. In Aymara the thing given is indicated by the zero morpheme ∅, which has the effect of subtracting sounds to indicate its presence. The word for potato in Aymara is *Ch'uqi*. So to say 'I gave you potatoes,' one says *Chursma ch'uq∅* or *Chursma ch'uq*. The *i* has been subtracted from *ch'uqi* to indicate its status as the object of 'give.' Note also that I omitted the *nayax jumaru* component of the sentence. These are not necessary as they would be in English because they are already specified by the verb inflection *-sma*.

The last two categories of suffixes referred to in the diagram above do not occur in indo-European languages. These are noted in the last two boxes as independent suffixes and sentence suffixes. Both these categories, given their lack of correlates, are difficult to translate, often functioning similarly to intonation patterns in English.

Independent suffixes are called as much because they move amongst other suffixes with few restrictions, and as a result placement is often stylistic (Hardman 162). In my diagram above, I show them as coming before inflectional suffixes, but this is not always the case. There are only a few independent suffixes in Aymara: *-ki*, *-raki*, *-puni*, and *-jama*. The independent *-raki* can be used neutrally as 'also' in English, and this is how Hardman translates it.

(166). But Hardman also points out that *-raki* in context suggests lamentation, caution, challenge, or protest (167-68). This range of emotional color the independent suffixes provide is what makes them difficult to interpret or translate for non-native speakers. Below are some examples to illustrate this point. The examples are necessarily longer than they have been so far. This is necessary to provide semantic context for understanding usage.

Julya.x us.xa.raki.tayna.sä, kuna.t.rak jan awisa.ya.n.ista.
Julie SS ill ASP also 3>3R SS what of also NEG inform CAUS near 2>1S
'So Julie's already had the baby! Why didn't you tell me?'
(Hardman 167)

Hardman translates *-raki* as 'also' in each of its instances in the sentence above, but she assigns the quality of regret to their presence. It is worth noting that in the gloss Hardman phrases the second sentence as a question, but there is no actual question suffix in the Aymara. The question form in English is necessary to carry the regret the use of *-raki* conveys in the Aymara.

Another example of *-raki* is given below, this time used to protest. Hardman highlights how this quality of protest is also partly conveyed through combining it with another independent suffix *-puni* and the sentence suffix *-sti*. (Sentence suffixes are discussed in more detail below.)

Inklisa.st kuna ch'ama.puni.raki.¨.spa.sti, yati.qa.p.x.irista
English & what hard indeed also >V3>3D& know down PL ASP 1>3D
'How difficult could English be that it couldn't be learned? We'd learn it.'

(Hardman 168)

The same might be said for Aymara!

Sentence suffixes, the last slot in the verb anatomy presented above, are word final, syntactically obligatory, and as Hardman notes "inflect" sentences--meaning that they mark sentences to denote their significance (170), or perhaps more precisely I would suggest, denote their "illocutionary force." This specialized phrase from Austin, refers to what sentences do as actions. Austin argues that in addition to making meaning or making statements of fact or truth, sentences also perform actions. When a child is baptized, the words of baptism performed by a priest or pastor have the effect of changing the baby's social status. As other actions that words perform, one can also apologize, command, question--or as is salient in Aymara--reference or source information. Sentence suffixes that perform this last illocutionary act are *-ɯa*, *-xa*, and *-chi* (Hardman 171, 179). The sentence suffix vowel lengthening or {-¨} exclaims, as does *-pi*, which can also be used to reinforce the emotional force of a statement (a way of "performing" conviction) (179). Two sentence suffixes, *-cha* and *-sa* ask questions, and the suffix *-ti* negates, although this also has to be accompanied by the negative word *jani*. The sentence suffix *-sti* "follows up" or continues the point of conversation that has gone before (175). Generally, one does not think of 'follow up' as an illocutionary act, but as a form of communicative cooperation, this sentence suffix is beautifully explicit in Aymara. It signals a willingness to engage:

Juma.st	kawk.sa.n.k.iri.raki.¨.ta.sti
you and	where side in >V >N also >V 2P &

'And you, just what place are you from?"

(Hardman 175)

Notable in this response is how the sentence suffix is repeated twice to emphasize the illocutionary force of the statement--not so much expressing interest in discovering where the interlocutor is from as in beginning a dialogue.

Verbs

Here is an example of a sentence from a story collected by Hardman that includes the full range of suffixes for a verb noted above, the verb being the second of the two words:

tuk.t'a.ta.naka.pa.sti ist'a.si.s.ka.raki.tayna.w
play MOM RSL [also >N] PL 3POS & hear RFLX CONT ASP also 3>3R SS
but he could hear the music from within . . .

(Adapted from *Aymara* 221).

So in this example, *ist'aña* is the verb 'to hear.' But added onto this is the derivational suffix *-si* that functions as a reflexive followed by two more derivational suffixes, the continuative (CONT) and aspect (ASP) that together have the same effect as the morpheme *-ing* in English. Following this is the independent suffix *-raki*, meaning 'also,' followed by the verb inflection *-tayna*, which is third person remote, or in other words, referring to a distant or remote time and acting on the third person 'he.' Finally, the word ends with the sentence suffix *-wa*, which has lost its final *a* because of where the stress falls on the word (on the first syllable of *táyna*).

The opening word in the example above begins as a verb, *tukaña*, most likely a loan word from the Spanish *tocar* 'to play.' This is followed by the

interesting derivational suffix indicating the momentaneous or *-t'a*. It has the effect of signaling 'suddenly.' This then is followed by another derivational suffix, also interesting, *-ta* the resultant (identifiably different from the previous *-t'a* because it has no glottal stop), which turns the verb into a noun. It is at this point in reading the Aymara that one sees how the English gloss falls short of the drama the storyteller is creating in the original Aymara sentence.

The story goes that a group of brilliant musicians are invited by a *wirajocha*, a white man, to play in his house. One of the friends leaves the *wirajocha's* house to urinate, but when he returns, he cannot find his friends. He only hears them playing, but the playing is coming from beneath the earth. If the reader can attempt to imaginatively enter the Aymara for a moment, the momentaneous plus the resultant on 'play' has the effect of making the sound of their playing (the plural plus third person possessive following) something suddenly dreadful. Hardman has found it necessary to add "from within" to the gloss to explain the effect, but there is nothing in the original Aymara to peg this to. The reason for this is that for Aymara speakers it is not necessary: the resultant signals the shift in the playing from an action to a thing and the inseparable distance that has suddenly opened between one musician and the rest of his forever-lost fellows.

Nouns

Like verbs, nouns also display distributional patterns that guide how suffixes follow one another, but the variation seems freer. Briggs divides

nominal suffixes into sets and uses the chart below to indicate ordering patterns left to right. I omit details of ordering variation for the sake of simplicity:

TABLE 2.7 Suffix order following noun roots/stems in Aymara

<table>
<tr><td>Limited Set</td><td colspan="8">Set 1 Nominal Suffixes</td><td colspan="3">Set 2 Nominal Suffixes</td><td rowspan="2">Zero Complement</td></tr>
<tr><td>chapi
ch"api</td><td colspan="6">Locationals</td><td>possessives</td><td>plural</td><td>Complement / relational</td><td>Final suffixes</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>ch'a</td><td>sa</td><td>kata</td><td>wja</td><td>jita</td><td>xa</td><td>¨xa</td><td>xa</td><td>naka</td><td>ru</td><td>kama</td><td>jama</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>ja</td><td rowspan="3">Diminutives</td><td colspan="2" rowspan="3">add/ human/owner</td><td colspan="2" rowspan="12"></td><td rowspan="3">ma</td><td rowspan="12"></td><td rowspan="3">ta</td><td rowspan="3">pacha</td><td rowspan="3"></td><td rowspan="12"></td></tr>
<tr><td>kipa</td><td colspan="2" rowspan="6">cha
illa
ita</td><td rowspan="9">ni</td><td rowspan="2">pa</td><td rowspan="2">taki</td><td colspan="2" rowspan="9"></td></tr>
<tr><td>¨ka</td><td>sa</td><td>mpi</td></tr>
<tr><td>¨k"a</td><td></td><td>na</td></tr>
<tr><td>layku</td><td colspan="2" rowspan="6"></td><td rowspan="6"></td><td rowspan="6"></td></tr>
<tr><td>pura</td></tr>
<tr><td>qata</td></tr>
<tr><td>ra</td><td colspan="2" rowspan="3">itu
situ</td></tr>
<tr><td>rara</td></tr>
<tr><td>wisa</td></tr>
</table>

(Adapted from Briggs 111; Hardman *Aymara* 138; 148)

One can see how the verb-turned-noun from the story about the *wirajocha* above almost follows this pattern. The possessive in fact follows the plural rather than preceding it.

Let me give another to show how these suffixes work in practice. A locational acts much as a preposition does in English, but instead of a prepositional phrase, the locational is worked into the noun's morphology and several can be piled up together:

ak.sa.¨xa.r
this.side.beside.toward 'to this side, beside this side'

In this example, the deictic 'this' has three nominal suffixes added to it: *-sa* or 'side,' -*¨xa* or 'beside,' and *-ru* or 'to, toward.'

Likewise, one constructs questions in Aymara, not by shifting word order as in English, but by adding specific sentence suffixes *(-sa, -sti, -ti*). Aymara also has a special class of interrogative nouns that function like indefinite pronouns in English. These combine with the set two nominal sentence suffixes to ask who, what, where, why, when, and how much questions (Hardman 129-132). For instance:

kuna.pacha.sa 'when?'
what time SS

(Hardman 144; my morpheme analysis)

Thematics

One topic I have only touched upon up to this point but bears close attention is what Hardman, albeit somewhat awkwardly, refers to as "thematics." This is the unusual property Aymara has of changing words back and forth into nouns and verbs. In working with Aymara, thematization has been the biggest imaginative challenge. What must the experience be like for native speakers as they listen to someone changing a noun to a verb and back again to a noun,

sometimes five times in one word? One gets a glimpse of this in the excerpt from the story above, but this is but one shift. The fluidity of nouns and verbs seems to almost premise modern physics with its depictions of matter as having properties of waves, and energy such as photons having properties of matter. But Aymara brings this notion from the realm of subatomic particles into everyday routine. Here is an example:

Manq'a.ñ uma.ña.¨.wi.ni.¨.ña.ja.wa
eat >N drink >N>V>N own >V>N 1P SS
'I ought to have a party.'
(Hardman 70)

In this instance, the sense of direction in the second word is not too difficult to follow. The nominalizer *-wi* turns verbs into the place or occasion for the verb (Hardman 65); the verbalizer -¨ (vowel lengthening) identifies the noun with the subject (Hardman 60). The nominal suffix *-ni* suggests ownership of the big noun conglomerate that comes before it. So to give my best guess as to the experience of this word for a native Aymara speaker but in English, I use ellipsis and meanings of the morphemes as best I can to suggest how a native speaker might--*might*--experience the listening to someone say this:

eat . . . to eat . . .drink . . .to drink . . . be drinking . . . occasion to be drinking . . . one's taking charge of the occasion to be drinking . . . be the one taking charge of the occasion to be drinking . . . my taking charge of the occasion to be drinking . . . [and finally with the emphatic sentence suffix *-wa* at the end of the word] I declare myself the one to be taking charge of the occasion to be drinking.

Looking at the sentence this way, one sees a certain humor or wittiness about it. Aymara offers simpler ways to say the same thing, but in the suffixes one senses something of the idle machinations of a Falstaff.

Evidentiality in Aymara

Studying evidentiality in Aymara will probably turn out to be one of the most productive approaches for understanding how persuasive claims are made in the language. In Hardman's work with Aymara, she calls evidentiality or "data-source marking" one of the "prime characteristics of the Jaqi family of languages" ("Data-Source" 113) and a "linguistic postulate" for Aymara in particular (*Aymara* 4) by which she means that its grammatical forms profoundly structure ideology/ thinking/ world view for Aymara speakers. One is obliged to assign evidentials to well-formed sentences in Aymara with few exceptions.

Evidentiality in Aymara is made up of grammaticalized categories that mark where information comes from. These categories include verb forms and inflectional suffixes, sentence suffixes. Less directly, but still applicable, the independent suffixes, the complement suffixes, and some noun roots also participate in data-source marking (Hardman ,"Data Source" 131) Together, these suffixes work like a super-charged MLA citation system. And the misuse of evidentials arouses in Aymara speakers negative assessments that match those of academics when students or colleagues do not properly cite claims in research essays.

Let me give some examples to illustrate how evidentials work in practice:

(John went to the store)wa.

(John went to the store)sa.

(John went to the store)pacha.

Assuming I am the one uttering these sentences, in the first example, the *-wa* attached at the end--a sentence suffix--indicates that I claim John went to the store based on my direct experience. In essence, I am saying that I saw John go to the store. In the second example, the *-sa* indicates that the information was reported, or that someone told me John went to the store. And in the third example, the *-pacha* means that I make the claim that John went to the store based on an inference. (Perhaps I noticed that the shopping bags John always takes when he goes to the store are not in their usual spot.)

My examples, while illustrating the function of evidentials, grossly oversimplify the actual system in Aymara. For one thing, *-wa* is a sentence suffix, *-sa* a form of the verb *saña*, 'to say,' and *-pacha* is a verbal inflectional suffix, so in each case, these morphemes/particles would encode evidential information in grammatically distinct ways and be in different places or slots in words and sentences. Nevertheless, the examples do give something of the flavor for how evidentiality works in the language--the evidential tags for the interlocutor how I know what it is I say I know.

In Hardman's analysis of Aymara evidentials, she conceives of their variety as forming a spectrum that spans the gamut from direct personal experience to knowledge acquired through language to non-personal knowledge

such as one would impute to legends and myths. While some categories are stark in citing data source, others, which she refers to as "weasels," allow speakers to blur or attenuate the precision of data source. So for instance, there is a category even weaker than non-personal knowledge that Hardman refers to as the "noninvolver"("NI" below). She gives the following example:

> Jupa.xay ut uñ.chi.xa."
> She. SS house see.NI.SS
> "'She sees/saw the house' (but I won't vouch, and do not blame me)"
>
> (Adapted from "Data-Source" 125).

The suffix *-chi* is the non-involver, abnegating the speaker's responsibility for claiming that the woman referred to saw the house. It is important to note in the translation how Hardman attempts to capture not just the data-source function but something of the tone of the statement as well. One can almost imagine a story to go along with it in which, say, a neighbor is telling tenants, who have been abusing a rental property, that the landlady just came by. The person making the statement may well want to distance herself from the bad news she reports to the tenants and uses *-chi* as an effective way to do so. I make up this hypothetical story to make a point about evidentiality in Aymara more generally: it functions frequently to carry subtle emotional overtones that are context-dependent and available for multiple readings and misinterpretation. As such, evidentials are both fruitful and dangerous for would-be translators.

Background for My Research

My interest in comparative rhetoric began in the eighties when I heard members of the Ahousaht First Nation speak in Vancouver. I was taking an

undergraduate course with Andrea Lunsford in rhetoric at the time, and so I was immediately intrigued when I observed how well-spoken and eloquent Ahousaht leaders were, especially with regard to objecting to logging virgin forest in Clayoquot Sound, British Columbia. I began to wonder what the root of this eloquence was. It certainly had not come from the Western rhetorical tradition or from British Columbia's K-12 educational system; Ahousaht leaders, more than just speaking, created an atmosphere around the audience that was magical.

I enrolled in graduate school at the University of Arizona, hoping to investigate different approaches to studying Native American rhetoric. I looked at the historical records; the approach raised more problems than it offered clues. One emblematic article, for instance, shows the iterations of Chief Seattle's 1854 speech, translated loosely even in its first instantiation, and later modified over time not with regard to historical context or even textual accuracy but instead as "a rhetorical instrument of domination" (Low 418). Stories in the *Jesuit Relations* appeared even more treacherous. How, I wondered, could I ever make credible claims about Native American rhetorics from such documents?

I looked at literary approaches, examining "Native American Literature." The highlight of this focus was attending in 1992 a class entitled "Poetics and Politics," that brought in person to the class Daniel Lopez, Simon Ortiz, Nora Marks Dauenhauer, Luci Tapahonso, Ofelia Zepeda, Roberta Hill Whiteman, Greg Sarris, James Welch, N. Scott Momaday, Leslie Marmon Silko, Felipe

Molina, Nora Naranjo-Morse, and Joy Harjo. The speakers were entrancing.[10] Nora Marks Dauenhauer in particular seemed to project the same aura that I had felt in the presence of Ahousaht speakers in Canada, and yet I felt no closer to having discovered what a Native American rhetoric might be.

Literary texts seem to resist rhetorical analysis, even those stories that are intentionally didactic. Northrop Frye offers some insightful observations for why this may be the case: literature from Frye's perspective is anti-ideological or subversive of ideology as it is motivated first and foremost to explore what he calls "primary concerns," or those motives "based on the most primitive of platitudes: the conviction that life is better than death, happiness better than misery, freedom better than bondage"(992). Frye shows how writers transcend ideological predilections by privileging these primary concerns. For instance, of Shakespeare's portrayal of Henry V, Frye points out how the play *seems* to be playing to the audience's nationalism when in fact, "We begin by thinking that the myth of the play follows history except for a number of poetic licenses. But it does not 'follow' history: it absorbs the historical movement and confronts it"(993). In other words, the structure of the play itself subverts the ideologies expressed through the characters, their actions, and what the interaction of these variables represents.

But Frye's analysis, while accurate for Shakespeare, does not necessarily account for how narrative or poetry function in non-Western cultures and is but part of the answer. Story may also frustrate the study of rhetoric given a

[10] To view speakers and texts in the series go to http://poeticsandpolitics.arizona.edu/main.html.

functional status within communities as a "social product" (Nelson Spivey 34). More specifically, Bartlett, an early theorist of constructivist theory, saw folk stories as a product of the community. As such, the story would represent the community's consensus about some underlying values and would be difficult to distinguish from the interests of particular stakeholders.

These observations taken together with the work of Bloch and Duranti lead to a useful methodological insight: while any text may be potentially rhetorical or lend itself to rhetorical analysis, including literary texts, the rhetoricity does not necessarily have to reside mainly in the text--it may lie mainly in the situation surrounding its production or performance. To go back to the Poetics and Politics class as an example, much of what was political about the course was bringing academics, students, and Native American writers together: it was the collaboration. This collaboration did not necessarily occur most fully from what the writers said; often the texts served a more iconic function. Dr. Rudy Troike pointed out to me that there had probably never been as many Native Americans on the University of Arizona's campus, and the venue for the speakers reading their works had to be changed from the Center for Creative Photography to the Student Union ballroom (and in the last session, even the junior ballroom had to be opened) to accommodate the audience. The audience included Native American families replete with children who came to participate in the event. Were I able to go back in time and do a rhetorical analysis of the Poetics and Politics class, I would not spend as much time analyzing the texts the writers presented to the class, but the discussion that led

to their performance and the discourse that surrounded it. The diagram below illustrates this principle:



In attempting to look for helpful texts for cross-cultural rhetorical analysis, it behooves one to take this slipperiness of rhetoric into account. If the rhetoric is occurring mainly in the situation in which the text is being performed, then it will be much harder to make claims about rhetoric based on that text, and one will have to rely heavily on contextual understanding of the situation. This is certainly the difficulty Bloch encounters in relation to Merina political oratory, which in its linguistic performance is mainly formulaic, but which accomplishes its political goals by virtue of the situation (including talk) around which it is produced (5-11).

I did not have the benefit of this insight at the time I was taking the course, so after it had concluded, I expressed my frustration to Larry Evers, one of the organizers of the course, not articulating the problem with much clarity. It was he who suggested I study with Jane Hill who taught linguistic anthropology. In her courses, I found the same (from my point of view) unfortunate emphasis on the literary that I had found in the English department, but with interesting exceptions. More importantly, the methodology that was being developed offered a way to make claims about spoken discourse in particular that is not

available in written texts. I learned how to use the methodology, and then, with just a nose for finding the sorts of texts I was interested in, I began to think about a place to study.

I originally decided I wanted to study Quechua because it is the largest Native American group in the Americas, and I hoped thereby to find oral traditions less impacted by Western influences. In retrospect, this approach seems naïve given the Europeans' overwhelming presence everywhere in the Americas over the last five hundred years. In 1994, I traveled to Peru hoping to make contact with a community where I could work comfortably. It was on this trip that I met Aymara speakers in Tacna, and I was captivated. Later on I learned that they had a nasty reputation among earlier generations of anthropologists, which I thought, sounded quite promising—the Aymara must have great strategies of resistance, I concluded. This resistance was corroborated from the folk history Aymaras recounted to me—the Incas, I was told, were paid tribute but were afraid to push the Aymara too far. I was also told that the Aymara had originally come from across the sea and settled in the mountains; they were not directly related to the Incas. From Tacna, I traveled up to La Paz.

Once I reached La Paz, I decided to stop traveling and settle in. I stayed at a local hostel where I made friends with the porter and the maid, both of whom were Aymara. Through them, I gradually made friends in the wider Aymara community. Eventually, I rented a small room in one of the peri-urban areas of La Paz and began to study Aymara in earnest. Not surprisingly, my Aymara

friends became open and encouraging once they understood my enthusiasm for their language and culture.

Methodology: Data Collection and Presentation

Linguistic anthropology has developed both a theoretical stance and a set of methods for collecting and representing spoken texts. In what follows, I sketch the methodology as I applied it as simply as possible without reference to theory, and then I describe each aspect of the sketch in more detail, referring to the theory and specific methodological practices upon which it is based. I then apply the method to a text as an example.

My approach for doing work in comparative rhetoric works as follows:

(1) Data Collection. In the Lake Titicaca region of Bolivia, I tape-recorded people speaking who were willing to allow me to do so. My objective was to collect examples of different genres of communicative events in the hope of finding some stable patterns that seemed rhetorical among them. So I recorded conversations, testimonials, interviews, speeches, and radio in Aymara. I collected texts from both men and women, and I looked for speakers who were as old as possible. I avoided recording stories. I also wrote field notes as part of the broader project of contextualization of the speech events.

I conducted interviews with the help of Aymara speaking friends. I would give them guidelines for the sorts of questions I was interested in asking. I usually became quickly lost in the Aymara, but I learned from one friend how to fill in pauses with an Aymara equivalent of "uh-huh" to keep the speaker going.

At the time I was doing fieldwork, the political situation was volatile, so I would often head off with a friend to marches, demonstrations, and protests to ask people for their opinions. I also tried to gauge the reactions of interlocutors to the texts I recorded. If rhetoric is used effectively, I presumed it would affect interlocutors as the speaker intended. However, as I pointed out in chapter one, this presumption of intended effect does not seem to directly apply to Aymara. I would re-frame this Western idea of rhetoric to say that Aymara speakers take great care to represent their own point of view as fully as they are capable but do not presume to influence others as a consequence.

With all the people I tape-recorded, I explained that I was a student of Aymara and that I was writing a dissertation that would be about Aymara rhetoric that would become part of the available information in a library. I suggested the possibility of keeping speakers' identities anonymous, but this did not communicate well. The people I interviewed were all proud of their ability to speak Aymara. In spite of this, the place names and people's names referred to in this dissertation are pseudonymous. I did not offer remuneration for any of the texts I collected.

(2) Transcription. After tape recording people talking, I worked with a native Aymara speaker to transcribe the tapes into the original language in written form and then translate the written transcriptions into Spanish, taking into account prosodic features, such as pausing. My transcriber Victor Herrera was twenty-one at the time when I met him, and a bilingual Spanish-Aymara speaker. He was literate in Spanish but not in Aymara. I taught him how to

write in Aymara and how to recognize intonation units so that he could transcribe recordings of Aymara to written form. I paid him for his services.

(3) Analysis. With written transcriptions in hand and with their translation, I analyzed the texts in terms of their morphology, syntax, semantics, and prosody to make claims about Aymara rhetoric. The reason for analyzing the texts linguistically is to minimize reliance on Spanish translations and allow me to approximate, as closely as I could, the experience of a native interlocutor hearing the speech event in context. Any emic understandings of the texts came from the observations offered by Aymara speakers or that I elicited from consultants.

Data Collection and Analysis: Theoretical Background

Ideas for how to collect and understand speech from communities is discussed in the subfield called the *ethnography of communication*. My approach for collecting, transcribing and analyzing data comes from the programmatic work in this field published in 1972, more specifically, from appendix two by Sherzer and Darnell in *Directions in Sociolinguistics: the Ethnography of Communication*, Gumperz and Hymes, editors. I take as assumptions for the most useful approach for discovering how rhetoric works in cultural contexts the topics they pose for consideration and the conception of speech framed in terms of *communicative events*. It is also worth mentioning that the model they describe is indebted to work by Kenneth Burke, as I point out in detail below, so one can say that the relationship between the ethnography of communication and

rhetoric has been, if brief, then at least fruitful. In the appendix, Sherzer and Darnell identify the following areas to guide research:

1. Analysis of the use of speech
2. Attitudes toward the use of speech
3. Acquisition of speaking competence
4. The use of speech in education and social control
5. Typological generalizations (549)

Worth noting in detail are what Sherzer and Darnell have to say about area number one above, or the "Analysis of the use of speech." In this first area, the authors distinguish the ethnography of communication from traditional linguistic study that focuses on looking at language in relation to Chomsky's postulate of the "ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homogeneous speech-community" (Chomsky 3). Instead Sherzer and Darnell make the assumption that speech communities are diverse, though rule-bound in their own ways. As they note about traditional linguistic study: "The usual description of a language, from this point of view, deals with only a portion, sometimes a somewhat arbitrary portion, of the structure of speaking in a community"(549). In other words, the *ethnography of communication* shifts the focus of language away from a conceptualization of language as an artifact to one in which language conforms to serve social ends.

The notion of a *speech community* is a key assumption that allows for the *ethnography of communication* to depart from linguistics. However, the concept has been evolving since Darnell and Sherzer's appendix was written in ways that reflect increasing globalization and observed complexities in defining groups in urban areas and on the internet where virtual networks often seem to have more relevance than any physical configuration of proximity[11]. Further, the locus of attention has been shifting away from the idea of groups as such and toward the boundaries of their interaction. This movement toward the boundaries begins with work by Gumperz in the 1960's, showing that defining a *speech community* among interlocutors relies as much on shared interpretations of language being produced as it does on producing language that is supposedly shared ("Linguistic"). Once one understands that it is the interpretive practices that make discourse meaningful, one sees that the idea of a shared language by itself could easily lead to misinterpretation. More recently Duranti, defining the speech community as "the product of the communicative activities engaged in by a given group of people"(*Linguistic Anthropology* 82) focuses attention on how shared norms for discourse emerge through the practice of community.

In spite of this more dynamic reframing of the concept, some suggest the term speech community be abandoned. Irvine and Gal propose that the concept of speech community be replaced by the more flexible notions of boundaries and processes of differentiation since these do not elide how power operates through discourse in a way that the idea of "speech community" does (75). The work of

[11] Related, but distinct from speech community is the notion of a *discourse community*. For discussion of its definition see Swales chapter two.

Irvine and Gal is pertinent to Aymara. The Aymara speech community is divided into urban and rural populations, though travel to and from city centers is an ancient practice, by international boundaries including Peru, Chile, and Bolivia, and by circumstances of relative weakness in relation to the more dominant colonial Spanish. Nevertheless, the Aymara are able to marshal speakers to confront the norms of language practices coming from dominant outsiders. In these cases, the responses to contact on both sides of the speech community divide--the boundaries--become fruitful places to investigate rhetorical practice.

Returning once again to Sherzer and Darnell's appendix, the four remaining areas they outline as a basis for fieldwork, or more precisely, as an approach for analyzing communicative events, explore in detail what rhetoricians like to call the rhetorical situation as described by Burke (xv): Act, scene, agency, agent, purpose are developed according to ethnographic practice as can be noted below. This being the basis for the analysis, they form an excellent guide for investigating rhetorical practice and can be taken as parallel to the list above:

A. Linguistic varieties.
B. Linguistic units of description: What are the local categories of speech acts, speech events, speech situations and genres?
C. Topic: What is the *topic* (or *topics*) of the message, act, or event?

D. Channel: Through what *channels* may a message be transmitted (e.g., "spoken, written, sung, whistled, drummed, etc.")

E. Key: What are the various *keys, tones,* or *manners* in which a message may be delivered?

F. Participants: What are the possible categories of *participants* in the uses of speech?

Discussion: Audience and *spokesman* must be considered as well as the more traditional *sender* and *receiver, addressor*, and *addressee*)

G. Setting: What are the times and places which serve as bounds or contexts of speech usages?

H. Ends: What are the *ends, goals,* or *purposes* of the speech usage under consideration?

I. Norms of interaction: What are the specific behaviors and proprieties that accompany speech usages?

II. Rules for the use of speech: What *relationships* exist among the components just described? (550-51).

As one can see, item B and I correspond to Burke's notion of "act"; items A, C, D, and E correspond to "agency"; F and G corresponds to scene; and H corresponds to "purpose."

Since Sherzer and Darnell, these categories have been updated and simplified, or at least better organized. Saville-Troike suggests the following categories for describing communicative events.

1. Function/purpose/ topic/ setting /genre
2. Key
3. Participants
4. Message form
5. Message content
6. Act sequence
7. Rules for interaction
8. Norms of interpretation

(Adapted from list p. 110.)

Under this approach, the first category--function, purpose, topic, setting, genre--comprises the scene, or "extra-personal *context* of the event"(111). Interestingly, genre is linked to scene because methodological experience has shown that genre is so context-dependent. For instance, one does not hold a wedding ceremony in a basement, although one could play poker there. This suggests that for the sake of collecting rhetorical texts one need merely record speech events in different venues to find patterns of argument, word play, and other rhetorical phenomena that reappear across different genres. It occurs to me that there is some ambiguity created by including genre here and also, in a sense, referring to it in a different sense as "message form." Also in this regard, "message form" has come to subsume "channel," understood as communication being carried out either vocally or non-vocally, and "code," indicating if the communication is verbal or non-verbal.

Category number two, or "key," is more clearly articulated than in Darnell and Sherzer. Key in its updated form is meant to refer to the overriding emotional tone of the communicative event, and as Saville-Troike points out, the key tends to override other emotional aspects of a communicative event: "For example, if a compliment is made in a sarcastic key, the sarcasm overrides the form and literal content of the message, and signals a different relationship between participants than would be the case if the compliment were sincere"(113). Communicative events can be said to have a general "key" that guides the tenor of the ensuing speech.

A new category has also been added--"act-sequence" to convey that communicative events often follow scripts. Saville-Troike uses the example of a salesperson approaching a housewife, first with a greeting, followed by identification of herself, and finally with information about her purpose (122-123).

Like Kenneth Burke with his "ratios" (15-20) Saville-Troike also points out the importance of considering categories in tandem. For instance how "participants" interact with "genre" or "message content" is suggested as a useful way of looking at the evidence.

Transcription Theory

Once a text has been collected along with essential information about the speech community and the rhetorical situation, the question arises of how best to represent the text. This aspect of the process involves both transcription and

conversation analysis. Collectively these methods are described in Edwards and Lampert's *Talking Data: Transcription and Coding in Discourse Research*. As Edwards points out, a fundamental issue when transcribing a text from a tape recording or film is establishing categories for what is to be recorded and what is to be ignored. For instance, should one include pauses, false starts, in-taken breath, or laughter as elements in a transcription? Having decided what categories one wishes to include, the next fundamental concern is how to represent these elements on the page, and especially in relation to each other. The layout implies what the transcriber considers primary, secondary, or of tertiary importance. As such, Edwards argues that transcriptions cannot be theory neutral (3). She suggests two principles for guiding the development of transcripts:

> (1) that the transcript preserve the information needed by the researcher in a manner which is true to the nature of the interaction itself (termed "authenticity" by Johansson, 1991), and (2) that its conventions be practical with respect to the way in which the data are to be managed and analyzed, for example, easy to read, apply to new data sets, and expand if needed for other purposes (related to Johansson's "practicality.") (4).

I apply these two principles to my own transcripts, but in each case, the focus being different, the form of the transcript changes accordingly. In this chapter, since I analyze an advertisement, it makes sense to reconstruct it as a script. In

addition, certain prosodic features are relevant in the advertisement, which are not relevant in the later text. Cruttenden defines prosody as sound features that "extend over stretches of utterances larger than just one sound"(1), and includes such properties as stress, intonation, and pitch. Even in chapter three, prosody is indirectly indicated through having organized the texts into intonation units (described below).

While Edwards does not directly discuss transcription in languages other than English, I apply her principles in considering how to present Aymara. In doing so, I take as a starting position that the Aymara consultant who helped me transcribe the Aymara from the tapes is the expert and ultimate authority on the language. As a result, I consider the integrity of the texts as so transcribed to be greater without my interference. I place my translation of secondary importance in relation to the Aymara in both cases. I indicate vowel lengthening in the text where it has been transcribed with the equal sign next to the lengthened sound. For instance, a long "ah ha" would be represented by "ah ha=." This symbol is commonly used to indicate lengthening in conversation analysis but not in phonology. I choose this symbol, however, because the Aymara consultant I trained to help me do the transcriptions caught prosodic lengthening but not as often phonemic lengthening. Most of the time I have to infer its presence through knowledge of Aymara grammar. The lack of vowel lengthening in my transcripts raises the issue of whether this phonological feature is widely recognized among native Aymara speakers, whether it constitutes an emic category. The evidence suggests that it is. In the Aymara

newspaper *Jayma* vowel lengthening is orthographically indicated where appropriate on a consistent basis. In Bertonio's 1612 dictionary *Vocabulario de la lengua aymara* lengthening is duly noted.

Since vowel lengthening is often phonemic in Aymara, its importance is critical to accurate grammatical analysis. So to handle this problem, when I see verbal inflectional suffixes appearing on a noun root with no other identifiable verbalizer, I infer that there must be vowel lengthening that was not picked up in the transcription. When I listen to the tape, I sometimes think I can hear the lengthening, but I do not consider myself competent to make that judgment from the tape. So in spite of my inferences, I have left the orthography of the texts the same as it was transcribed by my Aymara consultant. This means in the transcripts I do not add phonemic vowel lengthening even if I have inferred its presence. On the other hand, in my analysis, I do indicate vowel lengthening based on my inferences where it is phonemic. In these cases, I indicate such with two dots above the vowel, as is standard practice in written Aymara as opposed to using the "=" sign. For instance, 'I will give it to you,' is /churäma/ or, if I break it down by morphemes, /chura.¨.ma/. I have corrected obvious errors, such as typos, in the transcriptions.

Intonation Units

One could use a number of different categories to move from one line to the next in a text, the most obvious being syntax, that is, moving from one

sentence, clause, or phrase, to the next. However, following theory in transcription, I use intonation units as the principle of delineation.

Chafe defines intonation units as segments of language in speech that are

> identifiable on the basis of a variety of criteria, among which are pauses or breaks in timing, acceleration and deceleration, changes in overall pitch level, terminal pitch contours, and changes in voice quality. Intonation units are hypothesized to be the linguistic expression of information that is, at first, active in the consciousness of the speaker and then, by the utterance of the intonation unit, in the consciousness of the listener, or at least that is the speaker's intent (69).

For those working in discourse analysis the phenomenon of intonation units is well accepted. The basis of the theory for their presence is that physiological mechanisms of speech--that is the need to breathe, exhale air, and articulate words--corresponds with the nature of human consciousness in managing the flow of ideas in a conversation as active, semi-active, or new. This correspondence, then, produces segments in speech prosodically identifiable as intonation units (Chafe 53 - 81).

While most of Chafe's work is in English, he does apply the theory to Seneca and argues that given the physiological and psychological constraints on all humans, their presence must be universal. Work by Himmelman also demonstrates their presence. With regard to Aymara, my own tapes also

support the existence of intonation units in that language, mainly identifiable by pauses but also supported by regular patterns of pitch contour. When I explained the phenomenon to my Aymara consultant, he had no trouble in identifying intonation units as we transcribed the tapes.

My Goals in Collecting Texts

Having decided on a particular site to conduct my research, the question arose as to how best to find texts that would allow me to meaningfully make claims about rhetoric in Aymara. As noted in the flowchart (page 58), the ideal situation would be to collect texts that manifest themselves in accordance with emically defined genres that involve persuasion or equivalents. I was not a competent enough speaker to comfortably participate in the kinds of community activities where such speaking events occurred, and so I opted to interview speakers instead. Given U.S. policies with regard to some Aymara cultural practices, such as the religiously sanctioned use of coca, there is significant justified suspicion of Americans that made interviewing the best option. I developed friendships with Aymara speakers who helped me to conduct the interviews that I did collect.

It also occurred to me that one approach to making claims about effective rhetoric in Aymara is by way of comparison: find a speaking event that failed with one that could be safely claimed as effective and compare the differences. In this chapter, I analyze an example of what can reasonably be considered failed rhetoric in Aymara. In the chapter that follows, I analyze a text that, by contrast,

can be considered effective rhetoric. The differences in the texts, then, allow one to make perhaps a few cautious generalizations about Aymara rhetoric.

Failed Advertising in El Alto

Up to this point, I have tried to put forward some strategies for trying to disassociate Western discourses from the task of observing rhetoric in non-Western cultures. Simply put, I am suggesting that researchers be conscious of their own "terministic screens," to borrow a phrase from Burke, avoid making assumptions, and think carefully about the kind of data that can be collected which will yield insights into the nature of non-Western rhetoric. This is easily enough said but difficult in practice.

However, a strategy for seeing the sorts of errors and misjudgments one might be making can be highlighted by analyzing mistakes in culturally ignorant advertising. In developing countries, a lot of money is currently being directed through advertising at large scale behavior modification. Some of these efforts, as for instance Coca Cola advertisements, intend to turn billions of poor people into the rich market that they are, given there are so many of them. Another trend has been to use advertisers to change people's behaviors for their own good. This is referred to in the literature as "social marketing" (See Adreasen, Buchanan et al, Goldberg). As Pfeiffer argues about the social marketing of condoms in Mozambique, the approach may be more persuasive among the advocates of privatization and neoliberalism, such as the IMF and World Bank, than with the intended target market (78). The advertisement that I consider

below falls somewhere in the middle between rank capitalist motive and social advertising. Regardless of the motives for its creation or the virtues of its producers, the advertisement fails because it assumes that Western arguments will work just as well as more culturally situated ones, or even worse, that these other more culturally specific conventions do not exist.

Context of Advertisement: Rhetorical Scene

On July 24th, 1997 Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux, a French multinational corporation, took possession in Bolivia of the municipal water utility of La Paz with its additional operations in the satellite city of El Alto. The new company, which they dubbed "Aguas del Illimani," is now in the position of providing potable water and basic sanitation for these two cities. According to the original contract signed with the city, Aguas del Illimani had to provide potable water for 100% of the inhabitants of La Paz, extend the sewerage system, and provide 71,572 new connections of potable water in El Alto, with the goal of providing water for almost 100% of the population by 2002. Such a heavy investment in infrastructure had to be paid for, of course, and Aguas del Illimani calculated that they could persuade the inhabitants of the city to pay, however poor they might be. Everyone, after all, needs water.

To put this takeover in more of its proper context, the United States, some first world nations, and the multilateral institutions they manage, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, have been applying pressure on developing countries to privatize public utilities and institutions wherever

they can be profitable. This push is part of a larger agenda, with which most of us are familiar, that its proponents refer to as "Structural Adjustment, " a euphemism for what is really the exercise of political and economic muscle to establish conditions that allow corporations to extract resources cheaply from these countries. It is true that in the case of the Andean region (Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia), state or municipality-run utilities have been hampered by numerous problems that have prevented them from adequately satisfying the needs of their constituents. In the case of La Paz and El Alto, and from an outsider's point of view, these problems were glaring and inexcusable. They included under-financing for building more infrastructure, a Kafkaesque-style bureaucracy, inefficient methods for dealing with the local inhabitants, corruption, inadequate technology and poor application of that technology. From an insider's perspective, however, life was what it was, Samapa—the name of the old water utility—did what it could, and that was that.

Once the privatization had taken effect, however, the challenge for Aguas del Illimani was that the place where it was contracted to invest 80% of its resources, El Alto, is a city composed of principally of Aymaras. According to Multilingual Bolivia: A Guide for Planners and Educators, 41% of the inhabitants are immigrants. Of this part of the population, 30% come from the surrounding La Paz Department. Among women 50 years or older, 82.6% speak Aymara and 73.3% of the same group also speak Spanish. So if you need to do business in El Alto, you must do business with the Aymara in Spanish and in the Aymara language (Albó *Bolivia*).

Water-using habits of the Aymara are antithetical to the interests of anyone trying to make money off of them from that source. In rural areas, for instance, the Aymara are used to collecting rainwater and digging wells to satisfy their water needs. These practices did not stop when they moved to El Alto. Defecating in the out-of-doors is also an ordinary part of life in rural Bolivia in the mountains. From the perspective of many, especially recent immigrants, sanitation is not something to be overly concerned about. (Part of the reason this does not create a tremendous health risk is that the region is so high up—around 14,000 feet—that the ultraviolet light combined with the cold and dryness effectively sterilize human waste in a short period of time.)

When the Aymara do use water, they treat it as the precious resource that it is. For instance, when they wash dishes, they mix a small amount of water and soap together on a sponge, soap up all the dishes and then give them a quick rinse.

So in agreeing to install more than seventy-one thousand connections of potable water in five years, Aguas del Illimani set for itself a task that perhaps the French multinational had not originally anticipated. Not only would they have to persuade the Aymara to buy water connections, they would also have to persuade them to use more water than they were accustomed to using if a profit was to be made. There was also one other big persuasive push that would have to be made: they would have to persuade them that the privatization of the municipal their water utility Samapa was to their benefit. One of the principal venues Aguas del Illimani employed in trying to achieve these persuasive intents was, unsurprisingly, through advertising.

For a rhetorician, advertising of any sort holds value for testing theories about rhetoric. In any given advertisement, a set of rhetorical strategies are employed, and the results of those strategies then become visible as a result of changes in public behavior or not. This is usually buying behavior, but in recent times, we have been privileged to see the results of other sorts of advertising—voting behavior, for instance—or in a few cases, in what is called "social advertising," in changed behaviors and attitudes toward, say, the use of condoms. In this particular case, the advertisement that Aguas del Illimani aired on the radio in La Paz and Bolivia, is a useful case study in another way since it stands as it is an attempt at cross-cultural persuasion. In it, we can analyze how the French wish to frame the debate for how business will be done from the enlightened Western perspective as opposed to how it had been done before.

Essentially the argument works as one of definition, but at the same time fails, partly because the values inherent in the definition work as a sort of neo-colonialist rhetoric, which the Aymara are particularly well-suited to resist. Perhaps secondarily it fails because the French assumed that arguments by definition work the same way in French or Spanish that they do in Aymara. This mistaken assumption appears as arrogance.

The claim the advertisement makes—"we are Aguas del Illimani"—also includes a number of blunders--prosodic, grammatical, and stylistic--that have much to do with how the advertisement was produced. It was written first in Spanish by the combined efforts of the French management and the local Bolivian staff who had been contracted from the upper classes of the society in

La Paz. This group, who are the descendants of the Spanish colonialists (as noted above), are slightly more educated about Aymara culture than we as (Americans and Canadians) are of our native peoples, which is to say, very little. The advertisement was first aired in Spanish. As a second step, the Spanish version was given to a subcontractor to translate and produce in Aymara.

Probably as a result of this method of production, problems arose with the intonation that make the advertisement less effective than it might have been. The subcontracting company was composed of urbanized and relatively young Aymara speakers. The stress and intonation patterns they employ appeared vulgar to many older Aymara speakers. In the first transcript, I indicate some of the shifts in intonation and the major intonation contours with a backslash. The "^" symbol indicates primary stress on a word to avoid confusion with the Spanish accent.

Transcript: Aguas del Illimani radio advertisement

Woman: Ist'a^pxam A^guas del Illima^ni uksa^nxa

utji^wa a^ski yatiwina^ka taqinita^ki

Listen, Aguas del Illiman has good news for everyone.

Man: Jich"uru^ta uksar(u)^xa machaqa^kasta pagaña^w

utja^ni, uma^tsa alcantarrilla^do ukä^tsä\

From now on there will be a new way of paying for water and sanitation

Woman: Nayra^xa uma^niñataki^xa Samapa

uksar mayiñä^nwa municipalidad tuqiru^sa

pagañarakï^nwa

Before in order to have water one paid both Samapa and the municipality

Man: Jich"a^xa juma^xa pata^ka p"isq-∅ (a) tü^/nka p"isqua^ni

dólares pagäta, A^guas del Illimanituqi^ru, ukatxa uma^nixäta^wa.

Now you will pay 155 dollars to Aguas del Illimani and afterwards you will have water.

Woman: Nayra^xa alcantarrilla^do uskuyasiñataki^xa

Sama^patuqir mayiñä^nwa, Alcantarrills(a) juparu^sa ya^q"a pagañarakï^nwa

Before in order to have sewerage connected one asked Samapa; one had to pay Samapa and another as well

Man: Jich"a^kak juma^xa pata^ka kimsaqallq tunka^ni

dólares pagata^xa alcantarrilla^do ukanixata^wa.

Now you are going to pay 180 dollars. You are going to have sewerage.

(H) A^guas del Illima^ni yanapt'apxata^mwa tra^mites municipalida^dtuqir

luraña^mpi, kunanaka^s munasi^ni, qawq"a qulqitaki^nisa ukunakä^mpsä\.

Aguas del Illimani is going to help you all with processing paper with the municipality.

Woman: Uk"amä^twa jamasa^ta luriri nika^sa ji^la pagañakas jan utxani^ti.

From now on there will be no more surreptitious dealings or payments; you won't see more of this.

Man: Ju^k'a qulqiki^wa juta^pxama jan juk'a^mpi tramites luraskañata^ki\, /A^guas

del Illima^ni ukä^ptwa. Taqi^nsa uñjkata q"a^na irnaqasipkara^kta.

It's only a little money! Come and do business with us. We are Aguas del Illimani, that, as all have seen clearly. We are working also.

As mentioned above, the first obstacle to this working as an effective advertisement has to do with the patterns of stress and intonation. For both speakers, the stress patterns are typical for Aymara discourse. Stress overwhelmingly falls on the second to the last syllable. But where there are exceptions, to this, the stress is also regular. An example of this is *juta^pxama*, which in fact is more generally pronounced as *juta^pxam*.

But for intonation or pitch patterns, there is a wide divergence between how the woman speaks and how the man speaks. When the woman speaks, her voice rises in pitch on the first stress and maintains this regular frequency throughout, dropping again on the last word of the sentence. Not noted in the transcription is the tempo; this too is regular and even.

But intonation patterns for the male speaker are quite another story. His voice swoops up and down dramatically throughout the text. These changes in intonation are accompanied by changes in tempo as well. At first this might appear a good thing: he is making the text more attention-getting for his listeners, but my consultants confirm the opposite is the case. Instead of finding it interesting, they find it distracting. According to one consultant, his voice is overly macho or trying to ape the intonation patterns that Spanish radio personalities use for their advertisements.

Of course there is a decision to be made here between a more conservative versus a more "attention-getting" approach, and this depends on the image that Aguas del Illimani wishes to create about itself and the type of audience it wants to reach. But even if Aguas del Illimani was targeting a younger demographic, they were making a blunder. The authority within the Aymara community that shapes opinion, and that shaped the opinion about Aguas del Illimani, was and remains the provenance of older speakers. Even some verbal forms are considered out of the purview of younger speakers until they have established themselves with families and property (Hardman 107). My impression, though, is that the advertisement probably would have been more effective if the male speaker had maintained more appropriate Aymara intonation decorum.

In addition to possible blunders in the intonation, the advertisement also is probably violating stylistic and grammatical propriety in several ways. In the second transcript, I describe below are the first three sentences of the advertisement's text, this time described in terms of their morphology rather

than prosodic features. To understand the morphology, I use the following abbreviations:

TABLE 2.8 Grammatical abbreviations for Aymara morphemes

F - Future	POS - possessive
IMP -imperative	R- remote past
LOC - locative	SS - sentence suffix
NOM - nominal	2>3 - 2nd person acting on 3rd person
OBL - obligator	3>3 - third person
PL - plural	

Ist'a-px-am Aguas del Illimani uk-sa-n-xa utj-i-wa aski yati-wi-naka

Listen-PL-2>3IMP Waters of Illimani that-LOC-from-SS there-3>3-SS good news-NOM-PL

taqini-taki.
everyone-for

Jich"uru-ta uk-sa-ru-xa machaqa-kasta pagaña-w utja-ni,
Today-from that-LOC-to-SS new-type pay-SS there-3>3F

uma-t-sa alcantarrillado uka-t-sa.
water-of-LOC sewerage that-of-LOC

Nayra-xa uma-ni-ña-taki-xa Samapa uk-sa-r mayi-ñ-än-wa
Before-SS water-POS-NOM-para-SS Samapa that-LOC-to ask for-OBL-3>3R-SS

municipalidad tuqi-ru-sa pagaña-rak-ïn-wa.
municipality there-to-even pay-also-3>3R-SS.

Looking at Aymara diction, a number of stylistic/quasi grammatical errors or at least vulgarisms present themselves in the example above. First worth noting is the use of the demonstrative *uka* + suffixes. The demonstrative appears in some form in every line in the examples, in the first line, as *ukasanxa*, in the second as *uksaruxa*, and in the third as *uksar*. By itself *uka* translates as 'that' or 'there.' *Uksanxa*, or *uka* with the suffixes added, translates as 'from that place' or 'from there'; and *uksaruxa* translates as 'to that place' or 'to there.' The reason that *uka* plus morpheme does not function properly in these contexts is that the writers are using it for emphasis in a metaphorical way whereas in ordinary usage it does not refer to an entity such as "Aguas del Illimani" but to a specific place. For example, someone asks you "where's the nearest market?" and you can point and say "Uksar saram," or "go over there." In the first sentence above, however, *uksanxa* refers directly to its preceding noun phrase "Aguas del Illimani," so the root is in fact serving as an empty category marker to attach suffixes that should more properly belong to the noun phrase. The proper way to form the first sentence would have been to attach the suffixes that are currently on the root *uka* directly to *Illimani*. In this case, the sentence would read: "Ist'apxam Aguas del Illimaninxa utjiwa. . . " and delete *uka* entirely.

This last observation was made by Juan de Dios Yapita a native Aymara speaker and linguist. Furthermore, grammatical fieldwork about Aymara demonstratives supports this point of view: demonstratives belong to the class of determiners that generally form the heads of the determiner phrase (DP). In the examples from this text, however, the determiners follow the substantive phrases.

Descriptive grammars support that the demonstratives come before the noun phrase that they head: for instance *Uka.x misa.wa*, or 'That's a table' (Hardman et al 259). Work from my own fieldwork also shows *uka* appearing in front of the noun phrases it heads. The relationship between the head of DP and its complement also explains why most of my consultants also felt that in the last sentence *ukatsa* should come before *alcantarrillado,* the word for sewerage.

As a final point about this usage, Hardman, Vasquez, and Yapita's grammar shows that "the pronouns are never used to refer to people except to insult" (258). While the usages above obliquely refer to "Aguas del Illimani" as a place, it may be equally viewed as a group of people. I have not confirmed, however, if this denigrating sense pervades the usage of *uka* in the above examples with native speakers.

Most compelling, however, as a reason for the failure of the advertisement is its misguided attempt at self-definition. As you can see from the text, the advertisement functions as a sort of announcement, a "coming out" advertisement, as it were, for the new company. For the first time, it may be presumed, some of the audience may not have even heard of the takeover or the name "Aguas del Illimani." And this name in itself is a blunder. Illimani is actually the name of the spectacular mountain that overlooks the city of La Paz. In Aymara religious ceremonies within view of the mountain, libations are made to it. Many Aymara hold that Illimani embodies a spirit, or *wak'a*, that has effects on the wellbeing of the region. Even those who do not give credence to this idea treat the mountain respectfully. When the French aligned themselves with this powerful presence, it

was presumptuous, not just because they were foreigners, but because they did not have a proper context for understanding the significance of the mountain from a local perspective.

It was a blunder in another way as well. The French did not know that the mountain had been losing snow for a number of years, with each new dry season showing fresh patches of black that had not been visible before. Now the Aymara know that the water does not come directly from the mountain, but the metaphor of using up their local resources was an unfortunate coincidence nevertheless.

Beyond the issue of the name, the French consortium chose for its new operation is the simple use of comparison, or more precisely, contrast as a topic to define Aguas del Illimani against the pre-existing company Samapa. In contrast to the interested and self-rewarding previous management, Aguas del Illimani portrays itself as disinterested—showing no favoritism for anyone, no variation in price, and requiring no effort on the part of the buyer, neither paperwork nor labor. Business is reduced to a bloodless transaction, a fair exchange of services. The subtext says in effect: "We will show you how you really should be doing business. We are fair, honest, and up front, something that your own home-grown institution could not achieve, which was why it had to be replaced."

As I mentioned before, Samapa did suffer from many of the problems typical of an inefficient and wasteful business operation, but this perspective was probably not felt to be as problematic by the Aymara. For the Aymara, the marketplace is a primary foundation for instilling social cohesion. Aymara develop long-standing relationships with their *caseras*, or favored vendors, and along with goods, the

casera-buyer exchange news, pleasantries, and affirm local values. Samapa had adapted to work in a way that fit in with these cultural norms.

I worked with one employee of Samapa shortly after the takeover who was referred to affectionately by his co-workers as "la Gordita," or "the little fat one," presumably because he was so good at extorting money from his clientele (he was neither fat nor a woman). When I went with him on his rounds, he would tell his current set of customers where they needed to dig a little more, where to apply sand so that rocks would not puncture the pipes once buried, and then he would of course, charge while negotiating what was to be the next step in the process. These negotiations were carried out in both Aymara and Spanish. Mutual respect and the negotiation so intrinsic to Aymara social life were maintained.

By contrast, Aguas del Illimani, instead of portraying itself as fair, honest, and a hard-working member of the community, in effect told the Aymara community that there would be no more opportunity for dialogue, that their participation was irrelevant, and that they would be forced to pay more for water. Thus the appeal to adopt the more universal mode of conducting business according to the standards of international capitalism and the advertisement, failed.

CHAPTER THREE: A RHETORICALLY EFFECTIVE TEXT IN AYMARA

Context of Speech

After having known my friend Joaquin Saenz, a native Aymara speaker, for three years, and after having returned to Bolivia six months prior to the date of this speech, Joaquin told me he had heard of an influential Aymara speaker and community leader in Sopocachi, a neighborhood of La Paz who was willing to speak to us. I had been trying to explain to Joaquin what I meant by the notion of persuasion, and Joaquin did his best to help, but all the while he was clearly feeling somewhat baffled. I think it is because Joaquin had difficulty understanding the motive I suggested must be there. However, after visiting Rubén Carvajal and recording the talk he gave, which is the basis for the following transcript and analysis, Joaquin told me, "I think, Dennis, this is what you're looking for."

Persuasiveness has always been a slippery term, and its effectiveness in a given text indeterminate. For instance, one of the most anthologized texts in the history of English composition must be Swift's "Modest Proposal," and yet the historical record indicates that at the time of its initial publication, the pamphlet was met with silence (Phiddian 620, note 11). Perhaps its complex and uncomfortable positioning of the reader as colluding with the narrator and the newness of Swift's brand of satire at the time slowed its acceptance. In any case, Joaquin Saenz, at least, attested to the persuasive nature of the following text.

In terms of the rhetorical situation, the problem Rubén Carvajal confronted in responding to our request to give us his opinion of the INRA law

was how to give a clear answer to complex circumstances. Joaquin was the principal audience, but Mr. Carvajal understood me as a student of Aymara who was also interested, at least superficially, in the well-being of the Aymara community. In terms of the INRA law, at that particular moment and place in time--La Paz, Bolivia at the end of 1996--the city had become the site of clashes with police, tear gas, and indigenous groups marching from all over Bolivia, but mainly from the highlands, to protest the passage of the INRA law, an agrarian reform law that altered Bolivia's constitution, put into effect by the then-elected president, Goni Sánchez de Lozada.

This law in its objects and effects was and remains complex. It was a modification of the earlier land reform of 1953. In this original land reform, some of the land that had been expropriated from the Aymara Indians and other indigenous groups was returned to them. The expropriation, however, had been incomplete or taken back a second time later on. According to some estimates, in 1989, 1.8% of landholders privately held 85.3% of the country's non-public lands (Flores 4), the kind of inequitable distribution of resources that is typical of Brazil and Mexico. Sánchez de Lozada sought to address this issue through the 1996 agrarian reform, which appeared to offer solutions to address some of these inequities, but also and just as importantly, applied neoliberalist principles to the process of selling, acquiring, and holding land, as well as providing a mechanism for legitimating ill-gotten land titles under the Banzer government of the seventies.

In effect, the law appears as a sort of devil's bargain. For instance, of benefit to the Aymara, the law states: "The existence of the campesino lot, the small property, community properties, cooperatives, and other forms of private property is guaranteed. The State does not recognize the hacienda [latifundia]" (Article 3 sect. II Ley INRA). This is important because it gives legal recognition to Aymara lands, traditionally held in the communal form called an *ayllu*, something of immense importance to them and their internal political structures (see chapter two). On the downside, section IV of the same article reads, "The mid-sized property and agricultural businesses are recognized by the Constitution." The reason this is significant is because this in effect did legitimate a form of the reconstituted hacienda. Some of these had become huge agribusinesses, many of them soybean exporters in what had previously been lands previously occupied by indigenous peoples (Healy & Paulson 8). In fact, a recent 2006 article in the *Presencia,* a local newspaper in La Paz, called for patience as the last of these properties goes through the process of *saneamiento*, i.e., being legitimated through bureaucratic stamp and seal enacted by this law ("El INRA pide").

The geographer Thomas Perreault lists more comprehensively both the benefits and drawbacks (from an Aymara perspective) that the 1996 INRA law gives indigenous communities: land title in eight limited cases without having to pay taxes on it, an exemption also extended to subsistence farmers. The law also qualifies indigenous groups and colonists for land donations in the future. At the same time, the large landholders also have their property rights secured,

many of whom hold title through previous legally dubious operations. The large landowners also are allowed to assess *for themselves* the value of their lands, of which they are expected to pay a 1% tax to the state. Perreault believes the overall effect of the law is to legitimize and protect inequitable land distribution and ownership (12).

Argument Content and Organization

Given the difficulty of responding to the INRA law, I wondered at the time how Mr. Carvajal could possibly respond to our request. It turns out, masterfully. The arc of the speech[12] is organized in a pattern typical of many Western texts. In its broadest shape, it takes the form of problem followed by solution. In this case, the problem is formulated as Bolivia's elite establishing rules that mainly benefit themselves, which Mr. Carvajal goes to some length to develop and explain. He then turns with less development to the solution, which for Aymara, he suggests, is to vote Aymara leaders into office. Although Mr. Carvajal was asked to comment on the INRA law, he approaches this law indirectly, choosing to treat it as symptomatic of a larger problem, that of unequal and unshared power and interests. So instead of directly addressing the law, Mr. Carvajal carefully deduces the allegiances Bolivia's power elites have toward the majority of its citizens—indigenous peoples—and concludes that the elites pursue interests that set them apart from the Aymara and that are

[12]I call it a "speech" but it could also be characterized as an informal interview in which the speaker made unprepared remarks, or it may fall into that genre in Latin America called *testimonio* or 'testimony,' a more formalized and widely read genre than one generally finds in the U.S.

deleterious to them. What applies to the general principle then applies to the particular--the INRA law. In the course of his critique, Mr. Carvajal makes a careful distinction, rejecting Bolivian nationalism in favor of an Aymara one, and he appeals to the experience he shares with Joaquin Saenz, the interlocutor, as well as establishing his credibility and authority to do so.

My claim that this testimony or informal speech is rhetorically effective, apart from Joaquin's enthusiasm after hearing it, is mainly a result of analyzing its complex and skilful use of Aymara. Mr. Carvajal understood that his response to our query would be transcribed and disseminated, and while mainly addressing Joaquin in the event, was often making eye contact with me as well. And I, like Joaquin, have found the text pleasing, satisfying, and persuasive just as I was somewhat disgusted by Agua del Illimani's advertisement. Ultimately, my judgment of whether this text is rhetorically effective will be substantiated only after this text is widely disseminated or available in Aymara communities for their discussion.

Here is an excerpt from an opinion solicited of Rubén Carvajal Huayllas taken in his house in Sopocachi, La Paz, Bolivia 12/3/96. Joaquin Saenz conducted the interview:

Transcript of Rubén Carvajal Huayllas in conversation with Joaquin Saenz

1	J --Muy bien ukhamaxa= aymar=at parla.nta.ñan Rubén.	Very good, then let us talk in Aymara, Rubén.
2	R -- Bueno ukhamaxa . . jilata aymaratxay aru.s.ki.p.t'a.si.ñani.	Good, then in Aymara we will talk, friend.

[Joaquin then asks Rubén to speak about the new INRA law.]		
3	R-- Bueno . . jilata	Well, friend,
4	. . jiwasaxa= . . amuyusana . . tut'iwisanxa,	we, in our thoughts, because of our heritage
5	. . yaqhachixaya	another thing it is, for sure.
6	jani= jupanakan amuyupjamaktantix	Our thinking is not like theirs.
7	. . jupanakax aka liyina=ka	They, these laws
8	. . kun sapxis jupanakaxa	What do they say?
9	reformana=ka sapxiw	Reforms, they say.
10	. . taqikun amuyunakapaxa	All their thoughts,
11	khursa tuqit apanitachixay janiti	they bring them from Europe, is not that right?
12	J-- Jis.	Yes.
13	R-- Claro, . . ujalay jiwasanaru . . jiwasanakarux saspan wueno kunjamas ayllunakamaxa	Of course it would have been great had they asked of us how our communities were,
14	kunjamas sara	where they were going
15	. . a=h qama.wi.na.kama irnaqa.wi.na.kama kunjamas awir	what was lived, what was done, how it was made, let us see.
16	eh juma.naka.n.xa uh . . qalltawinakam autoridada autoridad uriginarianakam utjchixay janiti	Of the native authorities, the authorities you have, is not that so? [apparently addressing Joaquin]
17	entonces Qama=nis e=h	the Qamani,
18	. . Jilaqatas Mallkus	the Jilaqata, the Mallku.
19	ukanaka kunjamapxtas saspa ujala walichispaxay janiti	Of these it would have been good to they were doing, is not that so?
20	. . ya . . entonces ukanx ukanaka= apanitanakapaxa	So then, what they have brought,
21	janiw ukaruxa jaysatakit jani ukaru uñt'atakitix	that is not accepted or known,
22	. . janicha?	Is not that so?
23	. . amayupxaktant taqis janich	Do we all know what is going on or not?
24	J-- Jisa.	Yes
25	R-- Entonces ukat natakixa	Then, because of that, from my point of view
26	uk . . kunatix khursat apanitaxa	anything that is brought from there
27	. . jani jiwasampix . . sum sum chikachaskaspati,	cannot fit in very well with us,
28	. . jiwasaxa . . ma suma amtawir ma suma lup- . . lup'iwinxa,	we who are of good memory and rational
29	sh- taqpacha . . kunas chuymasanki	everything that is in our hearts
30	kunasa . . lup'isanki	what is in our understanding,
31	kunasa . . jiwasanxa . . ma . . suma . . uñtawisan irnaqawisan utjaspaxa	what has been in our gaze, our labors,

32	jay uksarux sarnaqaspaxa walispa	if it goes toward that side, it would be good,
33	per khursat apanitanakan jupanakan muñaniyanakap luratanakaxa	but we make from what is brought from over there, their pleasures,
34	. . jani walikanitix	that is not going to be good.
35	ukhamaxaya?	Is not that so?
36	J-- Mm	Mm
37	R-- Janiw walikiti.	That is not acceptable.
38	jall ukatpi . . aka Bolivia sas-sasktanx	That's why, then, of this Bolivia we say
39	qhipat qhiparu juk'amp qhiparu juk'amp qhiparuy saraxchi . . jichax	from behind toward behind, and mo toward behind, and more toward bel again it's going now,
40	janiti?	Is not that so?
41	hasta que por último jichaxa . . yasta . . último= pais	Until finally, now Bolivia is the most backward country,
42	ma= . . isti= mendigo sataxiw último pais,	a beggar it is called, the most backward country,
43	aka Boliviax janiti?	This Bolivia, right?
44	. . mm mas atrasado	The most backward.
45	ukhamar tu- puriyatay aka=	To this have you arrived
46	. . jiwasan Kollasuyo markasax	our village, Kollasuyo
47	jiwasa Kollasuyutanxay	We are of Kollasuyo,
48	. . jani Boliviaktantix janiti	We are not Bolivians, right?
49	porque . . ju- jupanakaxa . . Constitución Política del Estado lurasipxix	Because they made the state's political constitution
50	mil ochocientos veinticinkuxa	in 1825,
51	. . ma qhawqha=	a few
52	. . isti criollo.ki.xa.y	a few measly mestizos.
53	. . jupanakax yasta haciendadunaka	these already landowners,
54	. . bankunakani	bankers,
55	. . latifundiunakani	estate owners,
56	. . taqikunanakani jupanakax . . ma qhawqhanix . . uka,	they have everything, among just a few . . . this
57	. . Constitución Politikx . . uñstayasipxchix.	Political Constitution that they have brought into being
58	A Entonces . . jay ukham siskasinx amuyu amuyusanxa	So keeping this in mind
59	. . yatay i=n- yapxatañasxaxpi jiwasanx, no?	We should have to add ourselves into it, right?
60	Kunjamas . . kunjamas . . jiwasana . . irnaqawinaka	What . . . what are our jobs like?
61	kunjamans jiwasan qamawinakax	how is our way of life,

62	kunjamans jiwasanxa . . ma= lup'iwinakas kunas	how is our state of mind,
63	jay ukanak amuyasinxa	taking this into account,
64	. . jiwasatakixa . . janipuniw kunas khursat apatin- apanitanakaxa	nothing that is brought from there, for us,
65	jiwasampix . . chikakaspat walikaspati	can be integrated or be good for us.
66	. . jupanakax sapxiwa	They say
67	. . "civilización" sasin	civilization, they say
68	uka civilizacionx jiwasax jicha quntasxna jupanak taypiru	this civilization, we are seated now seated in the middle of
69	. . ukat jupanak taypinx yast civilizasxna	and in the middle of them, they would civilize us,
70	jay ukxay jupanaka munapxchix.	that's what they want then
71	. . entons ukaxa . . . aceitimpi umamp ch'aluntasin map- mayaptaysnan	so this, mixing oil with water in one it conv- would convert us
72	jay ukhamakaspas ukhamakchixay janti	as if that were so, so it is, right?
73	entons . . nunca janipunixay	so never, NEVER
74	aceitis aceitikipuniniw	and oil, oil is indeed just oil,
75	umas umakipunin jani ch'aluntaskanitix	And water, water is indeed just water. They are never going to mix.
76	, . . janicha?	or no?
77	. . jay ukhamaxiy jiwasan situaciona	So that is our situation.
78	. . . jay ukhama.t.pi jupa.naka.x Constitución Politica del Estado . . lur.t'a.si.p.x.i jupa.naka.tak aski.*	In this way they made the state's political constitution in their favor.
79	. . khaya i- Inglaterrar uñtata un uñtata,	as is seen in England,
80	. . khaya Fransir Franciar uñtata,	as seen in France,
81	. . khaya Roma.	distant Rome.
82	derecho Romas jichakamay akan apnaqataskchix janiti?	Roman law up till now has been used here, is not that so?
83	entonces . . jay ukatpi jiwasax nación . . nación originaryjamaxa,	So we for that reason, then, as first nation
84	. . q'ala= . . armanukuta q'ala= kams kamasañas nuk-	Everything made to be forgotten, everything
85	nukhunukuta,	pushed out of our control,
86	. . q'ala= maysar maysaru . . isti n- jani jan ist'ata,	everything favoring their side with us not being heard.

* The word "aski" is glossed as "Perfect. That has the highest possible grade of qualities." As such, the word captures the irony of the designation. From Felix Layme Pairumani, Teofilo Layme Ajacopa, Damian Apaza Mamani, Primitiva Lopez Apaza (1992) *Diccionario Castellano – Aimara.* La Paz: La Presencia.

87	jan ist'at jiwasa,	We are not heard we,
88	uka Constitución Politicapanx janiti?	in this their Political Constitution, true?
89	jay ukatpi . . jiwasaxa,	that's why then we
90	. . nayax sistx . . aka nacionanakax nacion aymarjama nacion qichuan nacion ua- uaranijamaxa,	I say these nations such as the Aymara nation, the Quechua nation, the Guaraní nation,
91	jan estaduniw uñjastanx,	without a state we remain,
92	porque jupanakax khaysa tuq uñtat estadunakapx,	because they, their State, coming from over there
93	re- ah Constitución Politicanx lurt'asipx jupanakat aski janiti?	have made the Political Constitution for their own benefit, right?
94	. . jall ukat,	that's why
95	pero . . jupanakast jichax uka Estado uñstayapxixa,	but now they have made this state appear
96	. . . jan nacioniniraki,	without a nation.
97	. . nacionaxa armanukutachi janti?	The nation is forgotten, is not that so?
98	nukhunukutachi uñisnukutachixay janiti?	It is shoved, it is hated, right?
99	entonces jay ukatpi uka uka jan amuyxtantix,	then that's why we do not think
100	uka amuyu ah jichax nax apthapisktxa entonces jay ukhamat qhanstayasktxa,	this thought ah now I am picking up, so in this way I am clarifying
101	akhamaniw akhamaniw sasin . . jilat.	like this it will be done, like this it will be done saying . . . friend
102	entonces awir amuyt'asikiñan uk sum s suma,	then looking we will think about this carefully, carefully, carefully,
103	jay ukapi mutiwuxa,	that is, then, the motive
104	. . kunjamas aka= Boliviaxa,	as this is Bolivia
105	ah en vez de que nayrar sartawinxa,	ah in place of moving ahead
106	qhipar qhipar qhiparu juk'ampix sarxix,	behind, behind, no less, very much behind it goes.
107	jay ukhamataya.	In this way
108	jan estaduxa . . nacionanikit,	the state does not have a nation
109	jiwas nacionanakasti . . janirak estaduniktanti,	and our nation does not have a state.
110	. . uka= Constitución Politica del	This Political Constitution of the

	Estado.	State.
111	ves?	You see?
112	ukat jichax aka= maranakakiw uñstayapxaraki,	From that now this year they have made appear--
113	Boliviaxa= kamsapxisa=	What do they say about Bolivia?
114	. . Boliviaxa . . pluricultura=l [sapxiti,]	Do not they say multicultural Bolivia?
115	J [Jisa jisa]	Yes, yes.
116	A no se ven,	It does not exist.
117	ya ve uka papilitupar uka anott'ayana ist ah,	Already one sees noted on this paper, ah
118	ukax constituciona ah ukarux,	This constitution ah there
119	. . ma ma rimientukaspas jay ukham rim rimkatapx ukaru,	As if it were a remedy, as though they could remedy that.
120	. . janiti?	Is not that right.
121	entonces ukax . . papilar,	So then . . . on this paper
122	pero jupanakatakix jani walikitix ukax.	But for them things are not well, this
123	entonces ukat jichax jiwasanxa	So then now, our
124	akax Pachakuti sataxchixay nayas waynakayat ukjatpach i- ist'askayatx	this Pachakuti is being spoken of since I was young, from those times I hear
125	saskirit kunarakipach Pachakut Pachakut walraks parlapxixa sasina ukat	I know always to speak of pachakuti pachakuti and many more times again speaking of that.
126	entonces uka Pachakutix saski anchhichhax pacha jiwasatakixa materia	So it is being said of Pachakuti right now that the time is a matter for our benefit.
127	Tiempo y espacio	Time and space
128	Tiempo y espacio	Time and space
129	uka pachaxa kutt'aniniw saski janiti pachakuti u kutipacha kutt'aniniw uka	It is said this time will return, is not that right? Pachakuti or kutipacha, it will return.
130	pachax entonces phisqa patak maraxay yast pasxiw kamacharakiñani	So five hundred years have already passed. What can we possibly do?
131	q'ala t'unjata q'ala isclavisata q'ala na- nayras venda- ve- q'ala vendantata ah	Everything broken up, everyone enslaved, everything-- our eyes sold, everything sold
132	istimpix ah evangelismu=mpix nayrax liju ve- vendantata amparas ñach'antat	with this Evangelism our eyes sold, our hands tied,
133	kayus ñach'antat jay ukhamay kidastanx uh istinakax naciones	our feet bound; like this our nations have stayed.

134	indigenanakax entonces jichax pero pacha kut sisxixa siskaspas	So now the time will return for indigenous peoples it is said as has been said
135	pachax kutt'aniniwa jumanakatakixa ukjaxa am- ampar ñach'antats kayu	the time will return for you all; in that lapse our hands tied our feet
136	ñach'antats nayra vendatats saraqxaniw siskaspas jay ukhamaxchixay	bound, our eyes sold, they're going to go down as is said, so it is, then.
137	janit?	Is not that right?
138	entons jay ukarupi jichax nanakax amtasipktxa ukat ukhamaru jichax aka	So from here we are thinking now at this moment
139	eleccionanakarus mantañani sasin ma pit entons jupanakaxa puedepxchi	That we will enter the elections once and for all saying they can
140	kun kun lurasiskañsa lurasisippanay jupanakax uka lurawinakaparux	do whatever they like; toward their works [one should show]
141	rispitañay ukhamatak luratapachay jupanakax	respect. For the benefit of their own deeds are they.
142	ukhamatak unañchatapachay	That's what their goal is.
143	jumanakax jupanakax kuna droganaks kuns jupanaka	You all -- what drugs do they
144	lurasisipki lurasisippanay kamacharakini jupanakatakipachay ukax no es cierto?	continue taking among themselves? What are they up to? For their own benefit, it must be that. Is not that right?
145	per jiwasasti jiwasaxa kunatix saphinakasan utjkixa nayra timpacha saphi	But we--they from distant times
146	jan jiwayañ puiripkataynat jupanakax no ve?	could not kill our roots, is not that so?
147	ukat jichax ch'istaniw uka pachakuti timpumpix janiti?	That's why, now Pachakuti's going to be reborn in these times. Is not that right?
148	jall ukanakak jiwasax apnaqasiñan ukampi janiw siskañanit jupanakjamaxa	In just these ways we are going to manage ourselves, and we will not speak as they do,
149	ah ni kuna jupanakar uñisnukuña ni sarxam akat sasiña ni kuna sino uka	nor show hatred toward them, nor say to them leave here, nor anything of the sort.

Mr. Carvajal's opening gambit is not to mire himself in the details of a complex law with its conflicting provisions but to critique it by way of the process that led to its creation. In line 13 of the transcript, when asked to respond to the INRA law, Mr. Carvajal responds, "Of course it would have been great had they asked us how our communities were." He develops this idea at some length, through line nineteen in fact, suggesting several ways that input might have been solicited, local authorities who could have been consulted. He thus avoids the difficulties of addressing the law as a text with conflicting provisions. At the same time, he suggests that the law cannot be any good given that no consultation had occurred. Upon establishing this claim, that they weren't consulted, he then argues, given the lack of consultation that without this process, one cannot expect the law to function very well. The logic of this line of reasoning suggests the importance of dialogue, if not consensus, in Aymara communities. Although the literature on consensus is limited (See Dirks; also see Murphy for difficulties in establishing if consensus is feigned), it is worth pointing out that it has been the Aymara community's ability to show concerted action that drove out Goni Sanchez de Lozada and ushered in the current president Evo Morales. But at a minimum, the importance of dialogue is documented in Aymara communities, so either way the argument is likely to resonate (See *Aymara Leadership*).

Mr. Carvajal does not let the argument for a failed process stand by itself to critique the law but puts it in the context of the Bolivian history of failed policy engineered by elites. In lines 26-27, Mr. Carvajal concludes, "anything that is

brought from there cannot fit in very well with us." His evidence of this is the obvious state of poverty which Bolivia continues to experience, how poorly Bolivia has performed as a polity and economy (lines 41-42): "Until finally, now, Bolivia is the most backward country, a beggar it is called, the most backward country." In other words, the elites have not just been harmful to the Aymara but to the country overall, reinforcing their flawed communication strategies. From there he goes on to point out the unequal distribution of resources (lines 53-56), and their instrument for maintaining the status quo, the Bolivian political constitution (line 57).

The division between elites and their instruments of power, and the Aymara without them, leads Mr. Carvajal to state the problem as a chiasmus (lines 108-109): "In this way, the state does not have a nation [the Aymara] and our nation does not have a state" [the state being controlled by elites.]. This chiasmus is central to the argument because having established the distinction between the Aymara nation and the state as equivalent entities, Mr. Carvajal is in a position to put forth his solution.

Mr. Carvajal touches on one other aspect, the propagandistic element in statehood, before turning to the solution. In line 114, he refers to "multicultural Bolivia," a term that refers to a part of Sánchez de Lozada's reform, "Bolivia for Everybody." Under this aspect of the reform "Multicultural Bolivia" is posited as a harmonious cultural mosaic, that conveniently elides the historical inequities of power and resources. As Nancy Postero, writing about the Bolivian uprising in 2003 points out, "Although its [Boliva's] constitution now describes Bolivia as a

'multiethnic' and 'pluricultural' nation, these legal reforms have not brought about the end of racism, discrimination, or, most importantly poverty"(80). Mr. Carvajal notes, dryly and in Spanish "It does not exist," or to quote directly: "No se ven" (line 116). The switch to Spanish at this point is significant since this is the language of the elites, so in effect he is speaking back to them in their language of power. The use of the verb *ver* or 'to see' is also significant, since sight in the Aymara system of evidentials is the most emphatic and unambiguous source of evidence: one does not "see it" in Aymara; one does not see it in Spanish.

Mr. Carvajal proposes the solution to the problem of Bolivian elites making bad laws by suggesting voting Aymara into power in lines 138-139: "then from there we are thinking we will enter the elections." He proposes Aymara work within the existing political system, such as it is, and not resort to violence.

Throughout the text, I am struck by one observation in particular-- how extremely careful Mr. Carvajal is in qualifying his statements. As I have discussed above and as I will discuss in more detail below under "evidentials," Aymara has a system for documenting sources of information that allows listeners to associate the claims speakers make with the information source. In the case of this speech, the assiduously precise use of these categories throughout the text, adds tremendously to its credibility. This may also explain something of how agreement approaching consensus is effectively achieved among speakers, and how the Aymara are able to take collective action once the consensus is

established. Given such careful usage, the attendant force of conviction behind conclusions reached must be strong. It also brings to mind a conversation I had with Felix Layme, the editor of the Aymara newspaper *Jayma* when I asked him if they had any articles about the INRA law. His response was that they did not have any writers who were knowledgeable enough to write a competent article about it, and so up to that point they had chosen to remain silent. The response is slow in coming, but when it does come, the impact is much greater.

Style in Mr. Carvajal's Speech

One of my assumptions in carrying out an analysis of style in Mr. Carvajal's testimony is to take the position that aesthetics in Aymara is not so completely alien as to deprive English speakers from getting a sense of it. Part of my justification for making this assumption is that the figures of speech in English are mainly based on a few patterns: repetition, addition, subtraction, substitution, and rearrangement. Alliteration, for instance, repeats sounds; metonymy substitutes one noun for another. In English these principles apply to words, phonemes, morphemes, words, phrases, even clauses. It seems reasonable to expect these sorts of operations to reappear in other languages according to the resources that a given language provides. There is evidence that this is the case, though patterns of repetition seem to dominate such studies unduly. Hymes' work *In Vain I Tried to Tell You* finds repetition in how particles mark verses in Chinookan narrative (318). Reduplication, or the repetition and attaching of a morpheme or root to itself are also stylistic and argumentative

strategies in Southern Paiute narratives and Bengali (See Bunte and Wilce). Global studies of how the figures of speech pattern across languages seem to be lacking or head in the direction of cognitive psychology or cognitive linguistics (See Dann, Shen, and Gibbs).

Apart from describing style in terms of the figures of speech, other strategies include breaking sentence types into patterns of frequency, measuring sentence length, and in general, applying quantitative measures to analyze a particular text or works of a writer. This is part of the approach Corbett takes in *Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student.* It is hard to see, though, how this approach reflects the experience one has of a text, even in English. The approach leaves this writer feeling a gap between the effects one experiences reading the text and the explanation for what these effects amount to (404-408). More satisfying, in this regard, are studies such as W.K. Wimsatt Jr.'s *The Prose Style of Samuel Johnson,* in which Wimsatt analyzes the figures of speech Johnson employs, the prominence of antithesis and other peculiar features, which give one more of a feel for the text. This more intuitive approach seems better for handling a novel aesthetics where structural frequencies are not so much the point as just seeing what is there in the first place.

In the case of Mr. Carvajal's text under consideration, a number of different figures as so-named in English or apparent equivalents are observable throughout the text. There is the chiasmus, already referred to above (lines 108-109); an extended analogy (lines 71-75); forms of repetition and parallelism (lines 79 - 81, 84-86, 90, 129, 131-134, 135-136); and polyptoton (lines 39, 72,74, 75, 140-

141). In the discussion of these below under "Rhetorical Use of Derivational Suffixes and Figures of Speech" (page 167), I argue that Mr. Carvajal's use of these figures comes at key points in the argument that emphasize and reinforce the central points he is trying to make. They show an impressive mastery of the linguistic resources of the language and support the claim that his speech is rhetorically effective.

In addition to these initial observations about style in Mr. Carvajal's speech, Hardman also points to processes at the morphological level that embody much of the artistry in Aymara. Figures of speech are sometimes morphological in English, but Aymara does far more of the work of the language in the morphology, so one would expect to find stylistic expression there. Analysis of Mr. Carvajal's use of morphological features not specifically identified as figures of speech also demonstrates linguistic mastery and clear rhetorical intent. As Hardman notes:

> Aymara is a suffixing language with complex morphophonemics. The bulk of the grammatical resources are found within the morphology. The grammatical resources open to speakers of the language through suffixation are extensively exploited; the culture places a high value on the skilled use thereof. . . . Speaking poorly is partly defined as using short sentences, using minimal morphological forms . . . (4).

These morphological features include playful use and competence in employing derivational suffixes, sentence suffixes, independent suffixes, and evidentials.

Apart from making the case that Mr. Carvajal's text is a rhetorically compelling one, an additional benefit of this sort of analysis is the ability of this approach to bring out aspects of the language that remain hidden in the context of traditional grammars. Most of us familiar with working with grammars are used to seeing single line examples of text, broken into its morphemic units and described accordingly. But this is no substitute for more extended texts, and my hunch is that these texts need to be broken into the full range of genres salient in a language such as Aymara for the adequate representation of these perplexing linguistic phenomena to emerge.

Rhetorical Use of Evidentiality

The question of how evidence is presented and justified in Mr. Carvajal's speech is central, not just to my claim that his speech is rhetorically effective, but also to the notion of what--to a rhetorician--is special about Aymara as a language and culture in particular. One could say that the Aymara are the original academics: the language demands that speakers cite where information comes from, whether it is direct experience, whether it was spoken by others, whether it was reached by way of inference. This linguistic exigency cuts across grammatical categories to include verb inflections, sentence suffixes, and independent suffixes. As such, It is impossible to relegate evidentiality to a single grammatical category. Hardman explains this as follows:

> The Aymara are obligatorily aware of the source of their data; that which one knows because of the information through one's own senses, primarily vision, takes one set of inflective forms, sentence suffixes, and other comparable structures; that which one knows through language takes a different set; that which one knows otherwise, by inference or guessing, or non-personal sources take still different sets. This division of the world into the personally known (PK), the known-through-language (KTL), and the non-personally known (NPK) is so natural to the Aymara and the lack thereof so unbelievable, that even the Aymara linguists with the Aymara Language Materials Program found it hard to believe the English speaking linguists when the lack of this category in English was explained; even personal experience with the English language leaves them baffled. The category is of such overriding importance that the Aymara endow forms in a foreign language with the required properties(5).

Following Hardman. I also divide evidentiality according to whether it is personally known (PK), known-through-language (KTL), or non-personally known (NPK), that is known-through-inference.

Mr. Carvajal's speech is notable in that he arrives at most of his conclusions principally through lines of reasoning rather than through reference to personal knowledge. This is significant given that in Aymara, in a way similar

to English discourse, speakers tend to find conclusions based on evidence more persuasive than those based on lines of reasoning. So the question arises how does Mr. Carvajal build a strong case given this potential weakness that the evidence or data is ephemeral and that he argues through logic? Originally, I had expected to see ample use of the NPK category, that is, the non-personally known or what is indexed as known through inference. However, a remarkable characteristic of the text is that the verb inflection *-pacha* that marks NPK in typical cases where reasoning is involved is noticeably absent. In fact the inferential verb suffix*-pacha* does not appear on a single verb throughout the text.[13] Instead what Mr. Carvajal is doing is much more subtle. In place of making it clear that he is relying on inferences to proceed, he employs the sentence suffix *-pi* to, in essence, co-opt the listener's tacit or expressed agreement with each step in the argument so it may go forward. In essence, he is claiming for the speaker "you already know this. Wake up and smell the coffee." This shared agreement then, as Hardman puts it, obviates the need for the use of inferential or non-involver suffixes and "includes the listener in mutual knowledge" (personal communication). To reiterate a point from chapter two, this also illustrates how the sentence suffixes embody illocutionary force, or the

[13] The attentive reader will find multiple instances of *-pacha* in the text. None of these, however, according to my analysis, is the inferential verb inflection *-pacha*. One of the difficulties in Aymara is homophony among morphemes. In the case of *-pacha*, the morpheme can be confused with the word pacha meaning "time" or "period," the root "sky," or the nominal suffix meaning "all" or "self" (according to Hardman 234) or to what I refer to in my texts as "oneself" following Layme (278).

performative function in language. *-pi* performs the function of claiming mutual experience.

A straightforward example of where one would expect to find the inferential verb suffix *-pacha* is when Mr. Carvajal uses his water and oil analogy to argue for cultural separation between Aymara and Bolivian elites. After making the analogy he concludes as follows:

78 | jay ukhama.t.pi jupa.naka.x Constitucion del
INT like that from EXC s/he PL SS Constitution of the
In this way, they [political elites]

Estado lur.t'a.si.p.x.i jupa.naka.tak aski*
State make MOM REF PL COMP 3<3S they PL BEN perfection
made the state's constitution in their favor.

One would have expected *-pacha* to be present on the verb *lurt'asipx--pacha*. Instead, however, as one can see from the text, the ending on the verb is the third person simple tense or *-i*, which in fact does not index data source at all--it simply marks the verb as inflected. On the other hand, the sentence suffix *-pi* on *ukhamatpi* says something to the effect that "so in this way clearly we can both agree that . . ."[14].

Apart from this example, the sentence suffix *-pi* makes regular appearances at key points in the argument, often attached to *ukat* as *ukatpi*, marking the logical progression of the argument. *ukat*, literally "that from" translates best as "thus," so it is the logical place to shore up assent with the listener. In line 38, it marks the move in the argument that links European desire

* The word aski is glossed in Layme as "Perfect. That has the highest possible grade of qualities." As such, the word captures the irony of the designation.
[14] I owe MJ Hardman credit for this analysis.

with Bolivia's poverty. In line 83, *ukatpi* links the imposition of European legal norms for the loss of cultural memory. In line 89, *ukatpi* links the lack of participation in the state for justifying separating Aymara nationhood from the Bolivian state.

It seems to me that the weakest point Mr. Carvajal makes to contribute to his argument is where he advocates for the idea of *Pachakuti*. My impression talking to people in La Paz is that this notion, even given its cultural currency, is dubious for many, especially when the future is both grammatically and metaphorically located behind their backs where they cannot see it. As mentioned earlier in the essay, there has been some evidence at this point in time for a reclaiming of Aymara authority through the rebirth of the *ayllus*, but Mr. Carvajal in lines 126 through 129 does not explicitly make this link. Instead his strategy is to use a combination of verb tenses/inflections, sentence suffixes, and testimony--essentially skillful use of the verb "to say"--to gradually build his case. He starts off tentatively, suggesting the basis for believing in the idea is highly circumstantial, and then after documenting community discourse that supports ongoing belief in the concept, he ends emphatically with the using the absolute/affirmative suffix *-wa* to insist on its reality.

Mr. Carvajal begins his case for Pachakuti by initially claiming he had heard of the concept, but had no direct personal experience of it or did not pay it much attention--not the sort of thing one would put much stock in. In line 124, Mr. Carvajal refers to *Pachakuti* being spoken of by way of *-chi*, which Hardman refers to as the "non-involver." The line reads as follows:

124 | Aka.x Pachakuti sa.ta.x.chi.xay
This SS Pachakuti say.RES COMP NI SS
this Pachakuti has been spoken of.

Of the verb inflection *-chi*, Hardman writes:

> The non-involver indicates the lack of involvement in the matter, primarily by the speaker, but may relate to non-involvement of the subject and/or complement. The nature of the non-involvement is determined by sentence suffixes and/or particles elsewhere in the sentence. Non-involvement may be because there is no information or it may be emotional, or both (110).

Following linguistic norms for Aymara, Mr. Carvajal combines the non-involver *-chi* with the sentence suffix combination *-xay[a],* thereby marking this verb as the point of emphasis in the sentence, even while insisting no personal involvement (Hardman 180).

The combination of *-chi* + *-xaya* falls on the verb "to say" to indicate that knowledge of pachakuti comes to Mr. Carvajal through language. As such, its veracity falls short of direct personal experience that would warrant applying the absolute sentence suffix *-wa*. Mr. Carvajal will get to *-wa* in the end, but it takes some maneuvering to get there.

The verb 'to say,' because it can convey knowledge-through-language, plays critical grammatical roles in the language. The verb 'to say' often acts as a subordinator with *-sina*, as it in fact does further down in line twenty-five

(Hardman 104-5; 212-13). In this case, he, in effect, uses this subordination to document his increasing awareness and/or involvement through discourse about this concept.

The first move, then, is to go from being not personally involved at the beginning of line 124, to attesting to hearing about it first-hand but in the distant past. This shift is indicated by way of the suffix *-yät*, which signals personal experience with the remote past--essentially a step-up in the reliability of evidence from the non-involver. In line 125, the belief in *pachakuti* grows stronger as the nominalizer *-iri* combines with *saña*, the verb to say. *-iri*, in addition to nominalizing the verb, marks it as a goal (Hardman 66). That the goal of this conversation is *pachakuti* is indicated by the loss of the final *-i* on *pachakuti*, which shows the presence of the ∅ morpheme, making *pachakut*∅ the equivalent of an object in English and thus the goal of the ongoing discussion. This point is re-emphasized in the second half of line 125, where *walraks* "and many more times" plus the verb *parlaña*, "to converse" make the same point.

124	Aka.x	Pachakuti sa.ta.x.chi.xay
	This SS	Pachakuti say.RES COM NI SS
	this Pachakuti has been spoken of.	
	Naya.s	wayna.kaya.t ukja.t.pach i- ist'a.s.ka.yat.x
	I SS	young man state of when from period hear CONT ASP 1>3R SS
	Since I was young, from those times I hear	
125	sa.s.k.iri.t	kuna.raki.pach Pachakut Pachakut
	say CONT ASP goal of	what also always Pachakuti Pachakuti
	I know to always speak of pachakuti pachakuti	
	wal.rak.s	parla.p.x.i.xa sa.sina uka.t
	much also SS	speak PL COMP 3>3S SS say SUB that from
	and many more times again speaking of that.	

Among lines 124 and 125, testimony of community discourse about Pachakuti, in addition to showing increasing levels of adherence to belief, is organized in two ways. First the level of KTL (knowledge through language) discourse is subordinated/subsumed by *sasina*, the second to the last word in the example above. The purpose of this subordination would seem to demarcate the KTL discourse with the NPK apparent at the beginning of line 124. Both these sources or knowledge then appear to be summarized and subsumed into the larger context of the speech itself with *ukat*, which Hardman argues functions as a "resumator," summing things up (214-15) so the argument can proceed.

The sentence suffixes in line 126 work in conjunction with line 129 to complete Mr. Carvajal's case for Pachakuti. In Aymara, the fundamental affirmative statement alternates two sentence suffixes, *-xa* and *-wa*. Together these suffixes define a straightforward claim and are intrinsically dialogic, based on the model of question-*xa* then answer-*wa*, *-wa* being an unambiguously affirmative "yes" marking PK or personally known information. To quote Hardman: "The basic statement in Aymara is the xa/wa sentence. It is a declaration of equivalence which puts into equation, Xwa = Xxa or into balance the two parts so marked. Its underlying structure is the two-part question" (185). If one applies this theory to lines 126 and 129, one sees the alternation in the equation. Line 126 is marked throughout with the neutral sentence suffix *-xa* Pachakuti, "right now" and "for our benefit." This is the question: Is *pachakuti* right now and for our benefit? He repeats the terms twice in Spanish, as if

considering the issue, and then the answer comes in the affirmative in line 129: "this time will return-*wa*."

124 Aka.x Pachakuti sa.ta.x.chi.xay
This SS Pachakuti say.RES COMP NI SS
this Pachakuti has been spoken of.

Naya.s wayna.kaya.t ukja.t.pach i- ist'a.s.ka.yat.x
I SS young man state of when from period hear CONT ASP 1>3R SS
Since I was young, from those times I hear

125 sa.s.k.iri.t kuna.raki.pach Pachakut Pachakut
say CONT ASP goal of what also always Pachakuti Pachakuti
I know to always speak of pachakuti pachakuti

wal.rak.s parla.p.x.i.xa sa.sina uka.t
A lot also SS speak PL COMP 3>3S SS say SUB that from
and many more times again speaking of that.

126 entonces uka Pachakuti.x sa.s.k.i anchhichha.x
So this Pachakuti SS say CONT ASP 3>3S right now SS
So it is being said of Pacha Kuti right now

pacha jiwasa.taki.xa materia
time we BEN SS matter
the time is a matter for our benefit.

127 Tiempo y espacio
Time and space

128 Tiempo y espacio
Time and space

129 uka pacha.xa kut.t'a.ni.ni.w sa.s.k.i
This period SS return MOM PROX 3>3F SS say CONT ASP 3>3S
It is said this time will return,

jani.ti pachakuti u kutipacha kut.t'a.ni.ni.w uka
NEG ? time space or space time return MOM PROX 3>3F SS that
Is not that right? pachakuti or kutipacha, it will return

Thus Mr. Carvajal argues for the reality of Pachakuti: first as one uninvolved in the issue but hearing about it, next entering into dialogue, and finally, it would

appear, testifying as from his personal experience. The progression matches the pattern Hardman describes for the strength of evidence as it is grammaticalized in Aymara: tentatively beginning with NPK, then mediated through language (KTL), and finally affirmed as a matter of conviction in PK. (personal knowledge). Ultimately, this must be viewed as an argument based on ethos, or belief in the veracity of Mr. Carvajal as an authority. However, by documenting for the listener how he reaches his point of view, he is also sharing the authority, allowing the listener to consider his own experience and reach his own conclusion.

Rhetorical Use of Derivational Suffixes and Figures of Speech

According to Hardman, speakers who are able to add multiple suffixes to roots demonstrate stylistic excellence, or the equivalent of pulling off a beautifully tailored sentence in English. This point is confirmed at the very beginning of the text in the short interchange between Joaquin Saenz and Rubén Carvajal. (Refer to line one of transcript.) In the text prior to where I begin this transcription, Mr. Carvajal and Joaquin are speaking in Spanish. The transcription begins where Joaquin delicately suggests that they start dialoging in Aymara. Joaquin uses the verb *parlaña*, plus an inceptive the *–nta-* morpheme to make his suggestion. *Parlaña* is a loan word from the old Spanish *parlar*, 'to converse or speak.' Mr. Carvajal responds affirmatively, but the verb he uses is a different one that means the same thing: in line 2, *aru.s.ki.p.t'a.si.ñani*. By switching to a verb with multiple suffixes, he demonstrates his authority of the

language, and his right or standing in the community to use it, given his age, status as a grandfather, and a respected intellectual. Joaquin, on the other hand, has also demonstrated some skill in using the humble *parlaña,* which serves as a bridge between the Spanish they had been conversing in and the Aymara he wants to begin.

Mr. Carvajal maintains his control of complex suffixization (to use my own suffixes) throughout. Moreover, among suffixes, particular emphasis is given to the Class One derivational suffixes. Of these Hardman writes, "Class I suffixes act on the root or stem rather than on the inflection of the verb. They modify the meaning of the root. . . . Creative and imaginative use of this particular subclass of suffixes is one of the marks of the language artist among the Aymara which frequently gives space for metaphorical and jocular uses"(75). One example is in line 59, the word *yapxataña*sxaxpi. The verb *yapaña* means 'to add or augment' (Layme 268). Mr. Carvajal then adds onto this root the suffix *-xata* meaning 'on top of' to give the listener the sense--putting it in our own colloquial terms--that 'we should add ourselves on top of the dog heap.' A *yapa* in Aymara also carries the connotation of a tip, but inversely for the buyer rather than the seller. For instance, after one buys something at the market, one can beg the seller for a *yapa* before leaving, an extra treat to be placed on the top of the potatoes or oranges, or whatever one happens to be buying. The word, then, carries something of the connotation that "there is something special about us Aymara," and at the same time that being placed on top is a modest request, something any good buyer would request in the course of doing business.

Finally, there is a kind of morphological practice where roots are repeated with different suffixes added. The repetition tends to create emphasis, but also demonstrates competency and wit, not to mention, in some cases, adding evidence. Above I refer to this as "parallel phrase structure" or "polyptoton," but neither category is emically defined, so I mean by naming it to only flag the possibility that verbal artistry is at work. Having said as much, let us look at some examples.

The two instances of parallelism analyzed immediately below are sandwiched between talk of the political constitution of which the INRA law has become a part. (See lines 78 - 88). Together they form a forceful critique of the constitution generally and the INRA law more particularly by bringing the rhetorical force of parallelism to bear on what Mr. Carvajal sees as the embodied class-interest in the constitution.

In the first case, what looks to be an almost exact match to parallelism in English is the following section: *khaya Inglaterrar uñtata un uñtata, khaya Fransir Franciar uñtata, khaya Roma* (lines 79 - 81). If one allows for the slight vagaries of spoken as opposed to written discourse, one sees the repetition of 'distant' *khaya* + country + 'it is seen' *uñtata.* All three states mentioned are European colonizers (the third also pointing to the Catholic Church), in which Carvajal, similar to Foucault, locates power in moments of instantiated discourse, or as he states, in their political constitutions. This notion is reinforced by the directional suffix *-ta* in the verb *uñtata* that carries the implication of 'looking at a specific part' (Hardman 93; also Layme 257). The "specific part" is how the constitution has

favored some, disfavored others (as noted in line 78 above). Mr. Carvajal then uses repetition as a way of mounting evidence for this process of colonization--Rome, England, and France--look at them; look at those they have colonized.

As in English, the effects of parallelism vary depending on the context in which they are employed. Above, parallelism is used to provide evidence; lines 84-86 draws conclusion. These examples, which follow shortly after the lines discussed in the paragraph above, are particularly interesting in this regard because the parallelism includes both repeated words and repetition in the suffixes. The suffixes combined with the parallelism suggest a breadth of meaning that goes beyond the denotative one : *q'ala armanukuta q'ala kamasañas nukhunukuta, q'ala maysaru jan ist'ata*, which can be translated as 'everything forgotten, everything, as is said, pushed to one side, everything [ellipsis: "moved"?] from one side to the other without being heard.' The parallelism includes not only repetition of the word 'everything' or *q'ala* but also in the suffixes on the verbs *arma.nuku.ta . . nukhu.nuku.ta*. Like *-xata* 'above,' *-nuku* is a class one derivational verb suffix that, according to Hardman "indicates action away from the subject without any particular direction. Occasionally [and I would argue here is a prime example of this] the action is away from the intention of the subject" (83). Given this connotation a more precise (but less accurate) translation--by this I mean something closer to how the meaning would be understood by a native speaker--would be something like "everything made to be forgotten, everything pushed out of our control, everything favoring their side with us not being heard."

One can guess, then, from these two examples that the parallelism in its concision, in its ability to articulate the power imbalance, and in its stylistic excellence is likely to make for a strong and convincing critique.

The next instance of parallelism in line 129 comes at the climax of the speech or the key point in the talk, in which Mr. Carvajal transitions from discussing the problem to proposing a solution. The solution, Mr. Carvajal will suggest, is to take political power through the vote. This idea seems a Western one, and as such would seem to undermine earlier comments Mr. Carvajal has made about nothing good coming out of Europe. However, Mr. Carvajal is able to fend off this possible critique by couching his solution in the terminology of the Aymara worldview. This was the critical blunder that the Aguas del Illimani advertisement made* that Mr. Carvajal avoids: it is not simply enough to translate foreign ideas into the native language and present them--they need to be addressed in ways that defer to the local and culturally specific.

So it is here that Mr. Carvajal brings up the idea of *Pachakuti* (line 129). The term as it is described in Layme (translated from Spanish): "Pacha: time, space. Kuti: return, cycle. Return of time. Change of time. Revolution"(207). The term is significant in a number of ways. In the Aymara worldview, the past is actually in front--the Aymara see forward into the past--and the future is behind their backs (Nuñez). Because this concept is grammaticalized in Aymara, Hardman considers this point so important that she includes it as one of her linguistic postulates for the Aymara language. Hardman (2001) asserts: "Time is

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* This is a reference to chapter two of the dissertation.

seen as spatially located: the future is behind one, not yet visible; the present/past is ahead of one, before the eye, visible. Thus the primary tense division is future vs. non-future"(6). Thus an argument based on a viewpoint that is encoded in the bedrock of the grammar is going to be difficult to argue against.

But the use of pachakuti to argue for taking power by voting has a wider context than its reification in the language. Pachakuti is also a pan-Andean idea, possibly a pan-American Indian idea in its scope. A google search of the term brings up 93,900 hits, the first of these being the name of a Peruvian musical group based in Munich (Pachakuti). The broader notion that the idea indexes is that, five hundred years of European domination having passed, Aymara and other indigenous groups will begin to reassert their authority once again. Evidence for this sort of thinking appear in works as removed from Mr. Carvajal as Leslie Marmon Silko's *Almanac of the Dead*, in which Silko sees the movement to the United States by Native Americans from the south as inevitable recolonization. Native Americans, in their closer association with the earth, are posited as the survivors in a world increasingly corrupted and poisoned through technology and environmental degradation.

But Mr. Carvajal has an even more specific and practical political outcome in mind when he refers to *pachakuti*. In Bolivia, *pachakuti* was first associated with the reassertion of traditional sociopolitical authority and land divisions among Aymara and Quechua rural communities in the early 1990's, embodied in the notion of the *ayllu*, or a segment of communally owned land managed

through the *mallku* or *jilaqata*, the traditional Aymara leaders. These traditional structures re-emerged, from the point of view of Bolivian elites, with surprising robustness in 1993. Choque and Mamani write:

> With colonial imposition, the Ayllu authorities had to act as intermediaries between the local indigenous society of the ayllu-village and the colonial power. With [Bolivian] independence this function began to deteriorate until the state did not recognize them, and state corruption in the hands of the cacique converted the [indigenous] authorities into their auxiliaries and even servants. This view was used commonly by the leaders of the campesino unions that saw in the indigenous authorities the representation of a past of servitude and dependence [to argue against the reinstatement of the ayllu]. With the reconstitution [of the ayllu], the roles changed and the relations also; the altiplano lives the return of the ayllu, that in proper terms is understood as Pachakuti, a new configuration of *pacha* (time and space). The return to its own authority constitutes an act of self-determination, the community reinstating its own government (212 My translation).

It is ironic that Choque and Mamani refer to a "new configuration of time and space," when the whole point of *pachakuti* is the cyclical return of a form that existed before. In any event, Mr. Carvajal, giving this interview as he does in 1996 is referring, in using the term *pachakuti*, not just to future events where he

hopes Aymara will take power in the government of the Bolivian state, but also to the recent past, where Aymara leaders in rural areas have *already* reinstated their traditional form of government that had existed prior to the European conquest. It is in this context, then that Mr. Carvajal says in incantatory fashion: *Tiempo y espacio, tiempo y espacio uka pachaxa kutt'aniniw saski janiti pachakuti u kutipacha kutt'aniniw uka pachax*. The parallelism moves from Spanish to Aymara, but is then broken up by "is it not being said" *saski janiti* and a reversal of *pachakuti* to *kutipacha*, a morphological chiasmus, to further emphasize the point. The verb *kut.t'a.ni.ni.w* is interesting in itself. The verb *kutiña* means to return, but added onto it, again, is a derivational class one suffix, this time *-t'a*, which Hardman calls a "momentaneous." This is combined with *-ni*, the proximator, giving the sense of the return momentarily coming close, thus giving a sense of drama to the verb and suggesting the change is imminent.

The final examples of parallelism follow right after the instance analyzed above. Lines 131-133 act as a refrain, summarizing the previous critiques: "everything broken apart, everyone enslaved, all our eyes sold, with the evangelism our eyes sold, our hands, bound, our feet tied and again in lines 135-136: "our hands tied, our feet bound, our eyes sold . . ." It is after these refrains that Mr. Carvajal makes the move from the general idea of *pachakuti* to its concrete enactment. In lines 138-139 Mr. Carvajal says, "So then from there we are thinking now is the time that once and for all we will enter the elections." I will come back to the specifics of the suffixes on this particular line in the discussion of sentence suffixes below, but at this point, to me the most interesting

development in the argument is the shift from the first person to the fourth--Mr. Carvajal is comfortable in claiming the strategy of getting involved in national elections as one reaching consensus within the Aymara community--in other words, *our* strategy rather than *my* strategy. In this way, Mr. Carvajal claims a role as spokesperson for the community: this is not his own independent conclusion but what the community is saying. The outcome of these initial suggestions, made ten years ago, would seem to be the 2005 election of Evo Morales, the first Aymara President of Bolivia.

The cases of polyptoton in the text involve class one derivational suffixes in only one case, but in all cases they involve morphological play, and so I analyze them under this category. Their deployment indicates rhetorical purpose as is the case with the examples given above.

Scholars define polyptoton in a variety of ways, but for my purposes, I am using Arthur Quinn's definition in *The Figures of Speech: Sixty Ways to Turn a Phrase.* According to Quinn, polyptoton is "Repetition of the same word or root in different grammatical functions or forms: 'Few men speak humbly of humility'"(103). Aymara already being a multiple suffixing language suggests that polyptoton is probably not as marked a construction as it is in English, but there is evidence that it is employed for artful purposes. For instance in Huanca's *El Yatiri en la Comunidad Aymara,* he gives the following example that describes part of the process an Aymara goes through in becoming a *yatiri*, a medicine man or woman:

jakta.s.kan.i.w They will be returning to life

jakt.xa.ni.w They will have returned to life

jakt.ipan When they will have returned to life (61).

Although it is not completely clear from the context, it appears that this is a saying used to describe the process an initiate goes through after being hit by lightning and returning to what will be a new life as a *yatiri*. The point I want to make by referring to it is that the saying is expressed by way of a polyptoton. The root *jakta-* is repeated with different suffixes as the basis for the description.

In Mr. Carvajal's speech, the first instance of polyptoton is in line 39. I feel justified in calling it such, not merely because of alternation of suffixes on the roots, but also because it is clear from the context that the usage is a stylistic choice--he did not need to say it the way he does but chooses to do so; the polyptoton is effective in emphasizing the point: "from last toward last with less, toward last with less, toward last it has gone," or to repeat the line in Aymara: *quipa.t quipa.ru juk'a.mp quipa.ru juk'a.mp quipa.ru.y sara.x.chi . . . jicha.x*. On the root 'last' or *quipa-* two directionals suggesting opposite directions or circularity are alternately added, *-ta* meaning 'from, away' and *-ru* signifying 'toward' (Hardman 148-151). Overall the impression is that the retarded progress comes from every direction. The repetition of *juk'a.mp*, literally 'with less' is also interesting as it suggests that at every turn there is less available, fewer resources, less human capital, the result of implementing unfair and flawed legislation. The suffix *-chi*, which Hardman refers to as "the non-involver," (110-

111) indicates that Mr. Carvajal takes the view that the Aymara are not involved or personally responsible for this sorry state.

Line seventy-two is a deft use of polyptoton in which the *second* instantiation comments and critiques the first. The first half of the pair indexes the desire of elites to convert the Aymara, while the second half critiques the attempt. In terms of just what sort of conversion Mr. Carvajal refers to, there seem to be at least two intertwined senses. One is clearly the ordinary sort of religious conversion that the colonizers brought with them. Further in the text, Mr. Carvajal responds directly to this religious conversion and its effects.

But here the source from which the notion of conversion comes from indexes the power dynamic established under the nominally defunct hacienda system. Lyons in an article entitled "Discipline and the Arts of Domination: Rituals of Respect in Chimborazo, Ecuador," explains this dynamic in detail in the context of Ecuador and a local ritual called *pascuanchina.* The festival, which involves ritualized whipping during Holy Week, is one in which Lyons argues notions of morality and respect--already powerful values among the Quechua before conquest--are exploited to legitimate the social order and the right of hacienda landlords to demand and exact work from tenants. As Lyons puts it:

> . . . moral regulation on Ecuadorian haciendas constructed and reproduced identities and relationships of gender, age, and class along with a moral language of respect (*respeto*) infusing all these relationships. Notions of respect both legitimated hierarchy and provided, in

> Roseberry's phrase, a 'language of contention.' . . . . [The respect complex] was not simply a set of ideas but a domain of mutually constituting meanings, practices, and relationships. In other words, ways of thinking about respect, society, and the cosmos were tied to linguistic, disciplinary, and religious practices that expressed and reproduced those conceptions. Moreover, the defined the hierarchical relationships that structured these practices (100-101).

Lyon's contention powerfully asserts that the colonists inserted their own claims to legitimacy and right to exercise power in viral form--finding a vulnerable culture value and exploiting it. It seems to resonate here with how Mr. Carvajal chooses to position the colonizers and their descendants as others completely outside the system of Aymara values, as a way of responding to this insidious and deeply entrenched dynamic. Thus he refers to the Aymara and Bolivian elites as "water and oil," something you can shake together, convert into an emulsion, but that according to their natures and over time will separate once more. Then this oil and water analogy is matched by the polyptoton, one half of which expresses the coercive desire of the colonizers, the other that expresses the Aymara response: *jay ukhamakaspas ukhamakchixay*. The root that forms the basis for the word *ukhama*, is, according to Hardman, a lexicalized version of *uk* + *jama*, literally 'like that.' In line 72, this root is reverbalized with *-ka* turning it into a semi verb. This is important since *ukhama* cannot, as far as I understand the grammar, become a full verb and be fully inflected. Thus the reference to the

Aymara or the elites is referred to only through ellipsis. Nevertheless, the turn that represents the power of the polyptoton comes with the two third-person verbal inflectional endings. The first, with *-spa* is of the desiderative aspect. This is the one referring to what the Bolivian elites would like; the second, I argue, is the Aymara response, the third person non-involver *-chi*, indicating unwillingness to go along with the desire, to simply cut oneself out of the dynamic altogether. Thus, an, again imprecise but accurate translation, starting some lines above would be: "and in the middle of them, they would civilize us, that's what they want then, so this mixing oil with water in one it would convert us [first half of the polyptoton:] like that [they] want it [second half:] like that [we] are not involved."

This polyptoton is followed after one intervening intonation unit by two more polyptotons that re-emphasize the analogy that the Aymara and European descendants do not mix:

74 | Aceiti.s aceiti.ki.puni.ni.w
Oil and oil just indeed add SS
And oil, oil is indeed just oil,

75 | uma.s uma.ki.puni.n jani ch'alun.ta.s.ka.ni.ti.x
and water water just indeed add never mix up CONT ASP 3>3F NEG SS
and water, water is indeed just water. They are never going to mix.

As pointed out above, the sharp cultural separation Mr. Carvajal proposes with this analogy is the antidote for colonialism. If there is no hybridity, no hacienda landlord able to exploit or modify Aymara cultural norms to coerce obedience and labor, then the Aymara are free to govern themselves.

The final example of a polyptoton I am going to discuss is complex, and frankly, beyond my skills in the language to say much about. The root of 'to do' is repeated four times in various forms in two intonation units. To my eyes, it appears a display of virtuosic skill in using the language. Essentially, the rhetorical intent of it seems to be to say, "we are going to vote, and we do not care what they do--they can all go to hell." The way Mr. Carvajal puts this, however, carries the same sentiment but with a great deal more urbanity and restraint. I include lines prior to the polyptoton to give more of the context of the polyptoton:

138	Entons jay uka.ru.pi jicha.x nanaka.x amta.si.p.k.t[an].xa Then INT this→EXC now SS they SS propose REF PL ASP 4<3S SS So from here now we are proposing uka.t ukhama.ru jicha.x aka that of like that→ now SS here Thus
139	Eleccion.[n]aka.ru.s manta.ñani sasin ma.pi.t entons Election PL → SS enter 4<3F say SUB one EXC of then To enter the elections saying once and for all then Jupa.naka.xa puede.p.x.chi They PL SS can PL regress* NI They can
140	Kun kun <u>lura.</u>si.s.ka.ñ.sa <u>lura.</u>si.si.p.pana.y What what do REC CONT INC >N SUB do REC CONT PL imitate SS do what they like, that they do what they do jupa.naka.x uka <u>lura.</u>wi.naka.pa.ru.x They PL SS that do >N PL 3pos → SS Toward their works [one should show]

* Hardman refers to the -*ʿxa* as a completive or regressive, and notes that it "is usually translated 'back'"(90). In this context, the idea of completed action does not make sense in the context as it is referring to future action. However, in terms of elites resorting to all their old tricks, it makes perfect sense.

141 Rispitañay ukhama.tak lura.ta.pacha.y jupa.naka.x
Respect >N SS that like BEN do >N self SS s/he Pl SS
Respect. For the benefit of their own deeds such are they.

Rhetorical Use of Sentence Suffixes

Sentence suffixes are essential for effective language use in Aymara. Not only do they convey subtleties in the meaning, but they also index data source, and so provide important tags for building credible claims. Hardman also notes that "An important part of skill in style and rhetoric, of excellence in public oratory and in personal persuasion, lies in the mastery of the nuances of the permutations [of sentence suffixes], affecting more than one sentence suffix at a time; that is, playing with complex frames of sentence suffixes and effecting interlocking permutations simultaneously" (208).

Having described their importance, however, one also must contend with the difficulty in pinning them down. They are among the slipperiest of categories when it comes to translation. To quote Hardman once more:

> Sentence suffixes are syntactically obligatory. In effect, sentences are inflected in Aymara. . . . The sentence suffixes are extraordinarily hard to translate, there being no comparable categories in Indo-European languages. More often than not, where a translation is possible, it will be with intonation rather than with some segmental form. Therefore, translation in general does not reflect the sentence suffix (170).

An equivalent in English of the effect Hardman is referring to is *repotia*, a figure of speech in which a word, phrase, or clause is repeated a second time, often verbatim, but with a move in the stress so that the meaning shifts accordingly. For instance, if I say, "I'd like to live in Oregon, but then I'd have to live in Oregon," a skilled reader will know to stress "Óregon," the second time it comes around (and probably imagine the writer rolling his eyes too), and will understand that the second sense of Oregon implies something very different from the first. One must not forget that the *repotia* is first and foremost an oral figure in English, and the relative rarity of them in written texts is probably partly because of the burden of interpretation it puts on the reader. In Aymara, a sentence suffix would flag the different sense in which the second meaning of Oregon is to be understood. One can see, then, that interpretation in such cases in Aymara is dependent on context. While some have argued that interpretation is always dependent on context (Hirsch), the distinction is an important one here as it departs from what a linguistic or grammar of Aymara can provide.

A good example of this is the sentence suffix *-sa* that parallels in some of its uses the word 'and' in English. Multiple iterations of *and* in English between words, phrases, or clauses are referred to as *polysyndeton*, their absence *asyndeton*. Apart from affecting the rhythm, these two figures create, respectively, a sense of greater connectedness among items or its reverse, in addition to innumerable context-dependent effects apparent in the given case. Signaling connection, polysyndeton is a resource for directing the reader's attention toward

relatedness. Likewise, in the example below, *-sa* seems to be doing some of this same work. The sentence suffix *-sa* is listed as having a number of functions (Hardman 176-178). The one I focus on in the example below is in its use as "lister" or "aggregator," a function it performs both for words and for clauses. In Mr. Carvajal's speech, he uses *-sa* within one of his instances of parallelism, but he uses it in alternation, first to list the nouns, and then further down to list the verbs. The verbs have been nominalized, but the point seems to be that by adding the *-sa*, similar to the effect of an added stress in a *repotia* in English, Mr. Carvajal directs the interlocutor's attention to consider the listed item in its full significance. At the same time, sharing as it does, a similar function with polysyndeton, it seems to suggest linking the list first of nouns and then later on of the verbs.

131 q'ala t'unja.ta q'ala isclavisata q'ala na- ah
everything break-up >N everything enslave >N everything
everything broken up, everyone enslaved, everything

nayra.s venda- ve- q'ala venda.nta.ta
Eye **list** sell everything sell INC >N
our eyes sold, everything sold

132 isti.mpi.x ah evangelismu=mpix
this with SS ah Evangelism with
with this Evangelism

nayra.x liju ve- venda.nta.ta ampara.s ñach'a.nta.t
Eye SS everything sell INC >N hand **list** bind INC >N
our eyes sold, our hands tied

133 kayu.s ñach'a.nta.t jay
feet **list** bind INC >N INT
our feet bound

ukhama.y kida.s.tan.x uh isti.naka.x naciones
like this SS stay CONT 4>3S SS this PL SS nations

like this our nations have stayed.

134 Indigena.naka.x entonces jicha.x pero pacha kut
native PL SS so now SS but time space
So now the time will return for indigenous peoples

si.s.x.i.xa si.s.ka.spa.s*
say CONT ASP 3>3S SS say CONT ASP 3>3D SS
It is said as has been said

135 Pacha.x kutt'a.ni.ni.wa juma.naka.taki.xa
time SS return PROX 3>3F SS you Pl BEN SS
the time will return for you all

ukja.xa am- ampar ñach'a.nta.t.s kayu
when SS hand bind INC >N **list** foot
in that lapse our hands tied our feet

136 ñach'a.nta.t.s nayra venda.nta.t.s sara.q.xa.ni.w
Bind INC >N **list** eye sell INC >N **list** go down COM 3>3F SS
bound, our eyes sold, they're going to go down

si.s.ka.spa.s jay ukhama.x.chi.xayᵠ
say CONT ASP 3>3D SS INT that like ASP NI SS
as is said, so it is, then.

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* This instance of *-sa* is probably not functioning as a "lister," but as an "indefinator," intensifying the suppositional aspect of the desiderative inflection.

The role of the verb 'to say' in Aymara is involved and varied. The above example is probably a case of "nesting" with *saña* (see Briggs 296-304), in which the first instance of the 'say' verb refers to community discourse about *pachakuti* (referring to comments made earlier in the text), and the second instance indexes Mr. Carvajal's discourse more directly--how he adapts this discourse to this particular argument.

I was not able to clarify these points with my translator. His gloss of this section of text was "ha dicho como si dijera," but since he speaks the Aymarized version of Spanish the move from the present perfect to subjunctive probably encodes data source.

ᵠ The demonstrative *ukhama* is probably verbalized through vocalic lengthening. The Aymara speaker I trained to transcribe the recording for me did not have an ear for vocalic lengthening--lengthening is phonemic in Aymara--and their absence is apparent throughout the text.

One can observe, then, in lines 131 through 133, the suffix *-sa* following one another on the nouns "eye," "hand," and "foot," pointing to the subjugation of both mind and body. Further down, though, *-sa* attaches to the nominalized verbs, "bound" and "sold." The subtle variation in the repetition, then, moves emphasis from the victim to the victimizer and works nicely to lead to line 138 where Mr. Carvajal says what the community plans to do about it.

Another example with sentence suffixes demonstrates how a skilled speaker can use them to capitalize on the assent of the audience and thereby build a stronger case. Mr. Carvajal suggests that Western pleasures--he is not specific, but one can imagine--are not good for Aymara. In line 34 Mr. Carvajal, following up on this statement says *jani walikaniti<u>x</u>*, something like 'that cannot be good.' The underlined *<u>-x</u>* has actually lost its vowel for morphological reasons, but in any case, this is the sentence suffix *-xa*. According to Hardman, *-xa* functions as an attenuator, or acts as a weak asserter of the statement (Hardman 171). So by putting *-xa* on the end of this statement, Mr. Carvajal is making his claim relatively weak.

But then in the next intonation unit (line 35), Mr. Carvajal follows this up with *ukhama.<u>xaya</u>* or 'like that, or is it not?' *-xaya* is not an interrogative sentence suffix, but it carries something of the same force, and prompts Joaquin Saenz to respond in the affirmative (line 36). Once Mr. Carvajal gains Joaquin's consent, he follows this up with the emphatic form of his earlier claim: *Janiw walikiti* or 'This is definitely not good.' The *-w[a]* suffix is absolute (171). So to recap the progression, in the first instance, Mr. Carvajal makes his assertion tentatively

with –*xa*, but then, once he has gained Joaquin's assent, he restates the assertion, this time much more emphatically, switching to the –*wa*. Note here also how the suffix moves from *wali* 'great' to *jani* 'no,' and how wali has been shorn of all but the essential morphemes to emphasize the point.

Rhetorical Use of Independent suffixes

Independent suffixes share morphological slot characteristics with one another but less in terms of rhetorical effect, so I will treat each of the four separately. Similar difficulties in translation that apply to sentence suffixes apply to the independent suffixes. As Hardman notes in her introduction to the independent suffixes:

> Independent suffixes are suffixes that occur independently of any morphological class. They act on the word in which they occur and/or on the syntactic unit and/or on the sentence. They may co-act with sentence suffixes in some types of sentence. Overall they are extraordinarily difficult to translate; in English similar semantic categories are most frequently carried in intonation patterns (162).

The independent suffix that appears least in the text is -*jama*. The two instances are not enough to say much about, but it is interesting that in both cases, Mr. Carvajal uses the suffixes when comparing the actions or thinking of Bolivian elites to the Aymara. While emphasizing the differences in motive and

orientation, Mr. Carvajal is quick to discipline the hearer against the dangers or reacting in ways that would turn any sort of political victory into a social disaster, and also in this way reinforcing his ethical appeal and by synecdoche, the larger Aymara community. Near the beginning of the text Mr. Carvajal says:

6 | Jani= jupa.naka.n amuyu.p.jama.k.tan.ti.x
NEG s/he PL POS reason 3POS like ASP 4>3 NEG SS
Our thinking is not like theirs.

And then at the end:

148 | Jall uka.naka.k jiwasa.x apnaqa.si.ñan
INT this PL just we SS Dominate REC 4>3F
In just these ways we are going to manage ourselves

uka.mpi jani.w sis.ka.ñani.t jupa.nak.jama.xa
this with NEG SS say INC 4>3F NEG s/he PL like SS
and we will not speak as they do

149 | Ah ni kuna jupa.naka.r uñis.nuku.ña ni
ah not what s/he PL → hate away >N nor
nor show hatred toward them nor

sar.xam aka.t sa.si.ña ni kuna sino uka
go 2>3I here from say SUB >N not what but rather this
say to them leave here, nor anything of the sort.

Hardman (165) calls the independent suffix *-ki* a "limitative . . . usually translating 'just,' 'only'; it is directly equivalent to the Andean Spanish *nomás.* In Mr. Carvajal's text, it follows this neutral pattern in the majority of cases: lines 25, 29, 30, 74, 75, and 112. However, in one instance, it intensifies a sense of disgust. In this case, the independent sentence suffix *–ki* interacts with the sentence suffixes *–xa* and *–ya* to disparage Bolivians who drafted and put into effect Bolivia's first political constitution in 1825. I may be taking too much liberty with my insertion of “measly” into the text, but it conveys the force of Mr. Carvajal's assertion at that point:

52 | Isti criollo.ki.xa.y
These mixed-blood just SS SS
[a few] measly mestizos . . .

-ki also interacts with another independent suffix *-puni* to emphasize boundaries. *-puni*, which Hardman refers to as an "emphatic" (164) strengthens the notion of separation of oil and water:

73 | entons . . . nunca jani.puni.xa.y
So never NEG indeed SS SS
So never NEVER

74 | aceiti.s aceiti.ki.puni.ni.w
oil and oil just indeed add SS
and oil, oil is indeed just oil,

75 | uma.s uma.ki.puni.n jani ch'alun.ta.s.ka.ni.ti.x
and water water just indeed add never mix up CONT ASP 3>3F NEG SS
and water, water is indeed just water. They are never going to mix.

Also worth noting in this example is how in line 73, where *-ki* is absent, Mr. Carvajal combines *-puni* with *-xa.y[a],* the same combination of sentence suffixes that sharpened the sense of *-ki* in line 52 above.

The one independent suffix that in the case of Mr. Carvajal ratchets-up the emotional force of a sentence, or more specifically, of a sense of moral outrage, is *-raki*. When it appears, Mr. Carvajal seems to be asking, "Do you smell the rat? I do." Its meaning, however, is unstable. Hardman describes this suffix in its neutral instantiations translating as 'also.' An example of this in the text is line 125. Of its more colorful uses, Hardman writes that *-raki* is "frequently employed when the speaker wishes to give a negative cast to the sentence, especially in combination with other sentence suffixes. Specific uses . . . are: lamentator, cautionary, protestational, and challenger/provocateur"(166).

A confirmation of Hardman's observations are in line 96, where *-raki* acts as a protestor on the word *nation*: "They have made a state appear without a nation." This then becomes the premise for the *-raki*-embellished chiasmus in lines 108-109 below: the state does not have a nation; our nation does not-rak have a state." The protesting function seems to be the same, but the movement of *-raki* from nation to the negative *jani* emphasizes the point, that the Aymara may live mainly in Bolivia, but that does not imply citizenship. This argument, essentially that indigenous Bolivians through years of a sense of divested citizenship are motivated to civic action, is confirmed and supported by Postero. Indeed, it is the main point of her essay.

The sense of *-raki* as progressing along a spectrum from irony to protest to moral outrage, is clear in the examples below. In line 112, Mr. Carvajal uses *-raki* to capture Sánchez de Lozada's political sleight-of-hand in repositioning structural adjustment reforms in ways to make them more palatable to indigenous Bolivians:

112	Uka.t jicha.x aka= mara.naka.ki.w uñsta.ya.p.xa.raki That from now SS here year PL just SS appear CAUS PL COM 'heads up' From that now this year they have made appear
113	Bolivia.xa= kamsa.p.x.i.sa= Bolivia SS what say PL COM 3>3S SS What do they say about Bolivia
114	Boliviaxa . . . pluricultura=l sa.p.x.i.ti Bolivia SS multicultural say PL COMP 3>3S NEG Do not they say multicultural Bolivia
115	J-- jisa jisa Yes, yes
116	A-- No se ven. It does not exist.

The use of *-raki* on the verb, 'to appear,' made almost humorous with the addition of a causative that gives the sense of pulling a rabbit out of a hat, alerts the listener to pay attention. After setting up this critique, line 116 has the feel of a punch line.

Also notable in this example--to position the idea of "multicultural Bolivia" for critique--is the use of the verb *kamsaña* in line 113, literally 'what say' or 'what is said' that refers to ideas known through language rather than known through personal experience (Hardman 51). Mr. Carvajal is saying he has no personal experience of this "multicultural Bolivia," in spite of his being Aymara himself, just the sort of person Sánchez de Lozada's government would have hoped to feel more included by the terminology. But Mr. Carvajal rejects the ruse. This use of the *kamsaña* with *-raki* contrasts sharply with his usage later on in the text with *kamchaña* in line 130. Compare this, for instance with another usage of *-raki* in line 130, where, in contrast to *kamsaña* Hardman uses these two

verbs to illustrate one of the language postulates of Aymara, that Aymara grammaticalizes knowledge gained through personal experience versus knowledge gained through language. When attached to *kamachaña*, the *-raki* loses the irony it carries with *kamsaña* and instead intensifies the idea of desperation:

130 | pacha.x entonces phisqa patak mara.xay
period SS so five hundred year SS
So five hundred years

ya.st pas.x.i.w kamacha.raki.ñani
Already and pass COMP 3>3S SS what do possibly 4>3F
have already passed. What can we possibly do?

The sense of moral outrage is especially evident in the following example, in which Mr. Carvajal touches on the notion of illicit drug use in relation to Bolivian elites. This topic is among the most sensitive in Bolivian politics. The Aymara view coca as a sacred plant, and they see its refinement into cocaine and the use of cocaine as an abuse of the plant, plain evidence of corruption (Goldstein 161). Added to that, the United States, in its efforts to stem the flow of cocaine to U.S. markets, has been waging what Postero refers to as a "low intensity war" that has led to human rights abuses and deaths in the Chapare region of Bolivia among Aymara farmers among others (76). This combination of reports of violence at the hands of the DEA and reports of debauchery, prostitution, and cocaine snorting in the upper-class *whiskerías* or bars of La Paz underlies Mr. Carvajal's comments in questioning the motives of Bolivian elites:

140 | jupa.naka.x uka lura.wi.naka.pa.ru.x
They PL SS that do >N PL their → SS
Toward their works [one should show]

141 Rispitañay ukhama.tak lura.ta.pacha.y jupa.naka.x
Respect >N SS that like BEN do >N oneself SS s/he PL SS
Respect. For the benefit of their own deeds such are they.

142 Ukhama.tak unañcha.ta.pacha.y
That like BEN direct RES oneself SS
That's what their goal is.

143 Juma.naka.x jupa.naka.x kuna drog.nak.s kun.s jupa.naka
You PL SS s/he PL SS what drug PL ? what ? s/he PL
You all -- what drugs do they

144 Lura.si.si.p.ki lura.si.si.p.pana.y
Do REC CONT PL LIM do RECIP CONT PL imitate SS
continue taking among themselves?

kamacha.raki.ni Jupa.naka.taki.pacha.y uka.x no es cierto?
What do outrage 3>3F s/he PL BEN oneself SS this SS no is certain
What are they up to? For their own benefit, it must be that. Is not that right?

Notable here too is how *-raki* is attached to the verb *kamachaña* The *-raki* that comes at the end of this section seems to concentrate the sense of outrage developed in these five intonation units in the speech.

CONCLUSION

Rhetoric and Development

Given how rhetoric saturates discourse in the West, the lack of serious attention that has been paid to it in non-Western cultures should raise eyebrows. Perhaps confusing rhetoric with genre and forgetting the importance of content or fearing the imposition Western hegemonic ideas onto foreign cultures has prevented rhetoric from being more carefully considered outside the West. But whatever the reasons may be, the absence of attention to it has been a serious omission. In effect, ignoring rhetoric reinforces colonialist ideas that non-Western cultures are primitive and ill-equipped to manage their affairs. In such circumstances, it may be assumed global capitalism does well to teach them the lessons that they have not learned from their own cultures.

The World Bank and others who call themselves "development professionals" have invented an array of techniques for the design and evaluation of development programs. And where understanding and using local rhetorical practices should be fundamental to planning the success of projects, little if any awareness of even the *possibility* of distinctive rhetorical practices has been the rule. For instance in the World Bank Publication, *Monitoring and Evaluating Social Programs in Developing Countries*, a five-hundred page compendium on the subject of measuring the success of development projects, there is not a single mention of communication, much less rhetoric, in the index. Evaluative techniques include such approaches as surveying and interviewing, but these instruments miss the point. The closest their evaluative techniques get

to mentioning dialogue of any sort is in their section on qualitative research where learning the local language is mentioned. Valadez and Bamberger, while noting that World Bank economists and sociologists depend on quantitative analysis to see if their programs are successful, also bravely point out that "The fullest condition of participating in the mind of another human being is face-to-face interaction. Face-to-faceness has the irreplaceable character of nonreflectivity and immediacy that furnishes the fullest possibility of truly entering the life, mind, and definitions of the other as this other conceives it" (330-31). What is remarkable about this quote is the presumption of transparency it supposes. For myself, I do not have much certainty of *truly* entering the mind of even my friends, much less someone I hardly know. If this study accomplishes anything, I hope it would be to complicate this overly simplistic view of the Other as readable to the post colonialist developer, if he or she should deign to talk face-to-face.

To be fair to the World Bank, it has partly tried to compensate for the vast problems of communication it has suffered (many of these--as recent history shows-- being internal as well as external) by hiring local staff to implement programs. The idea behind this is that the hires would be tacitly familiar with local practices including rhetorical ones. This approach has two problems. The first of these is that this practice does not explicitly address the issue of how communication and dialogue should form the basis of any development project rather than be an extra feature that might help ensure success. The second inadequacy of this approach is that if the local hires are from the upper classes

when the programs are for the poor, or if the local hires are from urban areas where programs are for rural areas, or if local hires are from one subculture when the program is for another, little has been solved. My own experience in Bolivia taught me that upper class Bolivians had little knowledge of Aymara language or culture even when they had grown up with Aymara maids working in their houses since they were children. Closer to home, how many of us know much about the lives of the gardeners who flock to our suburban areas to tend our lawns, tennis courts, and swimming pools?

Aymara Rhetoric

Before I began my fieldwork, I had envisioned writing an equivalent text to Aristotle's *Rhetoric,* with the subject being Aymara rhetoric rather than that of ancient Greece. I had wanted sections that dealt with argumentation, with lines of argument, with descriptions of situations where rhetoric occurs or occasions for its use. I had wanted guidelines for arrangement, style, and delivery. What, I wondered, would effective ethos be for Aymara speakers. What sorts of emotional arguments would be effective? What values persist in Aymara communities?

This study falls far short of that goal: instead of uncovering principles as Aristotle did, I have but a few examples. These examples are suggestive, not definitive. Furthermore, in attempting to study Aymara rhetoric, I became conscious that cultural bias was probably interfering more than helping me to understand the rhetoric going on around me. I began to wonder whether in

looking for Aristotle's categories I was missing more than were I to ignore his typology altogether. In observing the people around me, I did not see argument performing the role I was used to encountering in my own culture. There was an impassivity in the face of argument I could not fathom. Likewise I discovered that the experts in the problem of cultural bias, the anthropologists, in spite of sharing the same preoccupation, had allowed their terministic screens--Burke's phrase for describing how cultural bias works through language--to conflate rhetoric with genre. As a result, rhetoric in cross-cultural context became invisible behind the study of oratory and speech genres as form that was supposed to embody it. I learned that oratory, instead of being the rich site for exploring rhetoric in cross-cultural context, had becomes the means of obfuscation of its presence. There were some notable exceptions--the work of Rosaldo and Duranti--but these were not sufficient to buck the trend.

In spite of these difficulties in the library and in the field, not to mention my limited competence and access to the Aymara community, a few tentative claims can be ventured about Aymara rhetoric or at least directions to focus attention for further research. One thing that can be said is that whatever Aymara rhetoric may be, it has been and continues to be effective. In the more than five hundred years since they were colonized, the Aymara have shown themselves to be themselves to be politically astute, able to use language effectively to pursue their interests to the extent that, given unequal relations of power, this was possible. The historical record shows that the Aymara employed collaborative practices among themselves to develop consensus and

crafted careful negotiation with outsider elites to protect their communities and seek repatriation to the extent that such negotiation was possible. This consistent focus over such a long history has led them to their current status in which the Aymara Evo Morales has become president of Bolivia. The anthropologist Denise Arnold commented to me after the municipal water district became privatized that the people in El Alto were powerful, much more so than the French privatizers imagined, she guessed. Was it this backbone of tradition and commitment to developing common understandings among themselves that made it so? Perhaps in part.

Other details of Aymara ideology or worldview from the historical record are tantalizing and bear more specific attention in relation to rhetoric. The Aymara have viewed and continue to view men and women as equal. Although the imposition of Spanish ideologies gradually displaced women from positions of political power, the Aymara language itself resists this bias, though this is no guarantee. And I am interested to explore how arguments work differently when they are not governed as fully by indexing patriarchal power structures. Another interesting avenue worth exploring is the idea of reciprocity that structured ancient social relations may well have correlates in discourse and argument. How are arguments, for instance, structured reciprocally or as trade-offs? Certainly this is a question worthy of additional explanation. Related to the idea of reciprocity is also the dialectical engagement with dualisms in balancing political power among communities, an alternate approach to power sharing that may have its effects on rhetoric. Finally, the view of the material

world and spiritual worlds as interpenetrating, or seeing the animate in the inanimate, may partly explain what Hardman calls "thematics. " Thematics is the property of noun or verb roots in the Aymara language to switch back and forth from nouns to verbs and back again. More rhetorical study of Aymara may reveal this as another linguistic postulate of the language in addition to its rhetorical possibilities.

From my own fieldwork, a number of additional tentative claims about Aymara rhetoric may perhaps be ventured. Rubén Carvajal shows in his short testimonial an acute awareness of history. This makes sense given the Aymara view that they are literally looking into history as they move forward through time. If one thinks about it, this view is also corroborated by the idea of thematics: the present that we view is but the accretion of the past. Past actions leave the things of the present as their trace. When we look at what is around us, we are looking at the accumulation of our material histories. For a culture that has internalized this notion, arguments about the present apply to the past and vice versa. This may also explain why the water company Aguas del Illimani's claims to the water sounded hollow--they did not have a local past to draw on, and so the act of fabricating a tradition sounded mendacious.

Rubén Carvajal's speech also shows a number of characteristics that may well be generalizable to Aymara rhetoric. These characteristics parallel or match common ideas among rhetoricians about effective communication in the West and can be summed up by George Campbell's observation about clarity or perspicuity, that regardless of the purpose of an act of communication, if it is not

clear, it will not be effective. Mr. Carvajal creates this clarity through organization and style. Claims are organized deductively with evidence following. There is also a recursive quality to this organization that supports and emphasizes the points being made. Style also seems to parallel principles of good diction in English: precise use of suffixes to manage tone and create emotional effects; figures of speech or ornament and metaphor employed to communicate with emphasis and wit.

Studying Comparative Rhetoric

Susan Philips in a recent essay has noted the shift among some linguistic anthropologists from the idea of culture with its notions of worldview and "shared knowledge" and toward that of ideology with its more operationalized contexts of the hegemonic institution, the national identity, or the courtroom. Her explanation for this shift in emphasis is that linguistic anthropology has increasingly become interested in how language use is also an exercise of power and "signals new awareness of and attention to the way in which the salience and prevalence of particular ideas are themselves forms of power" (*Language Ideologies* 213). I also observe that the shift comes from a more precise recognition that cultures is fractured into subcultures, and possibly sub sub sub cultures.

Students of rhetoric should see this move of breaking culture down into the sites of ideology as an invitation to participate. Rhetoric has the potential to provide a theoretical coherency that is now missing in this examination of

language and power. After examining the work on rhetoric in anthropology, I came away with the lesson that in spite of the requirement to distinguish local interpretive practices from my own (the emic/etic distinction), I hinder my efforts by trying to ignore my own tradition. One could hardly find a more sedimented term--meaning one that has accreted layers of subtly different meanings over centuries--than that of rhetoric, and yet in spite of this, there it remains; ignoring it only confuses scholarship about it in other cultural/ideological contexts, but this has become the norm in anthropology. The long history of the use of rhetoric has also been a resource as different historical and cultural groups reinterpreted it to suit their own needs. From the reinterpretations have come observations about how language can be employed for specific effects in particular situations. Knowledge of these effects--and how they are effected--and how the effects form a coherent body--are indispensable to researching how these practices work elsewhere. As such, rhetoric's reinterpretations of its own history are edifying and deserve attention.

At the same time, it should be clear that current methods employed in *comparative rhetoric*--textual and historical analysis--are inadequate for the variety of languages and situations in which rhetoric manifests itself in the diversity of human cultures, many of them primarily oral. The methodology developed in the *ethnography of communication* for analysis of the communicative event offers rhetoricians the best current tools for exploring the field of *comparative rhetoric*--provided the blindness to rhetoric that has characterized its approaches be remedied.

Comparative Rhetoric and Pedagogy

We have something to learn from the rhetorics of non-Western peoples. In the West, the sorts of ideologies and hierarchies we operate from are often cruel and dividing. This should not surprise us given our colonialist history. These ideologies include first and foremost those of capitalism and ownership, but one could go through the list: religious ideologies, race, gender, nationalism, ageism, consumerism. By indexing these in our public and private speech, we transmit and reify differences so that they harden into social realities, the world we live in. It seems to me that some Native American speakers somehow manage to avoid this constant pointing to, and the result is the sort of ethic in speaking that one so often hopes for but so seldom finds. In saying this, I do not wish to infer that I am ignoring the real problems that Native American communities face. Nevertheless, this is something we can learn from and imitate.

Studying our own rhetorical practices critically and with alternate models also offers opportunities to reform our own interactions. Much current work is starting to show the way we make the sorts of claims that divide us are visible in the minutia of speech--in tone of voice, in morphemes, in stress patterns, in turn-taking. One has to capture and examine the subtleties of these processes to see how they work in human interaction, how those vested with power manage it. We can look to the *ethnography of speaking* and *comparative rhetoric* not just as

interesting methods of investigation but as exercises in reflecting more fully on our own imperfect communicative practices.

Another important way *comparative rhetoric* can be of service to pedagogy is in instructing students from non-dominant rhetorical traditions. Currently the rhetorical practices of such students are barely recognized, much less valorized. Work in *comparative rhetoric* can help to do both. Models and examples in rhetorical excellence improve the credibility of any culture. How would we feel about English if there were no Shakespeare or Martin Luther King? By the conscious study of one's own rhetorical tradition and of others, we gain a deeper view of the breadth and scope of human interaction.

APPENDIX ONE: ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

Aymara text is broken into intonation units.

J--	Joaquin Saenz
R--	Rubén Carvajal Huayllas
=	vowel lengthening
. . .	pause
4>3S	fourth person (we) acting on third person, simple tense
3>3S	third person acting on third person, simple tense
2>3I	second person acting on third person imperative
3>3D	third person acting on third person desiderative
4>3F	fourth person acting on third person future
1>3R	first person acting on third person remote
>N	Changes a verb to a noun
>V	Changes a noun to a verb
3pos	third person possessive
ASP	Aspect
BEN	Beneficiary
COM	Completive
CONT	Continuative
EXC	Exclamation
INC	Inceptive
INT	Interjection
LIM	Limiter
MOM	Momentaneous
NEG	Negative
NI	Non-involver
OBL	Obligator
PL	Plural
PROX	Proximator

REC	Reciprocal
REF	Reflexive
RES	Resultant
SS	Sentence Suffix
SUB	Subordinator

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